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{{Campaignbox Maryland Campaign}}
The '''Maryland campaign''' (or '''Antietam campaign''') occurred September 4–20, 1862, during the [[American Civil War]]. The campaign was [[Confederate States Army|Confederate]] [[General (CSA)|
Following his victory in the [[northern Virginia campaign]], Lee moved north with 55,000 men through the [[Shenandoah Valley]] starting on September 4, 1862. His objective was to resupply his army outside of the war-torn Virginia theater and to damage Northern morale in anticipation of the November elections. He undertook the risky maneuver of splitting his army so that he could continue north into Maryland while simultaneously capturing the Federal garrison and arsenal at [[Harpers Ferry, West Virginia|Harpers Ferry]]. McClellan accidentally found a copy of [[Special Order 191|Lee's orders]] to his subordinate commanders and planned to isolate and defeat the separated portions of Lee's army.
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===Military situation===
{{Main|Northern Virginia campaign|Second Battle of Bull Run}}
{{Further|Peninsula Campaign|Seven Days Battles|Eastern Theater of the American Civil War|Confederate Heartland Offensive|American Civil War}}
[[File:ATLAS OR VIRGINIA-MARYLAND-PENNSYLVANIA.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Northern Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania (
[[File:ATLAS OR VIRGINIA MAP.jpg|thumb|upright=1.5|Southern Virginia
The year 1862 started out well for [[Union (American Civil War)|Union]] forces in the [[Eastern Theater of the American Civil War|Eastern Theater]]. George B. McClellan's Army of the Potomac had invaded the [[Virginia Peninsula]] during the [[Peninsula Campaign]] and by June stood only a few miles outside the Confederate capital at [[Richmond, Virginia|Richmond]]. But, when Robert E. Lee assumed command of the Army of Northern Virginia on June 1, fortunes reversed. Lee
The Confederates had suffered significant manpower losses in the wake of the summer campaigns. Nevertheless, Lee decided his army was ready for a great challenge: an invasion of the North. His goal was to reach the major Northern states of Maryland and [[Pennsylvania]], and cut off the [[Baltimore
Several motives led to Lee's decision to launch an invasion. First, he needed to supply his army and knew the farms of the North had been untouched by war, unlike those in Virginia. Moving the war northward would relieve pressure on Virginia. Second was the issue of Northern morale. Lee knew the Confederacy did not have to win the war by defeating the North militarily; it merely needed to make the Northern populace and government unwilling to continue the fight. With the Congressional elections of 1862 approaching in November, Lee believed that an invading army playing havoc inside the North could tip the balance of [[U.S. Congress|Congress]] to the [[United States Democratic Party|Democratic Party]], which might force [[Abraham Lincoln]] to negotiate an end to the war. He told [[President of the Confederate States|Confederate President]] [[Jefferson Davis]] in a letter of September 3 that the enemy was "much weakened and demoralized."<ref>McPherson, pp. 89–92; Glatthaar, p. 164; Eicher, p. 337.</ref>
There were secondary reasons as well. The Confederate invasion might be able to incite an uprising in Maryland, especially given that it was a slave-holding state and many of its citizens held a sympathetic stance toward the South. Some Confederate politicians, including Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign recognition for the Confederacy would be made stronger by a military victory on Northern soil, but there is no evidence that Lee thought the South should base its military plans on this possibility. Nevertheless, the news of the victory at Second Bull Run and the start of Lee's invasion caused considerable diplomatic activity between the Confederate States and [[France]] and the [[United Kingdom]].<ref>McPherson, pp. 91–94; Eicher, p. 337.</ref> Additionally, generals [[Braxton Bragg]] and [[Edmund Kirby Smith]] in the [[Western Theatre of the American Civil War|Western Theatre]] outmaneuvered [[Don Carlos Buell]] to reach the border state of Kentucky from eastern Tennessee through the [[Battle of Richmond]] which coincided with Confederate victories in the East.
