利用者:Sarandora/試訳中記事3
מלחמת העצמאות or מלחמת הקוממיות 1948 Arab–Israeli War 第一次中東戦争 | |||||||||
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パレスチナ戦争中 | |||||||||
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衝突した勢力 | |||||||||
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指揮官 | |||||||||
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戦力 | |||||||||
イスラエル軍 開戦時:2万9677名 休戦時点:11万5000名 |
アラブ連合軍 3500名から6000名 エジプト軍 開戦時:1万名 増派後:2万名 イラク軍 開戦時:3000名 増派後:1万5000名から1万8000名 シリア軍 2500名から5000名 ヨルダン軍 8000名から1万2000名 レバノン軍 1000名[9] サウジアラビア軍 800名から1200名[10] イエメン軍 300名[11] | ||||||||
被害者数 | |||||||||
4000名(軍属のみ) | 8000名[12]~1万5000名[13] | ||||||||
第一次中東戦争とは1948年5月15日から1949年3月10日に発生したイスラエル国と中東諸国との戦争行為を指す。
英語圏においては第一次アラブ・イスラエル戦争(1948 Arab–Israeli War)と呼称されるのが一般であり、陣営の一方であったイスラエルにおいてはイスラエル独立戦争(ヘブライ語: מלחמת העצמאות or מלחמת הקוממיות、Milkhemet Ha'atzma'ut、Milkhemet Hakomemmiyut)、或いは解放戦争(ヘブライ語: מלחמת השחרור, Milkhemet Hashikhrur[14])と呼ばれている。この戦いを契機に始まった一連の戦争を中東戦争と呼び、その点から第一次中東戦争と呼ばれる。
第一次世界大戦時の秘密外交に基いた「パレスチナにおけるアラブ人国家とユダヤ人国家の両立」という問題の放棄を意味するイギリスのパレスチナ信託統治領からの撤退宣言が遠因となった。英軍の撤退によって自治区同士の対立を仲裁する戦力が失われ、また新たに仲裁者となった国連の分割決議案は両者の対立を先鋭化させた。英軍撤退の前日、1948年5月14日の深夜に行われたユダヤ人居住区における独立宣言(イスラエル国)をアラブ人によるパレスチナ支配を支持する周辺諸国は承認せず、ユダヤ人居住区に侵攻した[15]。戦いは主にパレスチナで発生したが、最後には逆襲したイスラエル独立軍がシナイ半島や南レバノンへ攻め返す状態となった[16]。
戦いは深まりつつあったアラブ系住民とユダヤ系住民の対立も決定的なものとなり、互いへの迫害や報復が繰り返された。報復や迫害を恐れたアラブ系住民が大挙してヨルダン領やエジプト領に亡命し(パレスチナ難民)、またアラブ側からの迫害によりイスラエルや中立国へ亡命を強いられるユダヤ系住民も発生した(アラブ諸国におけるユダヤ教徒の亡命)[17]。
戦争は1949年3月10日にはイスラエル優勢の状態で終結し、1949年7月20日に国連の停戦案が調印された。
背景
第二次世界大戦終結後、相次ぐ植民地の独立ラッシュで中東諸国にも複数の国家が成立していた。例えば1946年にヨルダン地方でトランスヨルダンの自治が条件付ながらも承認され、独立を達成していた。またエジプト王国はアングロ・エジプト条約という前提を残しながらも、既に名目上は独立国の権限を回復していた。他にレバノンは大戦中の1943年に独立宣言が出されたが、完全な独立はフランス軍が撤退に追い込まれる1946年まで待たねばならなかった。このような動きに対して、諸国の利害調整の場という名目で自らが主導する国家同盟(アラブ連盟)を組織させた。
一方、イギリスが対処を迫られていた問題の一つにパレスチナ地方の独立運動があった。第一次世界大戦の秘密外交により、イギリスは同地を聖地と考えているユダヤ教徒へ聖地帰還運動(シオニズム)の支援と引き換えに戦争協力を要求した。そして同時期に在地のアラブ系住民(宗教的にはイスラム教徒)にもパレスチナにおけるイスラム国家樹立を条件に協力を要求していた。お互いに矛盾する協定は第二次世界大戦後の独立機運の高まりを経て、無責任な仲裁者であるイギリスへの両住民によるテロ活動へと繋がっていった。深まる混乱に国連が仲裁案を提示、英軍の将来的な撤退に合わせてパレスチナはアラブ系居住区(46%)とユダヤ系居住区(56%)に分離して別々に自治政府を持つと決定された[18]。
