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Petrostate

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A petrostate, oil state, or petrocracy is a country whose economy is heavily dependent on the extraction and export of oil or natural gas. The presence alone of large oil and gas industries does not define a petrostate: major oil producers that also have diversified economies are not classified as petrostates due to their ability to generate income from various industries and sectors beyond the oil industry.[1] Petrostates also have highly concentrated political and economic power, resting in the hands of an elite, as well as unaccountable political institutions which are susceptible to corruption.[2]

Countries considered to be petrostates

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Map of petrostates as of 2022

Various countries have been identified as current or former petrostates:

Economy

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Petrostates rely on oil as a primary source of income, which can make their economies vulnerable to fluctuations in oil prices. When oil prices are high, they tend to thrive, but they can struggle during periods of low oil prices.

Petrostates are typified by weak economies, where products are more frequently imported than domestically produced. Diversification can successfully occur in limited circumstances, such as Mexico becoming part of the North American Free Trade Agreement, or Dubai leveraging its location to become a hub of commerce and tourism. Most petrostates do not attempt economic diversification, instead seeking economic domination through large, state-owned oil companies.[1]

Governance

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Petrostates are characterised by an extreme abundance of non-tax revenue[15] and typically extremely low or often zero direct taxes. This is because the extremely capital-intensive nature of oil and natural gas extraction means that negotiation between corporations and government is uniquely important to the extraction of these resources,[16] which are, unlike direct taxes, amassed without developing networks with citizens.[17] Petrostates, it is argued, are dependent on their rentier dynamic and could not survive if they lose access to these rents.[11][18]

In addition — and unlike states dependent upon taxation — petrostates are not constrained by economic interests in using military force to resolve disputes with the outside world.[19] This is why petrostates constitute the major source of twenty-first-century armed conflicts.

In some petrostates, leaders and governments may become more authoritarian as they accumulate significant wealth and power through the control of the oil sector. They may use these resources to maintain political control, suppress opposition, and stifle democratic institutions. For example, Steven Fish identifies oil wealth as one of the major reasons for Russia's failed democratization. He explains that revenue from oil exports fueled corruption, and corruption, in turn, hampered Russia's political liberalization. Furthermore, he notes that Britain's and Norway's resource wealth did not lead to authoritarianism because "sturdy democratic regimes" were already in place.[20] Similarly, Michael Ross argues that “the case of Russia since 1998 illustrates how oil revenues can endanger a weak democracy by boosting the popularity of an elected incumbent, who gradually removes checks and balances on their own authority”.[21]

Petrostates run by autocrats are also called petro-dictatorships.[22]

At the same time, in many petrostates, the government invest in social welfare programs, including healthcare, education, and subsidies for essential goods. For example, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Qatar have invested in education, healthcare, and public amenities to improve the quality of life for their citizens.[23][24]

Social impacts

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See also: Dutch disease

The reliance on oil and natural gas may preclude the development of other industries, known as Dutch disease. Light industries, including textiles and clothing, are key factors that drive women to participate in the workforce. Petrostates thus often have lower rates of female workers, which can impede women's access to social and political freedoms.[22]

Resource curse

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See also: Resource curse

Global energy prices can cause turbulent and unpredictable swings in a petrostate's economy. Undiversified reliance on oil and gas industries can cause political and economic crises when the price of oil drops. Over-investment in these industries at the expense of other sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, can hurt economic growth and competitiveness. Petrostates can suffer from the resource curse, meaning that their abundance of natural resources can have detrimental impacts on other parts of the economy, as well as negative social and political impacts.[2][25]

Petrostates, it has been argued, see increasing inequality with increasing wealth, because they do not depend upon the labour of their inhabitants but upon the luck a tiny elite possesses in owning their valuable resources.[10][11] It is also argued that they have no incentives to abide by rules regarding reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, and that consuming states have no ability to control the polluting petrostates.[11]

Environmental and climate concerns

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The extraction and production of oil can have significant environmental and ecological impacts, including pollution, habitat destruction, and greenhouse gas emissions. This can lead to environmental concerns and criticism, both domestically and internationally.