After the defeat of Pope at Second Bull Run, President Lincoln reluctantly returned to the man who had mended a broken army before—George B. McClellan, who had done it after the Union defeat at the [[First Battle of Bull Run]] (First Manassas). He knew that McClellan was a strong organizer and a skilled trainer of troops, able to recombine the units of Pope's army with the Army of the Potomac faster than anyone, and there was no other viable choice for the job except Burnside, who was asked and declined command of the army. On September 2, Lincoln named McClellan to command "the fortifications of Washington, and all the troops for the defense of the capital."<ref>Rafuse, p. 268; McPherson, pp. 86–87.</ref> The appointment was controversial in the Cabinet, a majority of whom signed a petition declaring to the president "our deliberate opinion that, at this time, it is not safe to entrust to Major General McClellan the command of any Army of the United States."<ref>Sears, ''McClellan'', p. 260.</ref> The president admitted that it was like "curing the bite with the hair of the dog." But Lincoln told his secretary, John Hay, "We must use what tools we have. There is no man in the Army who can man these fortifications and lick these troops of ours into shape half as well as he. If he can't fight himself, he excels in making others ready to fight."<ref name=Bailey15>Bailey, ''Bloodiest Day'', p. 15.</ref>
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The XII Corps under Nathaniel Banks had a poor reputation; it had been badly defeated by "Stonewall" Jackson's troops during the Valley Campaign in spring, had fought poorly at Cedar Mountain, and Pope held the corps and Banks in such low regard that he kept them away from the Second Bull Run battlefield. Banks was dropped from command of the XII Corps and eventually sent to Louisiana. Brig. Gen [[Alpheus Williams]] temporarily commanded the corps until Joseph Mansfield assumed command on September 14.
The III Corps and XI Corps had both suffered severe losses at Second Bull Run and were almost driven from the field in panic; they were left behind in Washington, D.C., to rest and refit. The III Corps were excellent troops who had fought hard on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, while the XI Corps, consisting of a large number of German-American troops, as well as its commander Maj. Gen [[Franz Sigel]] had a poor reputation and no record of success on the battlefield.
McClellan was thus able to use his influence to remove several underperforming generals, namely McDowell, Heintzelman, and Banks; the Army of the Potomac in this regard was a little behind its Confederate opponent as Lee had been able to purge his ranks of inadequate generals in the aftermath of the Seven Days Battles. The administration had wanted to remove Porter and Franklin, whom they considered politically suspect, but McClellan was able to retain them for this campaign.
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[[File:Confederates marching through Frederick, MD in 1862.jpg|thumb|Confederate troops marching south on N Market Street, Frederick, Maryland, during the Civil War]]
On September 3, just two days after the [[Battle of Chantilly]], Lee wrote to President Davis that he had decided to cross into Maryland unless the president objected. On the same day, Lee began shifting his army north and west from Chantilly towards [[Leesburg, Virginia]]. On September 4, advance elements of the Army of Northern Virginia crossed into Maryland from [[Loudoun County, Virginia|Loudoun County]]. The main body of the army advanced into [[Frederick, Maryland]], on September 7. The 55,000-man army had been reinforced by troops who had been defending Richmond—the divisions of Maj. Gens. [[Daniel Harvey Hill|D.H. Hill]] and [[Lafayette McLaws]] and two brigades under
Lee's invasion coincided with another strategic offensive by the Confederacy. Generals [[Braxton Bragg]] and [[Edmund Kirby Smith]] had simultaneously launched invasions of
Davis's draft proclamation did not reach his generals until after they had issued proclamations of their own. They stressed that they had come as liberators, not conquerors, to these [[Border states (American Civil War)|border states]], but they did not address the larger issue of the Confederate strategy shift as Davis had desired. Lee's proclamation announced to the people of Maryland that his army had come "with the deepest sympathy [for] the wrongs that have been inflicted upon the citizens of the commonwealth allied to the States of the South by the strongest social, political, and commercial ties ... to aid you in throwing off this foreign yoke, to enable you again to enjoy the inalienable rights of freemen."<ref>McPherson, p. 91; Sears, ''Landscape'', pp. 68–69.</ref>
===Dividing Lee's army===
Lee divided his army into four parts as it moved into Maryland. After receiving intelligence of militia activity in [[Chambersburg, Pennsylvania|Chambersburg]], Lee sent Maj. Gen. [[James Longstreet]] to [[Boonsboro, Maryland|Boonsboro]] and then to [[Hagerstown, Maryland|Hagerstown]].
