Suez Crisis: Difference between revisions

Suez Crisis (The Sinai War) (Arab-Israeli conflict)
File:HM Ships Eagle, Bulwark, and Albion .jpg HMS Eagle, Bulwark, and Albion of the British Royal Navy. All three ships were engaged in strikes against Egyptian forces
Date October 1956 – March 1957 Location Sinai Result Ended by a United Nations cease-fire and UNEF installed in Sinai
Belligerents
Israel, France, United Kingdom	Egypt
Commanders and leaders
Moshe Dayan (CoS of the IDF) General Sir Charles Keightley (C-in-C), Vice-Admiral Pierre Barjot (Deputy)	Gamal Abdel Nasser
Strength
45,000 British, 34,000 French, 175,000 Israeli	300,000 Egyptians
Casualties and losses
189 Israelis KIA, unknown number WIA, 16 British KIA-91 WIA, 10 French KIA-33 WIA,	Military: 1,650 dead, 4,900 wounded, 6,000 Prisoners

Template:Campaignbox Arab-Israeli conflict The Suez Crisis was a war fought on Egyptian territory in 1956. The conflict pitted Egypt against an alliance between France, the United Kingdom and Israel.

This alliance against Egypt largely took place as a result of the Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser's action of nationalizing the Suez Canal Company, which operated the Suez Canal, an important asset to French and British economies, particularly as a chokepoint in world oil shipments. British policy makers initially feared an Israeli attack on Egypt, and sought cooperation with the United States throughout 1956 to deal with Egyptian-Israeli tensions.

The alliance between the two European nations and Israel was largely one of convenience; the European nations had economic and trading interests in the Suez Canal, while Israel wanted to reopen the canal for Israeli shipping and end Egyptian-supported guerrilla incursions.

When the USSR threatened to intervene on behalf of Egypt, Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Lester B. Pearson feared a larger war and came up with a clever plan to separate the opposing forces and place with United Nations forces between them to act as a buffer zone or 'human shield' (he later won a Nobel Peace Prize).

The Crisis resulted in the resignation of the British Conservative Prime Minister, Anthony Eden, and marked the completion of the shift in the global balance of power from European powers to the United States and the Soviet Union.

Background

The Suez Canal was opened in 1869, having been financed by France and the Egyptian government. Technically, the territory of the canal itself was sovereign Egyptian territory, and the operating company, the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal (Suez Canal Company) was an Egyptian-chartered one (originally as part of the Ottoman Turkish Empire). In 1875, the British government bought out the Egyptian share of the company, giving it partial control over the canal's operations, which it shared with mostly French private investors. In 1882, during foreign intervention in Egypt, the United Kingdom took de facto control of the physical canal. The canal was of strategic importance, being the ocean trade link between Britain and her colonies in India, the Far East as well as Australia and New Zealand. The area as a whole was strategic to North Africa and the Middle East.

The importance of the canal as a strategic center was apparent during both World Wars. During the first, the British and French closed it to non-Allied shipping. During the Second World War, it was tenaciously defended during the North African Campaign.

Daniel Yergin, a historian of the oil industry, has written:

[I]n 1948, the canal abruptly lost its traditional rationale. For the year before India became independent, and control over the canal could no longer be preserved on grounds that it was critical to the defense either of India or of an empire that was being liquidated. And yet, at exactly the same moment, the canal was gaining a new role — as the highway not of empire, but of oil. The Suez Canal was the way most of the growing volumes of Persian Gulf oil got to Europe, cutting the 11,000 nautical mile (20,000 km) journey around the Cape of Good Hope to Southampton down to 6,500 nautical miles (12,000 km) . By 1955, petroleum accounted for two thirds of all the canal's traffic, and in turn two thirds of Europe's oil passed through it. Flanked to the north by Tapline and the Iraq Petroleum Company pipelines, the canal was the critical link in the postwar structure of the international oil industry.

British troops were withdrawn from Palestine in 1947 and the state of Israel was formally established in 1948, shortly followed by the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, which further established Israel's independence. See history of Israel, history of Egypt.

In 1952, officers in the Egyptian army overthrew the monarchy of King Farouk. Abandoning policies co-operative with European powers, the new government asserted an independent and Arab nationalist identity. This led to conflict with the European powers over the Suez Canal. Especially once Israel's port of Eilat was completed in the mid 50s, conflict also heated up over the only gateway to it, the Straits of Tiran.

