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Battle of Dhul al-Qassah

(Redirected from Battle of Zhu Qissa)
Main article: Ridda wars

The Battle of Dhu al-Qassah took place in the area of Dhu al-Qassah, located approximately 36 kilometres (22 mi) east of Medina, in the Medina Province, in the central-western part of Saudi Arabia, from July 25 to July 30, 632. It pitted the forces of the Rashidun Caliphate led by Caliph Abu Bakr As-Siddiq against the rebel apostates led by General Hibal ibn Khuwailid[3],[n 3].

Battle of Dhu al-Qassah
معركة ذو قِصّة
Part of Ridda wars

Map showing the most decisive battles during the Wars of Apostasy in the Arabian Peninsula, where Dhu al-Qassah is visible.
Date25 - 30 July 632[1],[2]
(5 Days)
Location
Province of Medina, Saudi Arabia[n 1]
24°28′01″N 40°00′00″E / 24.467°N 40.0°E / 24.467; 40.0
Result Victory of the Rashidun Caliphate
Territorial
changes		 Dhul Qissa is retaken by the Rashidun Caliphate
Belligerents
Rashidun Caliphate
Commanders and leaders
Abu Bakr As-Siddiq

Ali ibn Abi Talib
Talha ibn Ubayd Allah
Zubayr ibn al-Awwam
Abdullah ibn Masud
Khalid ibn al-Walid
Al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin
Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf
Suwaid ibn Muqrin [ar]
Abdullah ibn Muqrin		 Hibal ibn Khuwailid[n 2]
Strength
Unknown but less than the enemy Unknown but more than the enemy
Casualties and losses
Unknown Heavy

This battle, comprising four engagements[4],[5], resulted in a victory for the Rashidun Caliphate, marking the beginning of the Wars of Apostasy[6], the withdrawal of the apostate rebels to the Abraq area[1],[7],[n 4], and a consolidation of Abu Bakr As-Siddiq's legitimacy in his new role as caliph[6].

Background

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Situation following the death of Prophet Muhammad

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After the death of the Prophet of Islam, Muhammad, on June 8, 632[8],[9], Abu Bakr As-Siddiq was appointed as the successor to lead the newly emerging state[8]. However, the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula, which had mostly submitted and become Muslim under Muhammad from 631[8],[n 5], abandoned Islam after his death, expelled the Zakat collectors[10], and triggered widespread apostasy affecting all the tribes of Arabia[11],[12], with the notable exception of the inhabitants of Mecca, Medina, and the Banu Thaqif of Ta'if[11],[12]. Some clans entirely renounced the faith, while others were divided between those who abandoned the belief and those who remained loyal[11],[12],[n 6].

Two self-proclaimed prophets, Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid and Musaylima ibn Habib, as well as a false prophetess, Sajah bint Al-Harith, fueled this apostasy[11]. Musaylima ibn Habib had long been known as an impostor, while Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid began proclaiming himself a prophet during Muhammad's illness[13],[11].

The main threat to Medina came from Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid and the tribes of central, western, and northern Arabia that followed him.

According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, these tribes were:
Banu Asad[11],[14] Banu Ghatafan[11],[15],[16] Tayy[11],[17] Banu Hawāzin[11],[17]


And according to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, these tribes were:
Banu Asad[11],[14]
Tayy[11],[17]
Banu Hawāzin[11],[17]
Banu Subay' [ar][14]

Course of Events

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Pre-Battle

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram

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In his work Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah[n 7], Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram relates that about a week or two after the departure of Usama bin Zayd's army[11],[n 8], delegates from the apostates of Dhu al-Qassah[n 9] came to Abu Bakr As-Siddiq in Medina[11],[14],[19],[20], and declared:

We continue to pray, but we no longer pay the tax[11],[21],[n 10].

However, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq refused this proposal. He responded firmly:

By Allah, if you withhold even an ounce of what is due, I will fight you. I give you one day to give your answer[11],[22],[21],[23],[n 11].

