Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip: Difference between revisions

Israel's unilateral disengagement plan (Hebrew: תוכנית ההתנתקות (the official name) or תוכנית ההנתקות; also known as the "disengagement plan", "Gaza Pull-Out plan," and "Gaza Expulsion plan" (by its opponents) is a proposal by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to remove all permanent Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip and from the northern part of the West Bank, also known as northern Samaria.

The Gaza Strip contains 21 civilian Israeli settlements, and the area to be evacuated in the West Bank contains four; these areas also contain numerous Israel Defense Forces (IDF) installations. Sharon says the plan is designed to improve Israel's security and international status, in the absence of political negotiations to end the conflict. Israeli families within Gaza had until the night of Tuesday 16/08/05 to leave or face forced eviction [1]

Under the disengagement plan [2] adopted on June 6, 2004, the IDF will remain on the Gaza-Egypt border and may engage in further house demolitions to widen a 'buffer zone' there (Art 6). Israel will continue to control Gaza's borders, coastline, and airspace, and reserves the right to undertake military operations at will (Art 3.1). Gaza will also remain dependent on Israeli water, communication, electricity, and sewage networks (Art 8); existing customs arrangements with Israel — whereby imports from Israel to Gaza are not taxed, exports from Gaza to Israel are taxed, and Israel collects customs duties on foreign products entering Gaza — will remain in force and the Israeli currency will continue to be used (Art 10).

For these reasons, and because Israel will not accept a Palestinian sovereign authority in Gaza at this time, foreign observers have argued that, legally, the disengagement will not constitute an end to Israeli control. [3] [4]

Positions of foreign governments

U.S. government position

U.S. president George W. Bush endorsed the plan, saying:

As part of a final peace settlement, Israel must have secure and recognized borders, which should emerge from negotiations between the parties in accordance with UNSC Resolutions 242 and 338. In light of new realities on the ground, including already existing major Israeli population centers, it is unrealistic that the outcome of final status negotiations will be a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949.

However, in his May 26, 2005 joint press conference with Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas in the Rose Garden, President Bush stated his expectations vis-a-vis the roadmap plan as follows:

Any final status agreement must be reached between the two parties, and changes to the 1949 Armistice lines must be mutually agreed to. A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.

While initially President Bush stated that "a full and complete return to the armistice lines of 1949" would be an "unrealistic" "outcome of the final status negotiations", the most recent position is that "changes to the 1949 Armistice lines must be mutually agreed to." Essentially, a Palestinian demand that Israel withdraw to the 1949 lines would become "the position of the United States".

European Union position

Similarly, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Brian Cowen (Ireland having Presidency of the EU at the time), announced the European Union's disapproval of the plan's limited scope in that it does not address withdrawal from the entire West Bank. He said that the EU "will not recognize any change to the pre-1967 borders other than those arrived at by agreement between the parties." However, Europe has given tentative backing to the Disengagement plan as part of the Road map for peace.

Chronology

Ariel Sharon first announced his plan at the 2004 Herzlia Conference, sponsored by the Institute for Policy and Strategy. Failing to gain public support from senior ministers, Sharon agreed that the Likud party would hold a referendum on the plan in advance of an Israeli cabinet vote. The referendum was held on May 2, 2004 and ended with 65% of the voters against the disengagement plan, despite most polls showing approximately 55% of Likud members supporting the plan before the referendum.

Commentators and the press described the rejection of the plan as a blow to Sharon. Sharon himself announced that he accepted the Likud referendum results and would take time to consider his steps. He ordered Minister of Defense Shaul Mofaz to create an amended plan which Likud voters could accept.

On June 6, 2004, Sharon's government approved an amended disengagement plan, but with the reservation that the dismantling of each settlement should be voted separately. The plan was approved with a 14-7 majority after the National Union ministers and cabinet members Avigdor Liberman and Binyamin Elon were sacked, and a compromise offer by Likud's cabinet member Tzipi Livni was achieved.

Following the approval of the plan and the intensive terrorist attacks on the Erez crossing and the Erez industrial zone, it was decided to close the industrial zone and move its factories to development towns such as Ashkelon, Dimona, Yeruham, and Sederot. Many factories were shut down earlier, because of attacks by Palestinian employees.

As a result of the passing of the plan (in principle), two NRP (Mafdal) ministers, Effie Eitam and Yitzhak Levy, resigned, leaving the government with a minority in the Knesset. Later, the entire faction quit after their calls to hold a national referendum were ignored.