ユダヤ系居住区はネゲブ砂漠を中心とし、同地には49万9000名のユダヤ系住民とやや下回る43万8000名のアラブ系住民が混在していた。アラブ系居住区は殆どがアラブ人で占められ、アラブ系住民の81万8000名に対してユダヤ系住民は1000名に留まっていた。またベツレヘムを含むエルサレムは同数程度のユダヤ系・アラブ系住民が住んでいたが、イスラム・ユダヤ両宗教において聖地とされている地域の帰属は棚上げされ、国連の管理下に置かれた[19]。
ユダヤ系住民は分割案を概ね好意的に受け入れたが、エルサレムの帰属など不満も残った。ユダヤ系居住区は「必要最小限の結果[20]であり、国際的承認を得た事は喜ばしいが目標が達せられた訳ではない」と声明した[21]。逆にアラブ系住民は人口比に対してユダヤ系住民への土地分配が多い事に不満を持ち、アラブ民族主義に基いた中東統一を計画していたアラブ連盟も国連案への反対を声明した[22]。1948年5月15日の声明文でアラブ連盟は「国連はフサイン=マクマホン協定に基いてパレスチナでのアラブ国家樹立を認めるべき」だと主張した[23][24]。
分割決議案と英軍撤退が国連で決議された1947年11月30日から英統治政府への両住民のテロ、及び互いの自治区への攻撃によって英領パレスチナは内戦状態に陥っていた[25]。激化する内戦は最終的に英軍撤退と同時に行われたユダヤ系自治区の独立宣言によって最高潮に達して、アラブ諸国の介入による中東戦争が開始された事で内戦から戦争へと発展的に解消するまで続いた[26][27]。
1948年4月、ユダヤ系自治区がハイファを確保するなど優勢を得ると、ユダヤ系自治区からのアラブ系住民の組織的亡命が開始された。1948年5月14日、英軍撤退の前日となる日の深夜にユダヤ系自治区の指導者ダヴィド・ベン=グリオンは独立宣言を行い、イスラエル国が成立した[28]。
政治上の立場
イシューブ(ユダヤ系居住区)
歴史学者ベニー・モリスはイシューブ(ユダヤ系居住区)の目的が戦争を通して変化した部分があったと指摘している[29]。
当初のイシューブが必要と感じていたのは単純かつ控えめな目標であり、即ちは周辺の異民族・異教徒からの攻撃に耐えうる情勢を作り出す事であった。モリスによれば「イシューブ内には(移民計画の進展にも影響を与えた)ナチによるホロコーストの恐怖が思い出されていた。彼らは第二次世界大戦でそれを目の当たりにし、連合軍によってやっと解放された経緯を持っていた」と指摘した上で、パレスチナのユダヤ系移民を排除しようとするアラブ民族主義の台頭が一層に脅威論に信憑性を与えていたと述べている。
戦争が始まって前半は危惧通りに周辺国からの武力攻撃によって亡国の危機に晒されたが、後にこれを押し返すとイシューブ内の目標にも変化があった。彼らは協定で定められたユダヤ系自治区からアラブ諸国軍を追い払うとアラブ系自治区への逆侵攻を開始した。単に侵攻への報復というだけでなく、今後も続くであろう周辺国との対立に備える意味合いがあり、各地に入植地が建設されてユダヤ系自治区への編入に向けた実効支配が行われた。こうした路線は最終的に「安全圏」確立の為、パレスチナ内のアラブ系住民への民族浄化という苛烈な復讐を容認するにまで至ってしまった[29]。
アラブ委員会(アラブ系居住区)
パレスチナ地方におけるアラブ系住民を代表する組織であったアラブ委員会の議長であり、エルサレムのイスラム教徒を指導する立場(マフティー)でもあったアミーン・フサイニーはユダヤ移民問題に極めて排外的な姿勢を維持した。フサイニーは熱心なイスラム教徒にしてアラブ民族主義のナショナリストであり、加えて第二次世界大戦中には枢軸国との関わりすら持っていた[30]。自覚した人種主義者・民族主義者として彼はユダヤ教徒らへのホロコーストを賞賛し、「アラブ諸国もドイツやイタリアの様に積極的に民族浄化を行うべきだ」とまで主張していた[31]。
上記のファシズムやレイシズムへの心酔だけでなく、実際にイギリスなど連合国へのテロ活動を行った為にフサイニーは連合軍から戦犯として追われる立場となった。1948年、刑務所から脱獄してエジプトに亡命、更にダマスカスでアラブ会議を主宰し、パレスチナのアラブ人からなる「聖戦の軍隊」(パレスチナ義勇兵)を組織した。しかし従兄弟のアルカディ・フサイニーや軍司令官ハサン・サラーマが指揮する同部隊の勢力はパレスチナにおいても限定的で、エルサレム周辺のみで活動した。そもそもアラブ連盟はフサイニーが民兵部隊を組織する事に明確な反対を表明していた[32]。結局、人望を集めていたアルカディ・フサイニーの死と共に聖戦の軍隊は急速に衰退した。
ヨルダン王アブドゥッラー1世がイシューブ側と秘密交渉を行ったという噂が流れた後、9月8日にエジプトを筆頭とするアラブ連盟はアミーン・フサイニーを元首とするパレスチナ統一政府を樹立した。歴史学者アヴィ・シュライムは「ガザに首都が設置された統一パレスチナ政府の設立、及び統一政府の指導下で組織だった軍隊を整備させようとする無謀な試みは、イスラエル軍に敗退したアラブ連合軍が撤兵する為に用意した口実でしかなかった」[33]と述べている。聖戦の軍隊も再建されたが、有名無実の存在であった。後にアブドッラー1世は聖戦の軍隊をアラブ軍団に命じて強制的に武装解除させた[34]。
トランス・ヨルダン王国