Recent studies challenge the assumption that the transition to sustainable energy will lead to the decline of petrostates, suggesting that their future depends on production costs and social factors.[26][27] Furthermore, the low-carbon transition might provide new export opportunities for petrostates as energy-intensive sectors in developed countries decrease, potentially leading some, particularly in the Middle East, to further specialize in high-carbon sectors.[26]

Since the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Alexander Etkind has suggested that petrostates are engaging in wars because of the existential economic threat decarbonization poses to their rulers’ power and wealth.[10] He also argues that petrostates pay absolutely nothing for the emissions and costs of climate change their oil creates abroad, nor for the emissions produced by burning oil at home.[11] The corporate identity of state-owned oil and gas corporations has also helped insulate petrostates from requirements to restrict fossil fuel production and caused them to attempt to claim that continued fossil fuel production can be decoupled from greenhouse gas emissions.[28] This is in spite of serious impacts of climate change in many extremely rich petrostates:[28] they have tended to avoid playing the victim and to align with other, less affected major polluters even when severely threatened.[29] Russia and other Central Asian petrostates also have begun in recent years to lead a powerful backlash against movements to decarbonise in the European Union.[14]

Cultural narratives

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The presence of a booming oil industry influences a nation's cultural landscape. It may manifest in conspicuous consumption, urban development, and the emergence of specific cultural symbols associated with wealth and status.

The petrostate narrative often becomes intertwined with the national identity.[30][31][32][33][34] The story of an oil-rich nation can influence collective memory and national pride. Cultural narratives might emphasize self-reliance, economic strength, or the role of oil in nation-building.

