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[[File:Mercury-Atlas 8 simulated launch activities.jpg|thumb|right|upright|The booster and spacecraft stacked for a simulated launch on September 29|alt=A smooth cylindrical rocket, with a small conical spacecraft at its tip, with its base held by a metal cradle. It is connected by a long cable to a tall framework structure to its right.]]
The capsule built for the mission, Mercury Spacecraft No. 16, had been delivered to [[Cape Canaveral Air Force Station|Cape Canaveral]] on January 16, 1962.<ref>Grimwood, p. 157</ref> The [[Atlas LV-3B]] booster assigned to the mission, No. 113-D, was accepted by NASA at the Convair plant on July 27 and delivered on August 8.<ref>Grimwood, p. 169</ref> After the delayed arrival of the booster at the Cape, the Air Force then revealed that two recent static firings of MA-3 engines had suffered turbopump failures, and that the explosion of Atlas 11F one second after liftoff in April had been traced to a malfunction of the sustainer turbopump. All of these failures had occurred while the sustainer HS valve was moving to the open position and while running untested hardware modifications. The Air Force recommended that NASA conduct a static firing test of 113D just to be on the safe side. On September 6, the tests were scheduled to continue until September 24, which allowed for a probable launch on October 3.<ref>''This New Ocean'', p. 467</ref> A static firing test on the pad would expose the sustainer turbopump to the failure mode in question. In the meantime, a fuel leak caused by a faulty weld in a piece of plumbing caused further delays. The static firing test was carried out on September 8<ref>Grimwood, p. 170</ref> and the booster reported as ready for assembly on September 18. The Flight Safety Review Board met on September 24 to go over the fifteen Atlas launches since Carpenter's flight, which included three failures. Atlas 67E malfunctioned due to a random quality control fault that would be avoided with the tightly managed Mercury program, and Atlas 145D had sent [[Mariner 1]] into the Atlantic Ocean thanks to a guidance system problem, which was of no concern to Mercury as its boosters used a different model of guidance system. Atlas 57F went off-course and was destroyed by RSO action, but more than a month later, the Air Force had not yet announced any cause of the failure.<ref>Grimwood, pp. 171–2</ref>
Concerns had been raised that the radiation belt produced in orbit by the recent [[Operation Dominic]] nuclear tests would be dangerous to crewed space missions, but an extensive study announced in early September declared that it was safe to fly. While the outside of the capsule was expected to receive a dosage of around 500 [[röntgens]], the study concluded that shielding and the effect of the spacecraft structure would reduce this to around 8 röntgens experienced by the astronaut, well within established tolerance limits.<ref>Grimwood, p. 170. To put this in context, an unprotected dose of 500 röntgens over a few hours would be easily fatal.</ref>
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