Sharon's pushing through this plan has alienated many of his supporters on the right and has garnered him unusual support from the left-wing in Israel. The right believes that Sharon has ignored the mandate he was elected on, and has instead adopted the platform of his Labor opponent, Amram Mitzna, who was overwhelmingly defeated when he campaigned on a similar disengagement plan. At that time, Sharon referred to Gaza communities such as Netzarim as "no different than Tel Aviv." Many on both sides remain skeptical of his will to carry out a withdrawal beyond Gaza and northern Samaria. Sharon has a majority for the plan in the government but not within his own party. This forced him to seek a National Unity government, which was established in January 2005. Opponents of the plan, and some ministers, such as Benjamin Netanyahu and former minister Natan Sharansky, have called on Sharon to hold a national referendum to prove that he has a mandate; as of April 2005, these plans had failed to materialize.

Javier Solana, European Union High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), stated on June 10, 2004:

I welcome the Israeli Prime Minister's proposals for disengagement from Gaza. This represents an opportunity to restart the implementation of the Road Map, as endorsed by the UN Security Council.

On September 14, 2004, the Israeli cabinet approved, by a 9-1 majority, plans to compensate settlers who are due to leave the Gaza Strip, with only Mafdal's Zevulun Orlev opposing.

On October 11, 2004, at the opening of the Knesset winter session, Sharon outlined his plan to start legislation for the disengagement in the beginning of November. In a symbolic act, the Knesset voted 53-44 against Sharon's address: the Israeli Labor party voted against, while Mafdal and 10 members of Likud refused to support Sharon in the vote.

On October 26, 2004, the Knesset gave preliminary approval for the plan with 67 for, 45 against, 7 abstentions, and 1 member absent. Netanyahu and three other cabinet ministers from Sharon's ruling Likud government threatened to resign unless Sharon agreed to hold a national referendum on the plan within 14 days.

On November 9, 2004, Netanyahu withdrew his resignation threat, saying "In this new situation [the death of Yasser Arafat], I decided to stay in the government". Following the vote 14 days earlier, and Sharon's subsequent refusal to budge on the referendum issue, the three other cabinet ministers from the Likud party backed down from their threat within days.

On February 16, 2005, the Knesset finalized and approved the plan with 59 in favor, 40 opposed, 5 abstaining. A proposed amendment to submit the plan to a referendum was rejected (29-72).

On March 17, 2005, the IDF Southern Command issued a military order prohibiting Israeli citizens who do not reside in the Gaza Strip settlements from relocating to that area.

On March 28, 2005, the Knesset again rejected a bill to delay the implementation of the disengagement plan by a vote of 72 to 39. The bill was introduced by a group of Likud MKs who wanted to force a referendum on the issue. [5]

On April 8, 2005, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel should consider not demolishing the evacuated buildings in the Gaza Strip, with the exception of synagogues (due to fears of their potential desecration), since it would be more costly and time consuming. This contrasted with the original plan by the Prime Minister to demolish all vacated buildings.

On May 9, 2005, the beginning of the evacuation of settlements was officially pushed back from July 20 to August 15, so as to not coincide with the Jewish holidays of the Three Weeks and Tisha B'Av, traditionally marking grief and destruction.

On June 9, 2005, a poll on Israeli Channel 2 showed that public support for the plan had fallen below 50 percent for the first time. [6]

On July 13, 2005, Sharon signed the closure order of Gush Katif, making the area a closed military zone. From that point on, only residents who presented Israeli ID cards with their registered address in Gush Katif were permitted to enter. Permits for 24-48 hours were given to select visitors for a few weeks before the entire area was completely sealed off to non-residents. Despite this ban, supporters of Gush Katif have managed to sneak in by foot through fields and dirt. Estimates range from a few hundred to a few thousand people are currently there illegally. At one point, Sharon was ready to send in the border police (Magav) to remove non-residents, but decided against it because the manpower requirement would have been too great.

