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====Army of the Tennessee====
[[Image:General U.S. Grant.tif|thumb|upright=0.5|right|[[Ulysses S. Grant|U.S. Grant]]|alt=sitting American Civil War general with beard and short hair]]
The [[Army of the Tennessee]] had the most Union men present at the battle, and it was commanded by Major General Ulysses S. Grant.<ref name="Shaara6"/><ref name="Scott100">{{harvnb|Scott|1884|p=100}}</ref> InTwo Februarymonths 1862earlier, a smaller version of [[Ulysses S. Grant and the American Civil War#Battles of Belmont, Fort Henry, and Fort Donelson|Grant's army]], with the assistance of gunboats under the command of [[Flag officer|Flag-Officer]] [[Andrew Hull Foote|Andrew H. Foote]], had been the victor in the Battle of Fort Henry and the Battle of Fort Donelson. Grant had had three infantry divisions in that campaign, commanded by John McClernand, Charles F. Smith, and Lew Wallace.<ref name="Shaara5"/>{{#tag:ref|Grant received national attention after the two victories in Tennessee. Theand jealouspromotion to major general of volunteers. Major General Henry Halleck attempted to "knocksideline Grant and accused him down"of drunkenness and failing to obey orders--this was attributed to machinations by usingthe untruejealous accusationsBuell ofand excessHalleck's drinkingpersonal frustration at being denied ultimate command in the Western theater. However, Halleck did get the command he sought in mid-March and neglecthis offeud with Grant reportssubsided.<ref name="Chernow189">{{harvnb|Chernow|2017|p=189}}</ref> Grant was removed from command on March 4 and replaced by Major General [[Charles Ferguson Smith|Charles F. Smith]], less than three weeks after achieving the greatest Union victory (at that time) of the war.<ref name="Daniel53">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=53}}</ref> After [[President of the United States|President]] [[Abraham Lincoln]] indirectly requested backup for the accusations against Grant, and Halleck received a promotion on March 11, Halleck stated that Grant had never been insubordinate and restored him to command.<ref name="Chernow194">{{harvnb|Chernow|2017|p=194}}</ref> Grant arrived in Savannah on March 17 to reassume command.<ref name="Cunningham84">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=84}}</ref>|group=Note}} For the Battle of Shiloh, Grant's army had 48,894 men in six divisions.<ref name="Daniel322"/> Two new divisions (4th and 5th) were added to Grant's three in early March.<ref name="Cunningham74">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=74}}</ref> A 6th Division was created from reinforcement units at the beginning of April. Charles F. Smith had been named by Halleck to command the expedition down the Tennessee River with the idea of sidelining Grant and operational command of his division went to W.H.L. Wallace, but Smith was injured in an accident in mid-March and died on April 25. On April 5, Grant learned that McClernand and Lew Wallace had both been promoted to major generals of volunteers despite neither man being a professional soldier.<ref name="Cunningham107">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=107}}</ref> The divisions (and gunboats) were as follows:
* 1st Division was commanded by Major General [[John Alexander McClernand]].<ref name="Daniel319">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=319}}</ref> This division consisted of veteran fighters.<ref name="Daniel106">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=106}}</ref>
* 2nd Division was commanded by Brigadier General [[W. H. L. Wallace|William H. L. Wallace]].<ref name="Daniel319"/> His men were veterans, but Wallace had been newly appointed commander after an injury to Major General Charles Smith.<ref name="Daniel109">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=109}}</ref> Colonel [[James M. Tuttle]], one of the brigade commanders, would eventually lead this division.<ref name="Daniel245">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=245}}</ref>
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Around 5:30{{nbsp}}am, Confederate leaders heard the commotion at Fraley Field, and Johnston ordered a general attack.<ref name="Daniel144"/> Johnston instructed Beauregard to stay in the rear and direct men and supplies as needed. Johnston rode to the front to lead the men on the battle line, and this arrangement effectively ceded control of the battle to Beauregard.<ref name="Eicher226">{{harvnb|Eicher|2001|p=226}}</ref>{{#tag:ref|Johnston was under tremendous pressure to perform well after the losses in Tennessee.<ref name="McPherson405"/> He felt that he could make his army more effective by inspiring his inexperienced troops in person.<ref name="Esposito34">{{harvnb|Esposito|1959|p=34}}</ref>|group=Note}} On the Union side, Powell sent a message to Colonel Peabody that he was being driven back by an enemy force of several thousand.<ref name="Daniel145">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=145}}</ref> Hearing the fighting, Prentiss soon learned that Peabody had sent out a patrol without authorization. Prentiss was outraged and accused Peabody of provoking a major engagement in violation of Grant's orders. However, he soon understood that he was facing a large Confederate force and sent reinforcements.<ref name="Daniel147">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=147}}</ref> Peabody's patrol, with Powell leading, partially ruined the planned Confederate surprise and gave thousands of Union soldiers time (although brief) to prepare for battle.<ref name="Cunningham154">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=154}}</ref> Although Peabody's patrol had alerted the Union army, some Union leaders were not convinced that they were under attack. Sherman was not convinced until he wassustained slightlya woundedgrazing wound to his hand, and one of his orderlies shot dead, after a 7:00{{nbsp}}am ride to investigate the commotion near Rea Field.<ref name="Daniel158">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=158}}</ref>
 
After Johnston's 5:30 order for a general attack, it took an hour before all Confederate troops were ready. Another hour was lost skirmishing at Seay Field (close to Fraley Field). This reduced the Confederate advantage from the unexpected attack.<ref name="Daniel149">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=149}}</ref> The Confederate army alignment was another issue that helped reduce the attack's effectiveness. The corps of Hardee and Bragg began the assault with their divisions in one line that was nearly {{convert|3|mi|km}} wide.<ref name="Cunningham200">{{harvnb|Cunningham|2009|p=200}}</ref> At about 7:30{{nbsp}}am Beauregard ordered the corps of Polk and Breckinridge forward on the left and right of the line, which only extended the line and diluted the effectiveness of the two attacking corps.<ref name="Esposito34"/> It became impossible to control the intermingled units, so the corps commanders decided to divide the battlefield, and each commander led their battlefield portion instead of their own corps.<ref name="Cunningham200"/> The attack went forward as a [[frontal assault]].<ref name="Eicher224-226">{{harvnb|Eicher|2001|pp=224-226}}</ref> Johnston and Beauregard did not put more strength on the east side, which meant they did not focus on their objective of turning the Union left.<ref name="Daniel119">{{harvnb|Daniel|1997|p=119}}</ref>