From 1953–1956 the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a number of strikes. These attacks were assisted by the future prime minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon, who interrupted his studies at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem to become the military leader of the first special forces unit of the IDF: the elite Unit 101. This policy of reprisals was a major source of internal dispute between hawks, led by David Ben-Gurion, and doves, led by his successor for a short time, Moshe Sharett. It sometimes led to strong external criticism from the United Nations and even Israel's supporters.

The Gaza raid on 1955 February 28 marked yet another turning point in relations between the two enemies. In retaliation Egypt began to sponsor official Fedayeen and commando raids on Israel, sometimes through the territory of Jordan, which also officially opposed these raids, while still publicly discouraging Palestinian infiltration. There were secret talks, through various intermediaries and methods, between Egypt and Israel, but the escalating tensions between the IDF and the Fedayeen put an end to them.

Throughout 1956, tensions increased between Israel and Egypt, with Egyptian fedayeen launching frequent incursions into Israeli territory and Israel launching retaliatory raids into Egyptian territory. On 1956 July 26, Egypt, under the leadership of President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, which operated the vital trade route to the east, and in which British banks and business held a 44% stake. This nationalization was done in order to raise revenue for the construction of the Aswan High Dam on the Nile River. Concerning the Aswan High Dam project, the United States and Britain had previously agreed to help pay for this project, but cancelled their support after Egypt had bought tanks from communist Czechoslovakia, then part of the Soviet-bloc, and also had extended diplomatic recognition to Communist China. The better relationship with the Chinese was the result of the Bandung Conference in 1955, where Nasser had asked the Chinese to use their influence on the Soviets to supply Egypt with the necessary arms.

The British Prime Minister of the time, Sir Anthony Eden, tried to persuade the British public of the need for war and so, perhaps in an attempt to recall World War II-era patriotism, he compared Nasser's nationalisation of the Suez Canal with the nationalism of Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler twenty years earlier. However, it is interesting to note that the very first comparisons between 1930s dictators and Nasser during the crisis was made by the opposition Labour leader, Hugh Gaitskell and the left-leaning tabloid newspaper, the Daily Mirror. Eden had been a staunch opponent of Neville Chamberlain's policy of appeasement and he claimed that a display of force was needed to prevent Nasser becoming another expansionist military threat. Eden had also been exercised over Nasser's apparent role in the dismissal of British military leader Glubb Pasha in Jordan prior to the canal company nationalization. The French also were hostile because of Nasser's support for insurgents in Algeria.

Between July and October 1956, unsuccessful initiatives encouraged by the United States were made to reduce the tensions that would ultimately lead to war. International conferences were organized to secure agreement on canal operations; no agreement was secured.

In the months that followed Egypt's nationalization of the canal company, with the support of the former managers of the company that operated the canal, La Compagnie universelle du canal maritime de Suez, a secret meeting between Israel, France and Britain took place at Sèvres, outside Paris. Details only emerged years later, as records of the meeting were suppressed and destroyed. All parties agreed that Israel should invade and that Britain and France would subsequently intervene, instruct the Israeli and Egyptian armies to withdraw their forces to a distance of ten miles (16 km) from either side of the canal, and then place an Anglo-French intervention force in the Canal Zone around Port Said. It was to be called "Operation Musketeer".

Invasion

Israeli conquest of Sinai

On October 29, 1956, Israel invaded the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula and made rapid progress towards the Canal Zone. As per the agreement, Britain and France offered to reoccupy the area and separate the warring armies. Nasser (whose nationalization of the company had been greeted with joy by the Egyptian public) refused the offer, which gave the European powers a pretext for a joint invasion to regain control of the canal and topple the Nasser regime. To support the invasion, large air forces had been deployed to Cyprus and Malta by the UK and France and many aircraft carriers were deployed. The two regularly available airfields on Cyprus were so congested that a third field which was in dubious condition had to be brought into use for French aircraft. Even RAF Luqa on Malta was extremely crowded with RAF Bomber Command aircraft. The UK deployed the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle, Albion and Bulwark and France had the Arromanches and Lafayette on station. In addition, HMS Ocean and Theseus acted as jumping off points for the world's first helicopter-borne assault. The United Kingdom and France began to bomb Egypt on October 31 to force the reopening of the canal with Operation Musketeer. Nasser responded by sinking all 40 ships then present in the canal, closing it to further shipping until early 1957.

