Talk:Tax

Taxation As Coercion

This is where I'm supposed to contend issues, right? I have reverted the link to the word "imposition" to coercion several times and have commented on this on my user page, where my explanation for taxation bring coercive is. I'm suspecting that I'm probably being disruptive, and seek to maintain civility and consensus, rather than having an editing war, which is inherently unproductive. To this end, please visit my user page and review my argument. Shyguy76767 (talk) 02:31, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

Place any argument on an appropriate talk page, not on your user page. Although I, personally, agree that taxation is coercive, it's not a mainstream view, so not appear on Wikipedia except as an alternative view. — Arthur Rubin (talk) 02:57, 27 January 2015 (UTC)

errors

"The purpose of taxes is to raise revenue to fund government. Money provided by taxation has been used by states and their functional equivalents throughout history to carry out many functions." this is all wrong, see http://www.epicoalition.org/docs/soft0004.htm 62.178.89.78 (talk) 19:04, 28 February 2016 (UTC)

Dear IP 62.178.89.78: No, the quote you provided is not "all wrong." And, please study Wikipedia's rules and guidelines. Famspear (talk) 23:36, 28 February 2016 (UTC)

New Section or Relevant Page: Fiscal Capacity

Hello! I am a student editor that is thinking of starting a new page for Fiscal Capacity. I am posting a bibliography on this page, as State-building and Tax are perhaps the best pages to ask for feedback. I plan on approaching Fiscal Capacity in within the arguments of two strains of literature: One is about state capacity (Tilly, Herbst, Schumpeter) and the other is from the more recent and emerging public finance literature. I would appreciate any feedback! Thanks. ----Vivianliu94 (talk) 04:12, 5 March 2016 (UTC)

Bibliography: What I'll read first:

• Gordon, Roger; Wei, Li. 2005. "Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation".
• Besley, Tim. Persson, Torsten. "Public Finance and Development" 2011. WORKING PAPER
• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson. 2007. The Origins of State Capacity: Property Rights, Taxation and Politics. NBER working paper No. 13028
• Johnson, Noel D.; Koyama, Mark. 2015. States and Economic Growth: Capacity and Constraints.
• Cukierman, Alex, Sebastian Edwards and Guido Tabellini. 1992. "Seignorage and political Instability". American Economic Review, vol 82, 537-555.
• Herbst, Jeffrey I. 2000. "State and Power in Africa: Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control" Comparative Lessons in Authority and Control, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Levi, Margaret. 1988. "Of Rule and Revenue", Berkeley: University of California Press.
• Migdal, Joel S. 1998. "Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World". Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press.
• Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1918. "The Crisis of the Tax State" International Economic Papers, vol. 4, 5-38.
• Tilly, Charles. 1985. "Warmaking and State Making as Organized Crime" in Evans Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), "Bringing the State Back In". Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Then:

• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2013, “Taxation and development”, Chapter 2 in Auerbach, A, R. Chetty, M. Feldstein, and E. Saez (eds.) Handbook of Public Economics.
• Besley, Timothy and Torsten Persson, 2014, “The causes and consequences of development clusters: State capacity, peace and income”, Annual Review of Economics 6, 927-949.
• Besley, Timothy, and Torsten Persson. 2014. “Why Do Developing Countries Tax So Little?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 28 (4): 99–120. doi:10.1257/jep.28.4.99.
• Gennaioli, Nicola, and Hans-Joachim Voth. 2015. “State Capacity and Military Conflict.” The Review of Economic Studies 82 (4): 1409–48. doi:10.1093/restud/rdv019.
• Gordon, Roger, and Wei Li. 2009. “Tax Structures in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation.” Journal of Public Economics 93 (7–8): 855–66. doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.04.001.
• Fisman, Raymond, and Shang‐Jin Wei. 2004. “Tax Rates and Tax Evasion: Evidence from ‘Missing Imports’ in China.” Journal of Political Economy 112 (2): 471–96. doi:10.1086/381476.
• Olken, Benjamin A, and Monica Singhal. 2011. “Informal Taxation.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3 (4): 1–28. doi:10.1257/app.3.4.1.
• Best, Michael Carlos, Anne Brockmeyer, Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Johannes Spinnewijn, and Mazhar Waseem. 2015. “Production versus Revenue Efficiency with Limited Tax Capacity: Theory and Evidence from Pakistan.” Journal of Political Economy 123 (6): 1311–55. doi:10.1086/683849.
• Piketty, Thomas, and Nancy Qian. 2009. “Income Inequality and Progressive Income Taxation in China and India, 1986–2015.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 1 (2): 53–63. doi:10.1257/app.1.2.53.
• Pomeranz, Dina. 2015. “No Taxation without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in the Value Added Tax †.” American Economic Review 105 (8): 2539–69. doi:10.1257/aer.20130393.

External links

Hello everyone, I am working for the International Trade Centre (ITC), a UN/WTO agency that aims to promote sustainable economic development through trade promotion. I would like to propose the addition of an external link (www.macmap.org) that could lead directly to the online database of customs tariffs and non-tariff market requirements, including Rules of Origin, held by ITC. I would like you to consider this link http://www.macmap.org under theWP:ELYES #3 prescriptions. Moreover, the reliability and the pertinence of this link can be supported by the following facts 1) ITC is part of the United Nations 2) No registration is required to access the tool 3) Market access data (Tariffs, non-tariff measures trade agreements and rules of origin) are regularly updated 4) Market Access Map contains up-to date information on rules of origin under preferential trade agreements, including certificates of origin when available. Thank you, Divoc (talk) 15:13, 21 March 2016 (UTC)