ヨルダン地域のアラブ人を治めるトランス・ヨルダン王アブドゥッラー1世はパレスチナ周辺の諸勢力の中で最も強大な軍事力を有していた。実質的にヨルダン王軍として機能していた私兵部隊であるアラブ軍団は1万名以上の兵員を抱え、イギリスから招致した軍事顧問団による現代的な訓練教育を受けていた。従ってその存在は一見するとイシューブにとり最大の脅威にも思われたが、実際にユダヤ移民が始まると実態は正反対であった。
異教徒に寛容な君主として、アラブ民族主義やイスラム主義とは距離を置いて積極的にイシューブとのパレスチナ分割を進めた。
アブドゥッラー1世はシオニズムによるユダヤ教徒の移民計画に賛意を示し、そればかりかユダヤ教徒による国家建設についても「余にこれを妨げる考えはない」と宣言した[35]。現実的な人物であったアブドゥッラー1世はパレスチナのアラブ人が独自に国家を作るより、パレスチナでのヨルダン領を増やす方が国益に繋がると結論していた[36]。無論、全パレスチナをヨルダン王国の占領下にできればそれが最善であったが、パレスチナ・ナショナリズムを主張するアラブ委員会との対立を考慮する必要があった。アブドゥッラー1世は「パレスチナ分割」を行うパートナーを用意するという妥協案を用意した.[37][36]。
国連による分割案議論において、アラブ連盟の反対運動の中でヨルダン王国はヨルダン川西岸地区の領有と引き換えに賛成側に転じた[38]。またゴルダ・メイアらによるイシューブ側要人との交渉も行い、ネゲブ砂漠の割譲(地中海へ繋がる港を望んでいたとされる)は拒否されたものの西岸地区領有については了承を得た。何より最大の成果は非公式ではあるが、ヨルダン・イシューブ間の不戦条約を締結していた事である[39]
アブドゥッラー1世は一貫してイシューブ寄りの姿勢を維持したが、イスラエル独立に伴う中東戦争ではアラブ連盟からの強い圧力を受けた。周辺国からの名声を維持する為、ヨルダン王国はアラブ連盟の介入に同意する宣言を出した[35]。戦力的に大きな力を持っていたヨルダン王国は介入軍の中核と見なされ、アブドゥッラー1世も連盟軍の総指揮官と称された[40]。
アラブ連盟
アラブ連盟は加盟国間で最大領土を有するエジプト王国が主導権を握っていたが、その君主であるエジプト王ファールーク1世はイシューブ以上にヨルダン王国に警戒感を抱いていた。彼はアラブ民族主義に基いた統一国家でも主導的な役割を果たす野心を抱いており、独自の発言権を持つアブドゥッラー1世を最大の政敵と考えていた[36]。領土的野心もヨルダン同様に抱いており、内心ではパレスチナ・ナショナリズムによる統一ではなくパレスチナ南部の占領を目論んでいた[36]。アラブ連盟でエジプトに同調していたシリアとレバノンも北パレスチナの併合を望み[36]、イラク王国首相ヌリー・アッサイードも王国拡大に向けた動きを見せていた[36]
結局の所、アラブ連盟の諸勢力の一致した方針は領土拡大の障害となるパレスチナ・ナショナリズムへの消極的姿勢と、加盟国への対抗心であった[36]。これは中東戦争介入後、アラブ連盟が常に内紛を抱えていた事からも理解できる[36]。
戦力
兵器
エジプトはイギリスから供給された兵器を使用し、シリアはフランス軍が遺棄した兵器を装備していた。ユダヤ居住区の兵士はドイツ、チェコスロバキア、及びイギリス駐留軍の装備を使用した[41]。
種類 | アラブ連盟 | イスラエル国防軍 |
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戦車 | マチルダII/R40/FT-17/R35/IV号戦車/M13/40/M4シャーマン/M22空挺戦車 | クロムウェル/H39/M4シャーマン |
APC/IFV | トラック/ハンバー装甲車/マーモン・ハリントン装甲車/ユニバーサル・キャリア/カーデン・ロイド豆戦車 | トラック/M3装甲車/ダイムラー装甲車/M3ハーフトラック/M14ハーフトラック/ M5ハーフトラック |
野戦砲 | 迫撃砲/II号自走重歩兵砲/25mm対戦車砲搭載ユニバーサル・キャリア/65mm山砲搭載ロレーヌ牽引車/2ポンド対戦車砲/6ポンド対戦車砲 | 120mm迫撃砲/1906年式65mmカノン砲/76.2mmダヴィドカ迫撃砲 |
航空機 | スピットファイア/ハリケーン/T-6テキサン/C-47スカイトレイン/アブロ アンソン | スピットファイア/S-199サキーン/P-51ムスタング/B-17フライングフォートレス/C-47スカイトレイン |
小火器 | リー・エンフィールドライフル/ブレン軽機関銃/ステン短機関銃/MAS 36小銃 | リー・エンフィールドライフル/Kar98k/ブレン軽機関銃/ステン短機関銃/トンプソン・サブマシンガン/MG34機関銃/ミルズ型手榴弾/火炎瓶/PIAT対戦車砲 |
戦力評価
モリスによれば、アラブ側はユダヤ系民兵の戦力を評価しつつも「中世時代のキリスト教徒が十字軍に失敗したように、ユダヤ教徒もまた我らに敗れ去るだろう」と楽観視していた風潮があったという[42]。