The next morning, before the one-day ultimatum expired, the emissaries discreetly left Medina, signaling their rejection of Abu Bakr As-Siddiq's demands[3],[14]. Shortly after their departure, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq sent his own emissaries to all the apostate tribes, urging them to remain faithful to Islam and continue paying their taxes, which did not have the desired effect[3].

The apostate emissaries from Dhu al-Qassah, observant and attentive, noticed the absence of fighters before leaving Medina[3],[14],[24],[25]. Upon their return, they reported to their compatriots about the conversation with Abu Bakr As-Siddiq and the apparent vulnerability of Medina[3],[14],[24],[25], however, although Usama bin Zayd's main army had not yet returned from its expedition, the city was not as defenseless as the apostates thought, as there were still many able-bodied men, particularly from the Banu Hashim clan[n 12], who had stayed behind to mourn their deceased relatives[3].

Meanwhile, Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid, now in Samira, reinforced the apostates of Dhu al-Qassah with a contingent led by his brother Hibal ibn Khuwailid[3].

After hearing the reports from the emissaries, the temptation to destroy Medina while it was still vulnerable became too great for the apostates[3],[14],[2]. They then decided to march on the city[3],[26],[2],[25]. From Dhu Husa[n 13], where the apostates had established a base, part of the forces from Dhu al-Qassah advanced even closer to Medina and camped, preparing to attack the city[3],[26],[2],[25]. We are now in the third week of July 632[3].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari

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In his work The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia[n 14], Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari relates that about ten days after the death of the Prophet Muhammad[17], delegations from the apostate tribes of the Banu Asad[17] tribe, reinforced by a contingent of Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid led by Hibal ibn Khuwailid[3],[14]; the Banu Ghatafan, the Banu Hawazin, and the Tayy went to meet Abu Bakr As-Siddiq[17]. Upon their arrival in Medina, they were received by the Muslim leaders[17], except for Al-Abbas ibn Abd al-Muttalib[17]. These delegations proposed performing the ritual prayer while requesting an exemption from the Zakat[17],[11],[21],[25]. Abu Bakr As-Siddiq rejected this proposal, stating:

If they refuse me even the halter of a camel, I will fight them for it[11],[22],[14],[n 15]

He issued an ultimatum[17],[3], giving the delegations one day and one night to accept his conditions[17],[3],[n 16]. After this period, the delegations, having refused the imposed conditions[17],[3], returned to their respective tribes[14],[3]. Upon their return, they reported the small number of defenders in Medina[14],[3],[25], thus arousing the covetousness of the city among their compatriots and prompting them to prepare for an attack[14],[3],[25]. After expelling the apostate delegations[14], Abu Bakr As-Siddiq placed men to monitor the mountain passes around Medina[26],[25], including Ali ibn Abi Talib, Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Talha ibn Ubayd Allah, Abdullah ibn Masud[26],[27],[25], Khalid ibn al-Walid[25], and Abd al-Rahman ibn Awf[25]. He then gathered the people of Medina in the mosque and declared to them:

The country has fallen into disbelief. The members of the delegation have observed that you are few in number and that you could be caught off guard in case of an attack, whether by day or night. The nearest enemies are only a stage away from you. They hoped that we would accept their demands and reconcile with them, but we rejected their proposals and annulled their treaty. So prepare yourselves[26].

As a result, the inhabitants prepared themselves[26],[25].

Battle

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First Confrontation

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram
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Abu Bakr As-Siddiq was informed of this movement and immediately began organizing the defense of Medina[3]. The Caliph gathered a fighting force from the remaining men[5]. Ali ibn Abi Talib, Zubayr ibn al-Awwam, Talha ibn Ubayd Allah, and Abdullah ibn Masud[27],[26], each commanded a part of this new army[5].

For three days, nothing happened. The apostates, uncertain of where to start, took no action[27].

