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== Security considerations ==
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Most wind/solar infrastructure has historically not been monitored or had any concrete security measures in place; it is only in the aftermath of the Nord stream attack that companies are starting to monitor offshore wind farms using, for example, remote monitoring CCTV and drones.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Gronholt pedersen |first=Jacob |last2=Kate |first2=Abnett |date=26 October 2023 |title=Europe's wind power goal hits new snag: security |url=https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/europes-wind-power-goal-hits-new-snag-security-2023-10-26/ |url-status=live |work=Reuters}}</ref> Given the expected increase in number and geographical distribution of windfarms in the coming years, more effective measures are needed to cover security blind spots, including those below the waterline. Issues around intelligence sharing among various stakeholders and governing bodies will also need to be addressed.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bueger |first=Christian |last2=Edmunds |first2=Timothy |date=2023 |title=Maritime Security and the Wind. Threats and Risks to renewable energy infrastructures offshore |url=https://rgdoi.net/10.13140/RG.2.2.23647.64167 |journal=Research Gate |language=en |pages=17 |doi=10.13140/RG.2.2.23647.64167 |via=Research gate}}</ref>
Furthermore, such infrastructure is vulnerable to greyzone/hybrid warfare, and this should be taken into account when developing and implementing security measures. Hostile actors have already been observed surveilling EU maritime infrastructure<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gupte |first=Eklavya |last2=Elliott |first2=Stuart |last3=Edwardes-Evans |first3=Henry |last4=Griffin |first4=Rosemary |date=20 February 2023 |title=Dutch intelligence warns of Russian sabotage against its key maritime, energy facilities |url=https://www.spglobal.com/commodityinsights/en/market-insights/latest-news/oil/022023-dutch-intelligence-warns-of-russian-sabotage-against-its-key-maritime-energy-facilities |url-status=live |website=S&P Global}}</ref> further indicating the potential for greyzone hybrid warfare, which could potentially trigger NATO article 5.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Monaghan |first=Sean |last2=Svendsen |first2=Otto |last3=Darrah |first3=Michael |last4=Arnold |first4=Ed |date=19 December 2023 |title=NATO’s Role in Protecting Critical Undersea Infrastructure |url=https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/2023-12/231219_Monaghan_NATO_CUI.pdf?VersionId=6Usacn9I0OlKjF6t4s4XhehMIVROp74W |url-status=live |website=www.csis.org}}</ref>
Insufficient consideration has been given to addressing these threats through robust risk assessment and fit-for-purpose security protocols to counter the risk of serious threats.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Bajarūnas |first=Eitvydas |date=22 March 2020 |title=Addressing Hybrid Threats: Priorities for the EU in 2020 and Beyond |url=http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1781685820912041 |journal=European View |language=en |volume=19 |issue=1 |pages=62–70 |doi=10.1177/1781685820912041 |issn=1781-6858}}</ref>
In addition, a large proportion of critical parts for constructing and maintaining maritime wind and solar infrastructure is manufactured outside of the EU/NATO states, which potentially represents a supply chain risk.<ref>{{Cite web |date=29 June 2023 |title=EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure: Final assessment report |url=https://commission.europa.eu/system/files/2023-06/EU-NATO_Final%20Assessment%20Report%20Digital.pdf |url-status=live}}</ref>
Cybersecurity is another important area of concern; in 2022, the German wind turbine company Nordex SE was attacked using ransomware<ref>{{Cite news |last=Tsanova |first=Tsvetomira |date=18 April 2022 |title=Russia-backing Conti claims Nordex cyber attack |url=https://renewablesnow.com/news/update-2-russia-backing-conti-claims-nordex-cyber-attack-781245/ |url-status=live |work=Renewables Now}}</ref> and in the same year, following a cyberattack on the Viasat Inc. KA-SAT satellite network, the German wind turbine manufacturer Enercon temporarily lost communication with 5,800 of its wind turbines.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Willuhn |first=Marian |date=1 March 2022 |title=Satellite cyber attack paralyzes 11GW of German wind turbines |url=https://energycentral.com/news/satellite-cyber-attack-paralyzes-11gw-german-wind-turbines |url-status=live |work=energy cental}}</ref>
==Largest offshore wind farms==
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