開戦前夜、アラブ側は既に存在している不特定多数のパレスチナ民兵を除いて各国正規軍を中核とした約2万3000名の介入部隊(エジプト兵1万名、ヨルダン兵4500名、イラク兵3000名、シリア兵3000名、イスラム義勇兵2000名、レバノン兵1000名、及び少数のサウジアラビア兵)の動員を準備していた。また本国には予備戦力も温存されていた。対するユダヤ居住区は正規軍ではなく民兵部隊が展開しており、統一した指揮権は存在していなかった。兵員数は諸説あるが、ハガナーを中心に3万8000名を集めていたとする資料もある[43]。
5月12日、各民兵部隊の指揮官達はダヴィド・ベングリオンに「独立した場合、アラブ諸国の介入に耐えうる可能性は五分五分である」と報告した[44]。
ユダヤ系住民
1947年11月、パレスチナ内戦で多大な力を発揮した民兵部隊ハガナーは全国的な地下組織を持つ最大規模の武装勢力となって [45]、組織の野戦軍は2000名の職業軍人と1万名の予備役と特殊部隊を持っていた。他の武装組織はパルマッハが2100名の正規兵と1000名の補充兵を持ち、武装組織エツェル及びレヒはハガナーよりも小規模で両組織を合わせても5000名以下でしかなかった。特に過激な対英テロを行っていたエツェルは英駐留軍から厳しく監視されていた[46]。他にイシューブ内には自警団が存在し、25歳以上の志願兵から構成されて治安維持に従事していた。これらの総員を合わせれば兵士1万5000名から1万8000名、警備兵2万名というのがイシューブ軍の全体像であった[47]。またどの民兵部隊にも参加しなかったが、第二次世界大戦で連合軍に従軍した経験を持つ退役兵が数千名存在した[48]。途中で警察軍に12000名の増員が行われたと考える論者もいる[49]。ただ結局の所、兵士の多数は実戦経験を持っていなかった[50]。
1946年、ベングリオンはいずれアラブ連盟とアラブ系自治区から挟撃される事は避けられないと判断し、戦いとなれば必要になるであろう兵器装備の拡充を計画した。1947年9月までにライフル銃1万489丁、軽機関銃702丁、短機関銃2666丁、機関銃186丁、2インチ迫撃砲672門、76mm迫撃砲92門を新たに獲得した。兵器生産能力も限定的ながら整備が進められ、1947年10月から1948年7月にかけて300万発の9mm拳銃弾と15万個の手榴弾、それにステン短機関銃1万6000丁と76mm迫撃砲210門が独力で生産された[51]。その最たるものが76.2mmダヴィドカ迫撃砲は僅かに数門が生産されたに過ぎないものの、初期の戦闘で有効な成果を見せた。
一方、開戦時点では重機関銃・野戦砲などの重火力装備や装甲車・戦車などの装甲兵器は殆ど保有していなかった[48]。同様に航空機など空軍も存在しなかった[52]。また装備の拡充が進められてなお、十分といえる程には装備を用意できなかった。ハガナーの場合、有事の緊急動員も含めて3万5000名分の装備を備蓄しておく目標であったが、実際には2万名分しか備蓄できていなかった[53]。論者の中には爆発物の独力生産により、こうした点を補うだけの火力を有していたとする意見もある[49][54]。
1947年12月5日、17歳から25歳までの全住民への徴兵制度が施行され、翌年の3月までに2万1000名が動員された[55]。3月30日には徴兵年齢が引き上げられ、男性と未婚の女性は35歳まで兵役義務を持つ事になった。後に男性は40歳までに延長されている[56]。
イシューブの各民兵部隊は複数の旅団へと整理されている。以下はその旅団の一覧表である。
旅団 | 指揮官 | 規模[57] | 参加戦闘 |
---|---|---|---|
ゴラニ旅団 | モーシェ・マン | 4500名 | デケルの戦い、ヒラームの戦い |
カルメリ旅団 | モーシェ・カルメリ | 2000名 | ヒラームの戦い |
アレクサンドロニ旅団 | ダン・イヴェン | 5200名 | ラトゥルンの戦い、ハメツの戦い |
キヤテ旅団 | ミカエル・ベン=ガル | 1400名 | ダニーの戦い、ハメツの戦い |
ギバテ旅団 | シモン・アヴィダン | 5000名 | ハメツの戦い、バラクの戦い、プレシェットの戦い |
エツィオニ旅団 | ダヴィット・シャルティエル | エルサレムの戦い、シフォンの戦い、イヴシィの戦い、ラマト・ラケルの戦い | |
第7装甲旅団 | ソモル・シャミル | ラトゥルンの戦い | |
第8装甲旅団 | イツハク・サデフ | ダニーの戦い、ヨアブの戦い、ホレブの戦い | |
オデッド旅団 | アブラハム・ヨッフェ | ヨアブの戦い、ヒラームの戦い | |
ハレル旅団 | イツハク・ラビン | 1400名 | ナシュションの戦い、ダニーの戦い |
イフターフ旅団 | イガル・アロン | 4500名 | イフタフの戦い、ダニーの戦い、ヨアブの戦い、ラトゥルンの戦い |
ネゲブ旅団 | ナフム・サリング | 2400名 | ヨアブの戦い |
アラブ系居住区