Abu Bakr As-Siddiq then decided, on his order, to have the Muslims leave Medina to launch a swift attack on the apostates' forward camp. This successful offensive pushed the apostates back to Dhu Husa[27].
Informed of this success, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq ordered the Muslims to stay in place and await further instructions[27].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari
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Less than three days later, the apostate forces launched a nighttime attack on Medina, leaving half of their men at Dhu Husa as a reserve. The attacking cavalry reached the mountain passes during the night, where fighters were already positioned. Scouts on foot preceded them, alerting the defenders and sending a message to Abu Bakr As-Siddiq[26].

Abu Bakr As-Siddiq ordered them to hold their positions, which they did, while the caliph led the inhabitants from the mosque, mounted on their pack camels[n 17]. Faced with this response, the apostates lost their resolve and turned back[26].

According to Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad
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In his work Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs[28], Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad relates that after three days, the apostate rebels began to move actively within the Dhu Husa camp. Muslim scouts reported that the apostates were planning to attack Medina that night. Abu Bakr As-Siddiq gathered all the adult Muslim men in the mosque. After the Isha prayer, these men were divided into groups to guard the various neighborhoods of the city. Leading a contingent, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq took position at a strategic point facing Dhu Husa, where the attack was expected to occur[29].

The apostates launched the attack at midnight, hoping to take the city by surprise. Convinced that there was no fighting force in Medina, they expected to meet no resistance and anticipated an easy victory. As the apostate forces advanced in the darkness of the night, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq's contingent fell upon them, taking them by surprise. Many apostate rebels were killed in the battle, while the others fled in total confusion back to Dhu Husa, where the Muslims pursued them[30].

Second Confrontation

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram
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The day after this first victorious confrontation by the Rashidun Caliphate, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq left Medina accompanied by a large number of pack camels[n 18], as all the riding camels[n 19] had been requisitioned for the Expedition of Usama bin Zayd. Upon their arrival at the abandoned camp of the apostates, the Muslims who had expelled them mounted the camels, and the army headed towards Dhu Husa, the apostates' base camp[27].

Hibal ibn Khuwailid, anticipating the Muslims' approach, displayed his military skills by strategically positioning his troops behind a slope, at some distance from the base towards which the Muslims were advancing[27].

The Muslims, riding their pack camels, advanced unsuspectingly, unaware of the apostates' presence hidden behind the slope[27]. As they approached the summit[27], the apostates suddenly emerged and hurled numerous water-filled goatskins towards the Muslims[18],[27]. Loud noises echoed among the apostates, with some drumming and shouting[27]. The pack camels, untrained for battle and unaccustomed to sudden noises or unfamiliar objects, panicked and fled[18],[27]. Despite the Muslims' efforts to control their mounts, they failed[18],[27], and soon, the entire Muslim force retreated towards Medina[18],[27].

Hibal ibn Khuwailid, having repelled the Muslims without truly engaging in battle, interpreted their retreat as a sign of fear, not realizing that the camels' panic was the real cause[4]. The part of his forces remaining at Dhu al-Qassah was informed of this success and prepared to advance[4],[31]. That same evening[4], the entirety of the apostate forces advanced and re-established their camp near Medina, which they had left the previous day[4]. The morale of the apostates was strengthened by this success[4].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari
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The Muslims pursued the apostate cavalry on their pack camels to Dhu Husa[26], where the enemy reserves suddenly appeared with inflated goatskins, tied with ropes[32]. They then rolled them with their feet towards the camels[18],[27], each skin unwinding on its tether[18]. The Muslims' pack camels, panicking as never before[18],[27], despite the Muslims' efforts to control their mounts, failed[18],[27], and brought them back to Medina[18],[27]. However, no Muslim was thrown off or injured[18].

The apostates, believing that the Muslims were in a weakened position, sent instructions to the troops at Dhu al-Qassah, urging them to advance[31].

In response to this situation, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq spent the night reorganizing and preparing his army[31].

Third Confrontation

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram
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The Muslims, furious and determined to take revenge, learned that the apostates had returned to their camp near Medina and decided to attack them before they could finalize their battle preparations. Under the instructions of Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, the Muslims spent most of the night reorganizing their small army and preparing for combat[31],[1].