On late November 5, the 3rd Battalion of the Parachute Regiment dropped at El Gamil Airfield, clearing the area and establishing a secure base for incoming support aircraft and reinforcements. At first light on November 6, Commandos of Nos 42 and 40 Commando Royal Marines stormed the beaches, using landing craft of WWII vintage. Salvos from the battlegroup standing offshore opened fire, giving covering fire for the landings and causing considerable damage to the Egyptian batteries and gun emplacements. The town of Port Said sustained great damage and was seen to be alight.

Meeting stiff resistance, No. 45 Commando assaulted by helicopter and upon landing, moved inland. Shore batteries hit several helicopters and casualties were sustained. Friendly fire from British carrier-borne aircraft caused heavy casualties to 45 Commando and HQ. Street fighting and house clearing was the order of the day. Again, stiff opposition came from well entrenched sniper positions caused a number of casualties.

Cease-fire and withdrawal

The operation to take the canal was highly successful from a military point of view, but a political disaster due to external forces. Along with Suez, the United States was also dealing with the near-simultaneous Soviet Hungary crisis, and faced the public relations embarrassment (especially in the eyes of the Third World) of criticizing the Soviet Union's military intervention there while not also criticizing its two principal European allies' actions. Perhaps more significantly, the United States also feared a wider war after the Soviet Union threatened to intervene on the Egyptian side and launch attacks by "all types of modern weapons of destruction" on London and Paris.

Thus, the Eisenhower administration forced a cease-fire on Britain and France, which it had previously told the Allies it would not do. Part of the pressure that the United States used against Britain was financial, as Eisenhower threatened to sell the United States reserves of the British pound and thereby precipitate a collapse of the British currency. There was also a measure of discouragement for Britain in the rebuke by the Commonwealth Prime Ministers St. Laurent of Canada and Menzies of Australia at a time when Britain was still continuing to regard the Commonwealth as an entity of importance as the residue of the British Empire and as an automatic supporter in its effort to remain a world power.

The British government and the pound thus both came under pressure. Eden was forced to resign and the invading forces withdrew in March 1957. Before the withdrawal, Lester Pearson, Canada's acting cabinet minister for external affairs, had gone to the United Nations and suggested creating a United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) in the Suez to "keep the borders at peace while a political settlement is being worked out." The United Nations eagerly accepted this suggestion, and the force was sent, greatly improving conditions in the area. Lester Pearson was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1957 for his efforts. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force was Pearson's creation and he is considered the father of the modern concept "peacekeeping".

Aftermath

Eden's resignation marked, until the Falklands War, the last significant attempt Britain made to impose its military will abroad without U.S. support. Scott Lucas wrote "that Britain did not require Washington's endorsement to defend her interests".

However, Nigel Ashton argues "that British strategy in the region changed very little in the wake of Suez. Macmillan was every bit as determined as Eden had been to stop Nasser" although he was more willing to enlist American support in the future for that end. Some would argue that the crisis also marked the transfer of power to the new superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union.

The incident demonstrated the weakness of the NATO alliance in its lack of planning and cooperation outside of the European theatre. From the point of view of General de Gaulle, the Suez events demonstrated that France could not rely on allies, especially the United States, when pursuing her own foreign policy goals. This eventually led to France pulling out of the NATO military network to safeguard its own interest.

The crisis also greatly improved Nasser's standing in the Arab world, helped to promote pan-Arabism, and reinforced hostility against the State of Israel. It also hastened the process of decolonization, as the remaining colonies of both Britain and France gained independence over the next several years.

After Suez, Aden and Iraq became the main bases for the British in the region while the French concentrated their forces at Bizerte and Beirut.

By early 1957 all Israeli troops had withdrawn from the Sinai. As part of the deal, the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) was placed in the Sinai (on Egyptian territory only) with the express purpose of maintaining the cease-fire. While effective in preventing the small-scale warfare that prevailed before 1956 and after 1967, budgetary cutbacks and changing needs had seen the force shrink to 3,378 by 1967. The Egyptian government then began to remilitarize the Sinai, and demanded that the UNEF withdraw. This action, along with the blockade of the Strait of Tiran, led directly to the Six Day War. During the war, Israeli armed forces captured the east bank of the canal, which subsequently became the boundary between Egypt and Israel and was therefore closed until June, 1975.

References

• Yergin, Daniel (1991). The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power. New York: Simon & Schuster. Chapter 24 is devoted entirely to the Suez Crisis.

Further reading

• Arnstein, Walter (2001). Britain Yesterday and Today: 1830 to the Present. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
• Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 0415287162