アラブ系居住区は全国的な武装組織が整っておらず、強いて言えば主に二つの組織が主流と見なされていた。一方はフサイニー派のアラビア騎士団と呼ばれる組織で、もう一つは反フサイニー派が結集して組織した救済団であった[36]。両組織は1万1000名から1万2000名程度の参加者を集めていたと考えられているが[36]、記録によってはヤッファを拠点とする救済団はパレスチナ内戦でアラブ委員会を掌握したフサイニーによって壊滅させられており、またフサイニー派のアラビア騎士団は殆ど志願兵を集められていなかったとも言われている[58]。
戦争が始まると俄かに各地で独自に民兵組織を興す動きが広がったが[59]、それでもなおアラブ系社会に蔓延するネポティズム(縁故主義)は広範な組織の形成を不可能にしていた。彼らはそれぞれの集落や氏族・一族で組織を作って戦場に参加していった[60]。またフサイニーを支持するか否かも対立を更に激化させ、彼の支持者と反対者はそれぞれ独自に行動した[36]。フサイニー派には他に先述したアルカディ・フサイニー率いる聖戦の軍隊が加わり、アルカディはイギリス人の退役兵らを雇い入れて軍を補強した[61]。時間が経過するにつれて第二次世界大戦で英植民地軍に召集されていた7000名のパレスチナ・アラブ人兵士、及び旧植民地政府の治安維持部隊に参加していた兵士達1万500名が援軍として加わっていった[36]。
こうしたアラブ委員会指揮下の部隊は植民地支配時代の植民地軍を引き継いだ形になっていたものの、肝心の装備の殆どは英軍が第二次世界大戦中に徴発してしまっていた[62]。内戦より前となる第二次世界大戦中、ハガナーらイシューブ側組織は植民地軍が5万名規模の兵士と装備を持つと考えていたが、これは過大評価で[63]実態とは食い違っていた[64]。アラブ委員会側もこうした状況に無関心であった訳ではなく、1948年に1700丁のライフル銃を輸入する計画を実行し、また周辺国もエジプト軍がライフル銃1200丁、イラク軍がライフル銃1000丁。シリア軍がライフル銃645丁、機関銃78挺、迫撃砲8門を援助している[65]。
アラブ連盟加盟国
ヨルダン王国
戦争に対して穏健姿勢を持っていたヨルダン王国の誇る王家近衛隊であるアラブ軍団は4個旅団に分けられ、総勢で1万2000名から8000名程度の兵士と野戦砲40門・装甲車75両を保有していた。英国軍から派遣された軍事顧問団による現代的な訓練を受けた彼らはアラブ連盟軍の中では最も信頼されていた[60]。アラブ軍団内の英国軍事顧問は48名の将校・将官が所属し[66]、グルッブ・パシャの渾名で呼ばれていたジョン・バゴット・グルッブ大将が全軍を統括していた[63]。
役職 | 氏名[67][68][69] | 階級 | 指揮権 |
---|---|---|---|
軍団長 | ジョン・バゴット・グルッブ | 陸軍大将 | 総司令官 |
野戦司令官 | ノルマン・ラッシュ | 代将 | |
第1旅団長(第1連隊・第3連隊) | デズモンド・ゴルディエ | 陸軍大佐 | Nablus Military Zone |
第2旅団長(第5連隊・第6連隊) | サム・シドネー・アーサー・コーク | 代将 | Support force |
第3旅団長(第2連隊・第4連隊) | ティール・アシュトン | 陸軍大佐 | Ramallah Military Zone |
第4旅団長 | ハヴィス・アル・マジャリ | 陸軍中佐 | Latrun, Lid, and Ramla |
第1連隊長 | H・C・ブラックデン | 陸軍中佐 | Nablus Military Zone |
第2連隊長 | R・スレード | 陸軍少佐 | Ramallah Military Zone |
第3連隊長 | ウィリアム・ニューマン | 陸軍大佐 | Nablus Military Zone |
第4連隊長 | アフマド・アル・ジュディ | 陸軍大佐 | Support: Ramallah, Hebron, and Ramla |
第5連隊長 | ジャームズ・ハウキン | 陸軍少佐 | Support |
第6連隊長 | アブルゥル・エル | 陸軍少佐 | Jerusalem Military Zone |
ヨルダン王アブドゥッラー1世は元から対ユダヤ路線に消極的であり、介入参加後もあくまで国益に関連した地域に軍事行動を留めさせた。即ちヨルダン川西岸地区とエルサレム東部である。
先述の通り、ヨルダン軍は介入軍の中で最も訓練された勢力で、対照的に他国軍は一様に軍隊としての錬度や作戦指揮に欠いていた[70]。ヨルダン軍はエルサレム近郊のラトルンを最も重要視し、他国軍が放棄した後に同市へアラブ軍団内から第4連隊を展開させている。
イラク王国
1948年時点、イラク王国軍は12の部隊に分けられた総勢2万1000名の陸軍と約100機の英軍航空機を保有し、自軍からは3000名の兵士を派遣する意向を決定していた[71]。1個歩兵旅団と1個装甲大隊からなる派遣部隊はヨルダン軍の先導を経て攻撃に移る事を予定した[72]。派遣部隊は順序増派され、第一次停戦時には1万名前後にまで膨れ上がり[73]、最終的に従軍戦力の総数は1万5000名から1万8000名に上った[74]。