During the last part of the night, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq led his army out of Medina and deployed it in an assault formation, with a center, two flanks, and a rear guard. He kept the center under his direct command, placed the right flank under Al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin, the left flank under Abdullah ibn Muqrin, and the rear guard under Suwaid ibn Muqrin. Before dawn, the army advanced towards the enemy camp, where the apostates, confident of an easy victory the next day, were sound asleep. This time, it was Hibal ibn Khuwailid who was caught by surprise[31],[1].

Before the first light of dawn appeared, the Muslims launched a furious assault on the apostates' camp. Without quarter, they killed many enemies[31],[1], while most of the survivors fled, stopping only at Dhu al-Qassah to rest and regroup[1].

After this attack, the morale of the apostates was significantly weakened. Abu Bakr As-Siddiq opted for a surprise attack to compensate for his numerical inferiority, and this strategy proved successful[1].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari
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After spending most of the night reorganizing and preparing his army, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq marched out in battle order during the last part of the night, with Al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin on his right flank, Abdullah ibn Muqrin on his left flank, and Suwaid ibn Muqrin commanding the cavalry at the rear[31],[1].

At dawn, they found themselves on the same plain as the apostates[31],[1]. The Muslims advanced in silence, without making a sound, until they attacked the apostates with their swords, massacring them before the night was over[31],[1]. Thus, before the first ray of sunlight rose[31], the enemy had already turned their backs on the Muslims, and Hibal ibn Khuwailid was killed[31].

The Muslims seized all their riding camels[n 20] after the confrontation[31].

Fourth Confrontation

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram
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After winning this battle, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq decided to give his enemies no respite. At sunrise, he led his troops towards Dhu al-Qassah[1].

Upon arrival, he reorganized his combat unit in the same manner as the previous night and launched a new attack. The apostates, with weakened morale, offered initial resistance before retreating towards Abraq, where other members of the Banu Ghatafan, Banu Hawāzin, and Tayy clans had gathered[1].

After capturing Dhu al-Qassah[33],[1], Abu Bakr As-Siddiq sent a small force under the command of Talha ibn Ubayd Allah to pursue the enemy[1]. Talha ibn Ubayd Allah advanced a short distance and eliminated some stragglers[1], but the small size of his contingent limited his ability to inflict significant losses on the retreating apostates[1].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari
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Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari does not detail the events of the fourth confrontation as extensively as his counterpart Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram. However, he reports that Abu Bakr as-Siddiq pursued the apostates until he camped at Dhu al-Qassah, the headquarters of the apostate rebels[33],[1].

Post-Battle

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According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram

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Dhu al-Qassah was occupied on July 30, 632[1],[n 21].
Abu Bakr As-Siddiq left Al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin with a unit to occupy Dhu al-Qassah, while he returned to Medina with the rest of his army[1],[34].
On August 2, 632, the army of Usama bin Zayd returned to Medina, ending the threat to the capital of Islam[1].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari

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Abu Bakr As-Siddiq appointed Al-Nu'man ibn Muqrin to lead a portion of the troops at Dhu al-Qassah, then returned to Medina[34],[1].

According to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, the army of Usama bin Zayd returned between 40 and 60 days after its departure[35]. Its departure was confirmed at the end of Rabi' al-awwal[36], which, in 632 CE, corresponded to the end of June. Adding 40 to 60 days aligns with the accounts of Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, who places the return of Usama bin Zayd's army on August 2, 632[1].

Outcome & Consequences

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Outcome

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The series of four confrontations during this battle is marked by strategic turnarounds and discrepancies in the accounts, although the outcomes of the confrontations are identical.
In summary: after an initial victory by the Rashidun Caliphate, a subsequent attempt fails due to a clever ruse by the apostates. However, Abu Bakr As-Siddiq manages to lead a successful night attack. Building on this success, the fourth confrontation, led by Abu Bakr As-Siddiq, results in the retreat of the apostate rebels from Dhu al-Qassah to the Abraq area.