On August 7, 2005, Netanyahu resigned just prior to the cabinet ratification of the first phase of the disengagement plan by a vote of 17 to 5. Netanyahu blamed the Israeli government for moving "blindly along" with the disengagement by not taking into account the expected upsurge in terrorism. He said:

I don't know when terrorism will erupt in full force — my hope is that it won't ever. But I am convinced today that the disengagement will eventually aggravate terrorism instead of reducing it. The security establishment also expects an increase in terrorism. The withdrawal endangers Israel's security, divides its people and set the standards of the withdrawal to the '67 border. [7]

On August 10, 2005, in response to calls from Jewish religious leaders, including former Chief Rabbis Rabbi Avraham Shapira, Rabbi Ovadia Yosef, and Rabbi Mordechai Eliyahu, between 70,000 (police estimate) and 250,000 (organizers' estimate) Jews gathered for a rally centered at the Western Wall in prayer to ask that the planned disengagement be cancelled. The crowds that showed up for the rally overwhelmed the Western Wall's capacity and extended as far as the rest of the Old City and surrounding Jerusalem neighborhoods. The prayer rally was the largest of its kind for over 15 years, since the opposition to the Madrid Conference of 1991. [8][9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14]

On August 10, 2005, in his first speech before the Knesset following his resignation, Netanyahu spoke of the necessity for Knesset members to oppose the proposed disengagement. He said:

Only we in the Knesset are able to stop this evil. Everything that the Knesset has decided, it is also capable of changing. I am calling on all those who grasp the danger: Gather strength and do the right thing. I don't know if the entire move can be stopped, but it still might be stopped in its initial stages. [Don't] give [the Palestinians] guns, don't give them rockets, don't give them a sea port, and don't give them a huge base for terror." [15]

On August 11, 2005, between 150,000 (police estimates) and 300,000 (organizers' estimates) people massed in and around Tel Aviv's Rabin Square for an anti-disengagement rally. Organizers called the event "the largest expression of public protest ever held in Israel." [16] According to a police spokesman, it was one of the largest rallies in recent memory. [17] [18][19] [20]

At midnight between August 14 and August 15, the Kissufim roadblock was shut down, and the Gaza Strip became officially closed for entrance by Israelis. This began the last 48 hours of voluntary evacuation.

On August 15, 2005, Sharon said that, while he had hoped Israel could keep the Gaza settlements forever, reality simply intervened. "It is out of strength and not weakness that we are taking this step," he said, repeating his argument that the disengagement plan has given Israel the diplomatic initiative. [21]

Public opinion about the plan

Palestinian opinions

The Palestinian Authority, in the absence of a final peace settlement, has welcomed any military withdrawal from the territories, but many Palestinian Arabs have objected to the plan, stating that it aims to "bypass" past international agreements, and instead call for an overall withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Their suspicions were further aroused when top Sharon aide Dov Weisglass was quoted in an interview with Israeli newspaper Haaretz on October 6, 2004 as saying that the purpose of disengagement was to destroy Palestinian aspirations for a state for years to come:

The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process and when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem.

This incident has bolstered the position of critics of the plan that Sharon is intentionally trying to scuttle the peace process, an accusation denied by the Prime Minister's camp. [22]

On August 8, 2005, Haaretz quoted a top Palestinian Authority religious cleric, Sheikh Jamal al-Bawatna, the mufti of the Ramallah district, in a fatwa (a religious edict) banning shooting attacks against Israeli security forces and settlements, out of concern they might lead to a postponement of the pullout. This is the first time that a Muslim cleric has forbidden shooting at Israelis. [23]

On August 15, 2005, scenes of delight took place across the Arab world, following the long-ingrained suspicion that the disengagement would not take place. [24][25]

Israeli opinions

A September 15, 2004 survey published in Maariv showed that:

• 69% supported a general referendum to decide on the plan; 26% thought that approval in the Knesset would be enough.
• If a referendum were to be held, 58% would vote for the disengagement plan, while 29% would vote against it. [26] [27]

Recent polls on support for the plan have consistently shown support for the plan in the 50-60% range, and opposition in the 30-40% range. A June 9, 2005 Dahaf Institute/Yedioth Ahronoth poll showed support for the plan at 53%, and opposition at 38%. [28] A June 17 telephone poll published in Maariv showed 54% of Israel’s Jews supporting the plan. A poll carried out by the Midgam polling company, on June 29 found support at 48% and opposition at 41%, [29] but a Dahaf Institute/Yedioth Ahronot poll of the same day found support at 62% and opposition at 31%. [30] A poll conducted the week of July 17 by the Tel Aviv University Institute for Media, Society, and Politics shows that Israeli approval of the disengagement is at 48%; 43% of the respondents believe that Palestinian terrorism will increase following disengagement, versus 25% who believe that terrorism will decline. [31]

On July 25, 2004, the "Human Chain," a rally of tens of thousands of Israelis to protest against the plan and for a national referendum took place. The protestors formed a human chain from Nisanit (later moved to Erez crossing because of security concerns) in the Gaza Strip to the Western Wall in Jerusalem a distance of 90 km. [32] On October 14, 2004, 100,000 Israelis marched in cities throughout Israel to protest the plan under the slogan "100 cities support Gush Katif and Samaria". [33]