1948年4月、イラク軍はヨルダン領内に到着して遠征準備を開始した。5月15日、工兵隊がヨルダン川に渡河用の桟橋を建設してイシューブ側のゲンシャー要塞を攻撃したが、結果は全くの失敗であった。敗北後、イラク軍はナーブルス・ジェニン・トゥルカルムの三角地帯に移動したが、そこでもイシューブ軍の猛攻を受けて甚大な被害を出した。辛うじてイラク軍は三角地帯を防衛したものの、これ以降は殆ど積極的な軍事行動は起こさなくなり、半ば戦争から脱落した[75]。
エジプト王国
1948年、エジプト王国軍は4万名の兵員を保有していたが、兵士の8割は軍務に不適当な年齢で動員されていた。またエジプト軍の未熟な兵站システムは明らかに数万名の兵力を維持する能力を持っていなかった。
当初、1万名の兵員が遠征軍として派遣され、アフメド・アリー将軍が総指揮官に任命されていた。装備は充実しており、遠征軍は英植民地軍から獲得した歩兵戦車マチルダIIや軽戦車マーク4を装備した1個戦車大隊、QF 25ポンド砲16門と6ポンド砲8門を持つ1個砲兵大隊を含み、更には機関銃大隊も加わっていた。エジプト空軍もスピットファイヤ30機、ハリケーン4機、爆撃機に改装したC-47輸送機20機を戦域に展開していた。戦力増加も行われ、最終的には兵員2万名、戦車135両、野戦砲90門が前線に派遣された[76]。
またエジプトとイギリスが共同管理するスーダン地方では6個部隊が編成され、援軍として加わった[77]。
シリア王国
1948年、シリア王国軍は3個歩兵旅団1万2000名を陸軍として保有し、空軍は50機の航空機を装備していた。
1948年5月14日、R35・R37戦車及び野戦砲や装甲車などで武装したシリア第1歩兵旅団が介入軍に加わり、数日間にわたる攻勢を経てテゼマフを占領した。だが5月18日にイシューブ軍の反攻作戦に敗れて退却に追い込まれた。それからは防戦が続き、6月10日に小規模な攻勢作戦で勝利を収めた以外には防御に徹していた[78]。
またアラブ連盟はパレスチナ内戦に対して、共同軍となるアラブ解放軍(Jaysh al-Inqadh al-Arabi)を6000名程度の兵士から編成、北パレスチナに展開させた。同軍部隊の殆どはシリア軍の提供部隊で占められていた[79]。
レバノン共和国
レバノン共和国軍は介入に加わった中東諸国の中では最も規模の小さい3000名の兵員しか持たなかった[63]。1947年、ベングリオンはレバノン内で反アラブ・反イスラムの路線を進んでいたマロン派キリスト教と友好協定を結んでいた。交渉の結果、数千ポンドの援助金と引き換えにレバノン政府はアラブ介入軍に不参加の姿勢を貫いていた[80]。
だがいざ介入が始まるとレバノン政府は名目上ながら1000名の兵士を派遣した為、イシューブ軍はこれを撃退した後に南レバノンを逆占領下に置いた[81]。
サウジアラビア王国
サウジアラビア王国軍は800名から[82]1200名程度の兵士を派遣した[83][84]。サウジアラビア軍はエジプト軍の補助部隊として作戦に加わっている</ref>。
イエメン王国
イエメン王国軍の小規模な遠征軍が戦争で確認されている[85]。
パレスチナ信託統治領
戦争勃発はパレスチナ信託統治領に駐留するイギリス軍が撤回を開始する直前であった為、依然として1万名規模の兵員(2個独立歩兵旅団、2個機械化連隊、野戦砲部隊、空軍部隊)が展開していた[79]。1947年7月に最大数に達した駐留軍は7万200名の兵士と数万人の民間支援部隊から編成されていたが[86]1948年から駐留軍の撤収作業が始まり、5月14日には高等弁務官が本国に召還されている[87]。
それでも依然として一部の英軍は幾つかの飛び地を確保し、またハイファの周辺と港に展開を続けていた[88][89]。後にエジプト軍は駐留を続ける英軍の空軍基地をイスラエル軍基地と誤認して攻撃、英軍側に死者が発生している[90]。
時系列
開戦
アラブ連盟に加盟する7ヶ国中5カ国(エジプト王国・トランスヨルダン王国・イラク王国・レバノン共和国・シリア王国)はサウジアラビア王国及びイエメン王国と共に[91]、イシューブ政府によるイスラエル独立宣言に対する軍事介入を開始した。エジプト軍とシリア軍はパーティション計画で予定されていたアラブ系居住区の外側から部隊を展開させ[92]、ヨルダン軍はエルサレム旧市街地に侵攻した。
アラブ連盟は自らの行動を正当化する為、軍事介入について公式声明を発した[93]。以下の宣言は1948年5月15日に発表されたものとなる。
- (民族自決の原則に基いて)パレスチナ地方における唯一の解決案はパレスチナ国家を建設する事に他ならない。
- また新体制においては全ての住民が平等に扱われ、また少数民族も立憲主義国家において約束されるだけの保護を受けるだろう…
アラブ連盟が国連決議案181に対する反対論を展開した時、その理由として掲げられていたのは「(パレスチナ住民の内)アラブ系の権利が軽んじられている」という主張であった[93]。
- 我々は国際連盟規約と国連憲章に従っている(中略)
- パレスチナ地方における治安と安全は混乱している。シオニズムによる侵略主義が100万名以上のアラブ系パレスチナ人の4分の1以上の居住地を奪い、隣国に離散させている.