Consequences

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One of the consequences of the Battle of Dhu al-Qassah is that the apostate rebels[34],[37],[n 22], in retaliation for their defeat, attacked the Muslims among them and massacred them[34],[37].
Abu Bakr As-Siddiq vowed that in retaliation for each Muslim killed, he would eliminate an equivalent or even greater number of apostate rebels from each tribe[34],[37].


Another major consequence of the battle is that it clarified the positions of the neutral tribes[2]. Many tribes sent delegations to Medina, pledged allegiance to the authorities, and paid the Zakat[2],[37],[38], while the tribes opposed to Islam openly declared their apostasy[2]. The situation was thus clearly defined[2].
Zakat began to arrive in Medina at night[38], brought successively by Safwan bin Safwan ibn Tamimi[38], then Al-Zabarqan Bin Badr [ar][38], and finally Adi ibn Hatim[38]. Safwan bin Safwan ibn Tamimi arrived at the beginning of the night[38], Al-Zabarqan Bin Badr [ar] in the middle of it[38], and Addy ibn Hatim at the end[38]. At each arrival, people exclaimed:

He brings a warning about the enemy[38]!

But Abu Bakr As-Siddiq responded:

He is a bearer of good news, a protector, not someone exhausted by urgency[38].

After hearing the good news, they declared:

Long live the good news you bring[38]!

This victory of Abu Bakr As-Siddiq and his newly established caliphate holds significant symbolic importance on multiple levels: It was his first battle as caliph[2], which was also victorious[2]; it marked the beginning of the Wars of Apostasy[2], solidified his position as caliph[2], and reinforced his legitimacy among the Muslims within the Rashidun Caliphate to continue the Wars of Apostasy[2].

Notes and references

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Notes

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  1. ^ The location of the battle is not singular, as it took place in Medina, Dhu Husa, and Dhu al-Qassah.
  2. ^ According to Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, Hibal ibn Khuwailid did not die in combat during this battle, but according to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Hibal ibn Khuwailid did die in combat.
  3. ^ Brother of Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid.
  4. ^ A place associated with the Banu Dhubyan tribe in the Nejd region of Saudi Arabia, now a steep rocky promontory located 8 kilometres (5.0 mi) north of Al Hinakiyah.
  5. ^ The Year of Delegations in 631 marked the peak of Muhammad's power. The seventy tribes that entered into agreements with him sent emissaries to Medina to confirm their subjugation.
  6. ^ Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari explains in his book (The History of al-Tabari Volume 10: The Conquest of Arabia), page 69:

    The common people of Tayy and the Banu Asad gathered around Tulayha ibn Khuwaylid, while the Ghatafan apostatized, except for those of Banu Ashja and the leaders of mixed origin groups, who pledged allegiance to him. The Banu Hawāzin remained ambivalent, withholding the payment of Zakat, except for those of Banu Thaqif and their group. The majority of Jadilah and weaker groups followed them. Some members of the Banu Sulaym apostatized, as did the rest of the people in various places.
  7. ^ Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009
  8. ^ cf. the expedition of Usama bin Zayd.
  9. ^ The closest concentration of apostates to Medina is in the area of Dhu al-Qassah, about 36 kilometres (22 mi) east of Medina.
  10. ^ The tax here refers to the Zakat.
  11. ^ The exact words spoken by Abu Bakr As-Siddiq remain uncertain, but the meaning is consistent across sources.
  12. ^ Clan of Muhammad.
  13. ^ According to Yaqut al-Rumi, Dhu Husa is located about 160 kilometres (99 mi) east of Medina, just west of Al-Rabadha.
  14. ^ The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993
  15. ^ The halter was used on camels, which at that time were the primary means of transporting Zakat. In some cases, the camels themselves were directly considered as Zakat, and it was required that the halters accompanying the camels be given in payment. The term also came to mean, by extension, a year of Zakat itself.
  16. ^ To perform the ritual prayer while paying the Zakat.
  17. ^ These camels were used for transporting goods, and according to Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari, these camels were specifically used for carrying water.
  18. ^ Used for transporting goods.
  19. ^ Used for transporting people.
  20. ^ Or saddle camels, used for transporting people.
  21. ^ 8 Jumada al-Awwal in 11 AH
  22. ^ Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari identifies the apostate rebels as the Banu Dhubyan and the Banu Abs. He also states that "their supporters did the same." Although no further information specifies the identity of these supporters, it is likely they were those who participated in the battle (cf. table in the "Background" section and page 76 in his work The History of al-Tabari Volume 10: The Conquest of Arabia).
    Agha Ali Ibrahim Akram, for his part, does not mention specific tribes.