The specific reason Lee chose this risky strategy of splitting his army to capture Harpers Ferry is not known. One possibility is that he knew it commanded his supply lines through the [[Shenandoah Valley]]. Before he entered Maryland he had assumed that the Federal garrisons at [[Winchester, Virginia|Winchester]], [[Martinsburg, West Virginia|Martinsburg]], and Harpers Ferry would be cut off and abandoned without firing a shot (and, in fact, both Winchester and Martinsburg were evacuated).<ref name="Sears83">Sears, ''Landscape'', p. 83.</ref> Another possibility is that it was simply a tempting target with many vital supplies but virtually indefensible, as it was dominated on all sides by higher ground.<ref name="E339" /> McClellan had requested permission from Washington to evacuate Harpers Ferry and attach its garrison to his army, but his request was refused by general-in-chief [[Henry Halleck]].<ref>Rafuse, pp. 285–86.</ref>
===Reactions to invasion===
Lee's invasion was fraught with difficulties from the beginning. The Confederate Army's numerical strength suffered
Upon entering Maryland, the Confederates found little support
Maryland and Pennsylvania, alarmed and outraged by the invasion, rose at once to arms.
In Maryland, panic was much more widespread than in Pennsylvania, which was not yet immediately threatened. [[Baltimore]], which Lee incorrectly regarded as a hotbed of secession merely waiting for the appearance of Confederate armies to revolt, took up the war call against him immediately.<ref>Sears, ''Landscape'', pp. 99–100.</ref>
When it was learned in Baltimore that Southern armies had crossed the Potomac River, the reaction was one of instantaneous hysteria followed quickly by stoic resolution. Crowds milled in the street outside newspaper offices waiting for the latest bulletins, and the sale of liquor was halted to restrain the excitable. The public stocked up on food and other essentials, fearing a [[siege]]. [[Philadelphia]] was also sent into a flurry of frenzied preparations, despite being over 150 miles (240 km) from Hagerstown and in no immediate danger.<ref>Sears, ''Landscape'', pp. 100–01.</ref>
===McClellan's pursuit===
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|source=Brig. Gen. [[John Gibbon]]<ref>McPherson, p. 105.</ref>
}}
Maj. Gen. [[George B. McClellan]] and the Union [[Army of the Potomac]] moved out of Washington starting on September 7 with his 87,000-man army in a lethargic pursuit.<ref>Eicher, p. 339.</ref> He was a naturally cautious general and assumed he would be facing over 120,000 Confederates. He also was maintaining running arguments with the government in Washington, demanding that the forces defending the capital city report to him.<ref>Esposito, map 65; Eicher, p. 340.</ref> The army started with relatively low morale, a consequence of its defeats on the Peninsula and at Second Bull Run, but upon crossing into Maryland, their spirits were boosted by the "friendly, almost tumultuous welcome" that they received from the citizens of the state.<ref>McPherson, pp. 104–05.</ref>
Although he was being pursued
The Army of the Potomac reached [[Frederick, Maryland]], on September 13. There, Cpl. Barton Mitchell of the 27th Indiana Infantry discovered a mislaid copy of the detailed campaign plans of Lee's army—[[Special Order 191]]—wrapped around three cigars. The order indicated that Lee had divided his army and dispersed portions geographically, thus making each subject to isolation and defeat
On the night of September 13, the Army of the Potomac moved toward [[South Mountain (Maryland and Pennsylvania)|South Mountain]], with Maj. Gen. [[Ambrose Burnside
Lee, seeing McClellan's uncharacteristic aggressive actions, and possibly learning through a Confederate sympathizer that his order had been compromised,<ref>Sears, ''Landscape'', pp. 350–52. General Lee made no reference to the lost order in his 1862 reports, and it was not until 1863, after McClellan had published his own report, that Lee acknowledged the circumstances of McClellan's intelligence find. However, in interviews after the war, he mentioned the Confederate sympathizer who had supposedly witnessed McClellan reading the order. Discovery of these interviews prompted [[Douglas Southall Freeman]] to include this information in his 1946 ''Lee's Lieutenants'' (a revised view from his 1934 work, the four volume biography of Lee), which has led to citations in subsequent sources. Sears argues that "there is substantial evidence that in this instance Lee's memory failed him" and that the "conclusion seems inescapable that Lee learned from the Maryland civilian only that the Federal army had suddenly become active" and nothing more.</ref> quickly moved to concentrate his army. He chose not to abandon his invasion and return to Virginia
==Battles of the Maryland campaign==
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[[File:US ARMY MARYLAND CAMPAIGN MAP 3 (SOUTH MOUNTAIN).jpg|thumb|left|300px]]