以上の様に、アラブ連盟の名分は「治安回復」「パレスチナ統一政府の樹立」「統一国家でのアラブ系住民の権利確保」という内容に留められていた。他にエジプトの政治家ラフマン・ハッサン・アザムは「この介入はモンゴル軍や十字軍と並び称される殲滅戦となる」と発言したとされるが[94]、この発言に明確な資料が伴わない事を指摘する意見もある[95]。後にラフマン・ハッサン・アザムは「統一国家に置いてもユダヤ系自治区の自治権は維持するべき」と発言している[96]。
ヤコブ・ゲルベルに拠れば、「アラブ諸国はパレスチナ・アラブ人とアラブ解放軍の崩壊によって、自国に大量の難民が流入する事を一番恐れており、それを阻止する事が戦争の目的であった」と指摘しており、「彼らの理解に拠れば、ハガナーを初めとしたイシューブ軍がアラブ系自治区の併合を望んだ場合、これを阻止できる力はアラブ系自治区に存在しないと見なされていた」という[97]。また対照的にイシューブ側は「アラブ系自治区や周辺国の存在を単純に脅威と捉え、その軍事能力についても過大な評価を与えていた」という[97]。
介入が始まった後、改めてアラブ連盟は介入の根拠を複数の項目に分けて声明した[93]
- イギリス統治体制においては、ユダヤ系パレスチナ人の増加が奨励されていた。
- パレスチナ内戦における紛争はこうした動き(シオニズム)の危険性を明らかにした。
- アラブ連盟諸国は同問題に介入する事を強いられている。
- 同問題の最終解決はパレスチナ国家を樹立することである。
- 既に我々はパレスチナ国家を承認していたが、イギリスにより具体的な動きは押さえ込まれていた。
- 介入はアラブ連盟の神聖な使命である。
The British Mandate over Palestine was due to expire on 15 May, but Jewish leadership led by Ben-Gurion declared independence on 14 May (because 15 May was a Shabbat). The State of Israel declared itself as an independent nation, and was quickly recognized by the United States, Iran, the Soviet Union, and many other countries. Within hours, Arab forces invaded Palestine. In an official cablegram from the Secretary-General of the League of Arab States to the UN Secretary-General on 15 May 1948, the Arab states publicly proclaimed their aim of creating a "United State of Palestine", in place of the Jewish and Arab, two-state, UN Plan. In the Arab League's official declaration, they announced their intention to fulfill their responsibilities to restore order in Palestine and establish a single democratic state, which they proclaimed as being the only solution to the conflict, proclaimed Palestine to be an Arab country, and subsequently recognized the independence of the State of Palestine. They claimed that partition was illegitimate, as it was opposed by Palestine's Arab majority, and maintained that the absence of legal authority made it necessary to intervene to protect Arab lives and property.[98] The Israelis maintain that the plan was not illegitimate, since Jews were a majority in areas assigned to the Jewish state. Israel, the United States and the Soviet Union called the Arab states' entry into Israel illegal aggression.[要出典] China, meanwhile, broadly backed the Arab claims. The United Nations secretary-general Trygve Lie wrote in his memoirs "The invasion of Palestine by the Arab states was the first armed aggression the world had seen since the end of the [Second World] War. The United Nations could not permit that aggression to succeed and at the same time survive as an influential force for peaceful settlement, collective security and meaningful international law".[99]
The Arab plans called for Syrian and Lebanese forces to invade from north while Jordanian and Iraqi forces were to invade from east.[100] The Syrian, Lebanese, Jordanian and Iraqi forces to link up in Galilee and then turn towards Haifa.[100] In the south, the Egyptians were to advance and take Tel Aviv.[100] Co-operation between the various Arab armies was extremely poor, so the plan was not entirely carried out in the spirit envisioned.[100] The first mission of the Jewish paramilitary organizations and later the IDF was to hold on against the Arab armies and stop them from destroying major Jewish settlements, until reinforcements and weapons arrived.