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Khalid Bin Al-Waleed: Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 87
  2. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 63
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 85
  4. ^ a b c d e f Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 63 & 64
  5. ^ a b c Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 86 & 87
  6. ^ a b Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq par Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 64
  7. ^ Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 65
  8. ^ a b c Treasures of Islam by Philip Bamborough - 1976 / Page 14
  9. ^ The Arabs by Hodgkin E.C - 1966 / Page 28
  10. ^ a b c The Great Arab Conquests by Hugh Kennedy - 2008 / Page 108
  11. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 84
  12. ^ a b c The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 69
  13. ^ Les derniers jours de Muhammad by Hela Ouardi / Page 40 & 41
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 72
  15. ^ a b The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 71 & 74
  16. ^ a b c d The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 70
  17. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 96
  18. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 74
  19. ^ Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 60
  20. ^ Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020 / Page 74
  21. ^ a b c The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 71
  22. ^ a b Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 61
  23. ^ Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020 / Page 76
  24. ^ a b Biography of Khalifa Abu Bakr Siddiq by Supremeseerah Publisher - 2023 / Page 62
  25. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020 / Page 77
  26. ^ a b c d e f g h i j The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 73
  27. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 86
  28. ^ Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020
  29. ^ Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020 / Page 62
  30. ^ Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs by Tamir Abu Suood Muhammad - 2020 / Page 62 & 63
  31. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 75
  32. ^ The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 73 & 74
  33. ^ a b The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 75 & 76
  34. ^ a b c d e The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 76
  35. ^ The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 67
  36. ^ The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 65
  37. ^ a b c d Khalid Bin Al-Waleed Sword Of Allah by A. I. Akram - 2009 / Page 88
  38. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. by Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari - 1993 / Page 77

Sources

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Bibliography

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  • Akram, Agha Ali Ibrahim (2009). Sword of Allah: Khalid Bin Al-waleed, His Life and Campaigns. Adam Publishers & Distributors. p. 504. ISBN 978-8174355218.
  • Bamborough, Philip (1977). Treasures of Islam. New York: Arco Pub. Co. p. 164. ISBN 978-0668041782., ISBN 0668041781
  • Hodgkin, E.C (1991). The Arabs. The Darwin Press, Inc. p. 164. ISBN 978-0668041782., ISBN 0668041781
  • Jandora, John Walter (1991). The March from Medina: A Revisionist Study of the Arab Conquests. London Oxford University Press. p. 155. ISBN 978-0940670334., ISBN 094067033X
  • Ouardi, Hela (2016). Les derniers jours de Muhammad (in French). Albin Michel. p. 365. ISBN 978-2226316448., ISBN 2226316442
  • ibn Jarir al-Tabari, Muhammad (1993). The History of al-Tabari Vol. 10: The Conquest of Arabia: The Riddah Wars A.D. 632-633/A.H. State University of New York Press. p. 244. ISBN 978-0791410721., ISBN 0791410722
  • Abu Suood Muhammad, Tamir (2020). Biographies of the Rightly Guided Caliphs: Prepared from the Works of ibn Katheer, At Tabari, As Suyuti and Other Historians. p. 416. ISBN 978-1675004272., ISBN 1675004277
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Videography

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  • Omar Al-Farouq [عُمَرْ] (in French). MBC Group & Qatar TV. 2012. MBC1.
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