Realtime DNS Exfiltration Detection in Recursive Resolvers

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DNS OARC 40

DNS Exfiltration & Tunneling Tools

- 1. DNSExfiltrator [1]
- 2. lodine [2]
- 3. DNSCat2 [3]
- 4. dns2tcp [4]

Let's Exfiltrate

```
$ echo "Hello_DNS_Oarc_40_and_Cisco" \
       base32 \
       tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]' \
perl -pe "chomp;" \
                 "my_$n=length;" \
                 "my_$i=0;" \
                 "while($i<$n){" \
                    "my_$s=substr_$_,_$i,_7;" \
                    "printf_\"@{[($i)/7]}.$s.base32.mydomain.com.\n\";" \
                    " i+=7;
>> 0.jbswy3d.base32.mydomain.com.
>> 1.pebce4u.base32.mydomain.com.
>> 2.zaj5gxe.base32.mydomain.com.
>> 3. vzaggvc. base32. mvdomain.com.
>> 4.aylomgq.base32.mydomain.com.
>> 5.eg2ltmn.base32.mydomain.com.
>> 6.xqu===.base32.mydomain.com.
```

DNS Exfiltration & Recursive Resolvers

Enroute a resolver checks the local cache and, if not expired, record served from cache.

Resolver Caches

- 1. Bind [5] tree
- 2. Knot [6] trie, ranked arrays for rrsets
- 3. CoreDNS [7] sharded maps
- 4. DJBDNS [8] doubly-linked list, rrsets form linked list

Cache Objectives

Some say read, write others additionally say update, delete

- 1. Lookup qnames from DNS wire format 001a001b003com
- 2. Qtypes such as A, AAAA, TXT, NS,
- 3. TTLs defining record expiration
- 4. DNSSEC keys

Cache Lookups




Figure: Cache misses force upstream lookups with answers placed in cache

Realtime Blocklist + Tunneling Cache Lookups




Figure: Cache misses force upstream lookups with answers placed in cache

With two caches we can asynchronously update the RBL cache and isolate performance degradation of the Tunneling cache updates and possibly wait to update until answers are given from upstream name servers.

Perplexity Filter

Given a label walk the string and determine if the word is similar to a known corpus (for example Wikipedia). [9]

$$\frac{1}{n-1}\sum_{i=1+1}^{n-1}[\log(p_{i-1})-\log(p_{i-1,i})]$$

Example: Let u, b denote a unigram and bigram count function, respectively. Then, given the string xyz we see $p_0 = u(x), p_1 = u(y)$ and $p_{0,1} = b(x, y), p_{1,2} = b(y, z)$.

Fast Perplexity




Figure: Perplexity represented as a lookup table requiring only addition and division by $n-1\,$

Pseudo-Unique Counts

Let $h: S \to Z^*$ be a 32-bit murmurhash function, with S the set of all character strings. Then define a fingerprint function as:

$$f(x,n) = 1 << (h(x) \mod n)$$

Explanation: We want a pseudo-set with a fixed size *n*. **Example:**

Detection Algorithm

```
for label IN qname do
   if perplexity(label) > threshold then
        label_fingerprint = fingerprint(label, n)
        key = tunnel_cache_key(qname)
        tunnel_cache_update(key, label_fingerprint)
        break
   end if
end for
```

Operations




Figure: Operational and tuning of the algorithm occur through allow-lists, thresholds, debugging tools, and monitoring

Challenges: Cache Fragmentation




Figure: Aggregating traffic per cache is slower than if all caches shared counter states

Challenges: Cache Key-Pairs




Figure: Cache keys contain some non-obvious information to create unique keys that may eat CPU resources so you don't want to construct multiple times.

Then End!

Enjoy the rest of DNS Oarc

Bibliography

- DNSExfiltrator https://github.com/Arno0x/DNSExfiltrator
- lodine https://github.com/yarrick/iodine
- DNSCat2 https://github.com/iagox86/dnscat2
- dns2tcp https://github.com/alex-sector/dns2tcp
- Bind https://github.com/isc-projects/bind9
- Knot https://github.com/CZ-NIC/knot-resolver
- CoreDNS https://github.com/coredns/coredns
- DJBDNS https://cr.yp.to/djbdns.html
- Perplexity and n-gram language models https://web.stanford.edu/jurafsky/slp3/3.pdf