See also

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References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Ashford, Emma (7 October 2015). "Petrostates in a Changing World". Retrieved 22 June 2020.
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Cara Labrador, Rocio (24 January 2019). "Venezuela: The Rise and Fall of a Petrostate". Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved 22 June 2020.
  3. ^ Hammond, John L. (2011). "The Resource Curse and Oil Revenues in Angola and Venezuela". Science & Society. 75 (3): 348–378. doi:10.1521/siso.2011.75.3.348. JSTOR 41290174.
  4. ^ "Why Baku is backing away from oil dependence". 11 August 2021.
  5. ^ Donath, Klaus-Helge (18 May 2012). "Politische Lage in Aserbaidschan: Petrokratie in Familienbesitz". Die Tageszeitung: Taz.
  6. ^ Darwish, Tamer K.; Mohamed, Abdul Fattaah; Wood, Geoffrey; Singh, Satwinder; Fleming, Jocelyne (2017). "Can HRM alleviate the negative effects of the resource curse on firms? Evidence from Brunei" (PDF). Personnel Review. 46 (8): 1931–1947. doi:10.1108/PR-04-2016-0081. hdl:10072/402179. S2CID 157431894.
  7. ^ Hasan, Qaraman; Heffron, Raphael J.; Mohtadi, Soran; Blankenship, Brian D.; Overland, Indra; Urpelainen, Johannes (July 2024). "Stepping into the just transition journey: The energy transition in petrostates". Energy Research and Social Science. 113.
  8. ^ Bindman, Polly; Ferris, Nick (April 4, 2023). "Inside Norway's efforts to move on from oil and gas". Energy Monitor.
  9. ^ Goldman, Marshall I. (2008). Petrostate: Putin, Power and the New Russia. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0195340730.
  10. ^ a b c Etkind, Alexander (21 April 2023). Russia Against Modernity. Polity. ISBN 978-1509556571.
  11. ^ a b c d e Etkind, Alexander (May 2024). "Oil, climate and war: The curse of the petrostate". CEU Review of Books. Budapest: CEU Press.
  12. ^ Ashford, Emma (June 2022). Oil, the State, and War: The Foreign Policies of Petrostates. Georgetown University Press. pp. 20, 56, 245, 266. ISBN 9781647122393.
  13. ^ Colgan, Jeff (2013). Petro-Aggression: When Oil Causes War. Cambridge University Press. p. 67. ISBN 9781107029675.
  14. ^ a b Skalamera, Morena (25 July 2024). The varying levels of contrasting adaptation in Central Asia’s climate change politics. Central Asian Survey.
  15. ^ Meierding, Emily (July 2022). "Over a Barrel? Oil Busts and Petrostate Stability". Comparative Politics. 54 (4). City University of New York: 671–694.
  16. ^ Karl, Terry Lynn (1999). "The Perils of the Petro-State: Reflections on the Paradox of Plenty". Journal of International Affairs. 53 (1): 31–48.
  17. ^ Weller, Nicholas William. The Causes and Consequences of Tax Policy (PDF) (Thesis). p. 56.
  18. ^ Badie, Dina (2012). Petro-Patrons: Economic Security and the U.S. in the Gulf (Thesis). University of Connecticut.
  19. ^ Kellogg, Anita Renda (2017). "Petrostates and Interstate Conflict". How the Power of Business Affects the Commercial Peace: Commercial Interests, Economic Interdependence, and Militarized Conflict (PDF) (Thesis). University of California, Los Angeles. pp. 51–58.
  20. ^ Fish, M. Steven (2005-08-29). Democracy Derailed in Russia: The Failure of Open Politics. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-1-139-44685-3.
  21. ^ Ross, Michael Lewin (2013). The oil curse: how petroleum wealth shapes the development of nations (1. paperback printing ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press. ISBN 978-0-691-15963-8.
  22. ^ a b Treisman, Daniel (2020). "Economic Development and Democracy: Predispositions and Triggers". Annual Review of Political Science. 23: 241–257. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-050718-043546.
  23. ^ Khoja, Tawfiq; Rawaf, Salman; Qidwai, Waris; Rawaf, David; Nanji, Kashmira; Hamad, Aisha (2017-08-21). "Health Care in Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: A Review of Challenges and Opportunities". Cureus. 9 (8): e1586. doi:10.7759/cureus.1586. ISSN 2168-8184. PMC 5650259. PMID 29062618.
  24. ^ De Jong, Martin; Hoppe, Thomas; Noori, Negar (2019-04-30). "City Branding, Sustainable Urban Development and the Rentier State. How Do Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai Present Themselves in the Age of Post Oil and Global Warming?". Energies. 12 (9): 1657. doi:10.3390/en12091657. ISSN 1996-1073.
  25. ^ Gaddy, Clifford G.; Ickes., Barry W. (2005). "Resource rents and the Russian economy". Eurasian Geography and Economics. 46 (8): 559–583. doi:10.2747/1538-7216.46.8.559. S2CID 153812247.
  26. ^ a b Goldthau, Andreas; Westphal, Kirsten (2019). "Why the Global Energy Transition Does Not Mean the End of the Petrostate". Global Policy. 10 (2): 279–283. doi:10.1111/1758-5899.12649. ISSN 1758-5880. S2CID 158105333.
  27. ^ Bradshaw, Michael; Van de Graaf, Thijs; Connolly, Richard (2019). "Preparing for the new oil order? Saudi Arabia and Russia". Energy Strategy Reviews. 26: 100374. doi:10.1016/j.esr.2019.100374. hdl:1854/LU-8623818.
  28. ^ a b Mason, Michael (2023). "Theorising the climate change accountability of Persian Gulf petrostates". Environmental Policy and Governance. 33: 631–640.
  29. ^ McDermott Hughes, David (2017). "Climate Change and the Victim Slot". Energy Without Conscience: Oil, Climate Change, and Complicity. Duke University Press. p. 134.
  30. ^ Rutland, Peter (2015-01-02). "Petronation? Oil, gas, and national identity in Russia". Post-Soviet Affairs. 31 (1): 66–89. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2014.952537. ISSN 1060-586X.
  31. ^ Kuteleva, Anna (2020-01-02). "Discursive Politics of Energy in EU–Russia Relations: Russia as an "Energy Superpower" and a "Raw-Material Appendage"". Problems of Post-Communism. 67 (1): 78–92. doi:10.1080/10758216.2018.1520601. ISSN 1075-8216. S2CID 158115925.
  32. ^ Maugeri, Leonardo (2006). The age of oil: the mythology, history, and future of the world's most controversial resource (1. publ ed.). Westport, Conn.: Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-99008-4.
  33. ^ Hertog, Steffen (2011-04-27). Princes, Brokers, and Bureaucrats: Oil and the State in Saudi Arabia. Cornell University Press. ISBN 978-0-8014-5753-1.
  34. ^ Vitalis, Robert (2009-03-02). America's Kingdom: Mythmaking on the Saudi Oil Frontier. Verso Books. ISBN 978-1-84467-313-1.
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