On May 16, 2005, a nonviolent protest was held throughout the country, with the protesters blocking major traffic arteries throughout Israel. The protest was sposored by "HaBayit HaLeumi", and was hailed by them as a success, with over 400 protestors arrested, half of them juveniles. Over 40 intersections throughout the country were blocked, including:

• The entrance to Jerusalem
• Bar Ilan/Shmuel Hanavi Junction in Jerusalem
• Sultans Pool Junction outside the Old City of Jerusalem
• Geha Highway
• Golumb St. corner of Begin Blvd in Jerusalem

On July 18, 2005, another nonviolent protest was held. The protest began in Netivot near Gaza. An independent media organization, WorldNetDaily, estimated that the crowd in Netivot numbered close to 70,000, most of whom walked to Kfar Maimon. [34] The protest march ended July 21 after police prevented protesters from continuing to Gush Katif.

On August 2, 2005 another protest against disengagement began in Sederot with approximately 50,000 attendees.

A widely publicized weeklong show of support for the disengagement attracted only tens of supporters. The supporters drove in a caravan through Israel, ending in Jerusalem. According to the organizer, there were at most seventy cars involved. [35]

Those advocating suspension or cancellation of the plan have often quoted one or more of these arguments:

• The religious approach maintains that Eretz Israel was promised to the Jews by God, and that no government has the authority to waive this inalienable right. In their view, inhabiting all of the land of Israel is one of the most important mitzvot.
• The political approach, owing much to existing right-wing ideology, claims that the areas to be evacuated constitute Israeli territory as legitimately as Tel Aviv or Haifa, and that relocating settlers is illegal and violates their human rights. Some have gone as far as labelling it a war crime. In the wake of the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of February 2005, some have claimed that now that there is a negotiation partner on the Palestinian side, the plan has become redundant.
• The military approach says that the plan is disastrous to Israeli security — not only will prevention of Qassam rockets and other attacks from Gaza become nearly impossible after the withdrawal, but implementation of the plan will be an important moral victory for Hamas and other organizations, and will encourage them to continue executing terrorist attacks against Israel.

Orange ribbons in Israel symbolize opposition to the disengagement; it is the color of the flag of the Gush Katif Regional Council, as well as being reminiscent of the Orange Revolution in Ukraine. Blue ribbons (sometimes blue-and-white ribbons) symbolize support for the disengagement and are intended to invoke the Israeli flag.

American opinions

Recent polls in the U.S. about the question of the Gaza pullout have produced varied results. A recent poll commissioned by the Anti-Defamation League, and conducted by the Marttila Communications Group from June 19–23, 2005 among 2200 American adults, found that 71% of respondents felt that the Disengagement Plan is closer to a "bold step that would advance the Peace Process" than to a "capitulation to terrorist violence," while 12% felt that the plan is more of a "capitulation" than a "bold step."

A poll commissioned by the Zionist Organization of America (ZOA), and conducted by McLaughlin & Associates on June 26 - 27, 2005, with a sample of 1,000 American adults, showed U.S. opposition to the proposed disengagement. Respondents, by a margin of 4 to 1 (63% to 16%) opposed "Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from a section of Gaza and northern Samaria and forcing 10,000 Israeli Jews from their homes and businesses" and by a margin of 2.5 to 1 (53% to 21)%, agreed with the statement that "this Gaza Plan sends a message that Arab terrorism is being rewarded".

Morton Klein, President of the ZOA, criticized the ADL commissioned poll, stating that the question in the poll was not whether or not respondents agreed with the Disengagement Plan, but was a subjective characterization of primary motives behind it: whether Israeli politicians are acting more for the sake of capitulating to terrorism or for the sake of continuing the road map. The ADL, in turn, criticized the ZOA commissioned poll, calling its wording "loaded."

External links

• Ariel Sharon's Disengagement Plan and President Bush's letter accepting it at MidEastWeb for Coexistence
• Map of disengagement plan showing settlements to be evacuated at MidEastWeb for Coexistence
• "The 3-days 'Kfar Maimon Siege' Anti Gaza Pullout demonstrators" (photo gallery by Eyal Dor-Ofer)
• Pictures of the Mass Prayer Rally against the disengagement plan at the Western Wall in Jerusalem
• Pictures of the Mass Rally in Tel Aviv against the disengagement plan