Pitched battles were fought on September 14 for possession of the South Mountain passes: Crampton's, Turner's, and [[Fox's Gap]]s. Maj. Gen. [[D.H. Hill]] defended Turner's and Fox's Gaps against Burnside. To the south, Maj. Gen. [[Lafayette McLaws]] defended Crampton's Gap against Franklin, who was able to break through at Crampton's Gap, but the Confederates were able to hold Turner's and Fox's, if only precariously. (For the counter argument that the Union held Fox's Gap, see Older, Curtis L., ''Hood's Defeat Near Fox's Gap September 14, 1862''.)<ref>
===Antietam (Sharpsburg)===
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[[File:Antietam Overview.png|thumb|upright=1.5|Battle of Antietam (Sharpsburg), '''September 17''', 1862]]
[[File:Antietam, Md. Confederate dead in a ditch on the right wing used as a rifle pit LOC cwpb.00240.jpg|thumb|right|Confederate dead at Antietam in the "Bloody Lane"]]
On September 16, McClellan confronted Lee near Sharpsburg. Lee was defending a line to the west of [[Antietam Creek]]. At dawn on September 17, Maj. Gen. [[Joseph Hooker]]'s I Corps mounted a powerful assault on Lee's left [[flanking maneuver|flank]] that began the bloody battle. Attacks and counterattacks swept across the Miller Cornfield and the woods near the Dunker Church as Maj. Gen. [[Joseph K. Mansfield]]'s [[XII Corps (Union Army)|XII Corps]] joined to reinforce Hooker. Union assaults against the Sunken Road ("Bloody Lane") by Maj. Gen. [[Edwin V. Sumner]]'s [[II Corps (Union Army)|II Corps]] eventually pierced the Confederate center, but the Federal advantage was not pressed. In the afternoon, Burnside's IX Corps crossed a stone bridge over Antietam Creek and rolled up the Confederate right. At a crucial moment, A.P. Hill's division arrived from Harpers Ferry and counterattacked, driving back Burnside's men and saving Lee's army from destruction. Although outnumbered two to one, Lee committed his entire force, while McClellan sent in only four of his six available corps. This enabled Lee to shift brigades across the battlefield and counter each individual Union assault. During the night, both armies consolidated their lines. In spite of crippling casualties—Union 12,401, or 25%; Confederate 10,316, or 31%—Lee continued to skirmish with McClellan throughout September 18, while transporting his wounded men south of the Potomac. McClellan did not renew the offensive. After dark, Lee ordered the battered Army of Northern Virginia to withdraw across the Potomac into the Shenandoah Valley.<ref>McPherson, pp. 116–31; Esposito, maps 67–69; Eicher, pp. 348–63.</ref>
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Although a tactical draw, the Battle of Antietam was a strategic victory for the Union. It forced the end of Lee's strategic invasion of the North and gave Abraham Lincoln the victory he was awaiting before announcing the [[Emancipation Proclamation]] on September 22, which took effect on January 1, 1863. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation. The Confederate reversal at Antietam also dissuaded the governments of [[Second French Empire|France]] and [[United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland|Great Britain]] from [[Diplomatic recognition|recognizing]] the Confederacy. And, with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation, it became less likely that future battlefield victories would induce foreign recognition. Lincoln had effectively highlighted [[slavery]] as a tenet of the Confederate States of America, and the abhorrence of slavery in France and Great Britain would not allow for intervention on behalf of the South.<ref>McPherson, pp. 138–39, 146–49; Eicher, pp. 365–66.</ref>
The Union lost
{{Gallery
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|date=October 20, 1862
}}
* U.S. War Department, [http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/moawar/waro.html ''The War of the Rebellion'']: ''a Compilation of the [[Official Records of the American Civil War|Official Records]] of the Union and Confederate Armies''. Washington,
==Further reading==
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* Murfin, James V. ''The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862''. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. {{ISBN|0-8071-0990-8}}.
* Orrison, Robert, and Kevin R. Pawlak. ''To Hazard All: A Guide to the Maryland Campaign, 1862''. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2018. {{ISBN|978-1-61121-409-3}}.
* Perry D. Jamieson and Bradford A. Wineman, [http://www.history.army.mil/html/books/075/75-6/index.html ''The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862–1863'']. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2015. CMH Pub
* Older, Curtis L. ''Hood's Defeat Near Fox's Gap September 14, 1862.'' Kindle and Apple Books. {{ISBN|978-0-9960067-5-0}}.
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