As Arab forces invaded Israel, two Royal Egyptian Air Force Spitfires bombed Tel Aviv. One of them was shot down and its pilot taken prisoner. However, the Egyptians continued their bombing raids over the city. On 18 May, the Tel Aviv Central Bus Station was bombed, causing over a hundred casualties. Efforts were also made to shell the city from the ground. For the first few weeks of the war, Egyptian warplanes were able to bomb Tel Aviv with almost complete impunity, meeting only ground fire.
On 22 May, Egyptian warplanes attacked Ramat David, an airbase in Israeli territory still occupied by British Royal Air Force planes covering the withdrawal of British forces from Israel. The Egyptians believed that the base had already been taken over by the Israelis, and attacked it three times. Five Spitfires were destroyed on the ground, a transport plane was destroyed as it landed, a hangar was destroyed, and four airmen were killed. During the third attack, RAF fighters shot down four Egyptian warplanes, and a fifth was shot down by a British Bren gun crew. The British left Ramat David Airbase a few days later.[101][102]
Two Egyptian columns with air, armored, and artillery cover entered southern Israel, but were met with fierce resistance from numerous settlements defended by armed inhabitants and Israeli troops.[103] Joining the Egyptian Army were a large number of volunteers from the Muslim Brotherhood.[103] One Egyptian column headed towards Tel Aviv to be joined by more Egyptian troops who arrived via sea at Majdal and another column advanced towards Beersheba.[103] To secure their flanks, the Egyptians laid siege to a number of kibbutzim in the Negev.[103] The Egyptians met fierce resistance from the lightly armed defenders of the besieged kibbutzim. They were stalled in their advance and took heavy losses, while losses sustained by the defenders were comparatively light.[103] Kfar Darom, after withstanding an attack by the Muslim Brotherhood, was attacked by Egyptian tanks who retreated after losing one tank to a PIAT.[103] At the kibbutz of Nirim, about 40 Israelis fought off repeated Egyptian attacks backed by artillery, armor and air power.[103] The most notable of these engagements was the Battle of Yad Mordechai, where an inferior force of 100 Israelis armed with nothing more than rifles, a medium machinegun and a PIAT anti-tank weapon, held up a column of 2,500 Egyptians, well-supported by armor, artillery and air units, for five days.[104] The Egyptians suffered some 300–400 casualties while Israeli casualties were 26 killed and 49 wounded. These battles were delaying actions, designed to give the Haganah time to prepare for the Egyptian attack.
Over the next few days, approximately 1,000 Lebanese, 5,000 Syrian, 5,000 Iraqi, and 10,000 Egyptian troops (initial numbers) invaded the newly established state, while 4,000 Jordanian troops invaded the Corpus separatum region encompassing Jerusalem and its environs, as well as areas designated as part of the Arab state by the UN partition plan. They were aided by corps of volunteers from Saudi Arabia, Libya and Yemen. The Arab nations gradually increased the number of troops by the thousands as the war later progressed. Both sides increased their manpower over the following months, but the Israeli advantage grew steadily as a result of the progressive mobilization of Israeli society and the influx of an average of 10,300 immigrants each month.
Syrian forces advanced into Galilee on 15 May, but were bogged down by resistance from numerous kibbutzim. The Syrians were forced to besiege the kibbutzim rather than advance.[105] Throughout the Galilee, numerous isolated Israeli settlement outposts were exposed to Arab attack on all sides, and had to rely on their own armories for defense.[106] The Lebanese Army took the village of Malkiya, which was recaptured by the Israelis three days later.[105] An Iraqi division comprising two infantry and one armoured brigade arrived in an area known as the "triangle" between Jenin, Nablus and Tulkarm, where on 25 May 1948 it started an offensive with the aim of taking Netanya, which failed.[105] On 29 May, an Israeli counter-attack against the Iraqis led to three days of heavy fighting over Jenin, which was finally retained by the Iraqis.[105] After these battles, the Iraqi forces became stationary.[105] On 6 June, a Syrian-Lebanese-Arab Liberation Army force retook Malkiya.[105]
Initial strength | 29,677 |
4 June | 40,825 |
17 July | 63,586 |
7 October | 88,033 |
28 October | 92,275 |
2 December | 106,900 |
23 December | 107,652 |
30 December | 108,300 |
On 26 May 1948, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) was officially established, and the Haganah, Palmach and Irgun were incorporated into the IDF.
On 29 May, Israeli forces stopped the Egyptian drive towards Tel Aviv in Operation Pleshet. In the first combat mission performed by Israel's fledgeling air force, four Avia S-199s attacked Egyptian armored column of 500 vehicles on its way to Ashdod. The Israeli planes dropped 70 kilogram bombs and strafed the column, although their machine guns jammed quickly. Two of the planes crashed, killing a pilot. The attack caused the Egyptians to scatter, and they had lost the initiative by the time they had regrouped. The attack was followed by small-scale Israeli harassment of the Egyptian lines. Givati Brigade forces then launched a counterattack. Although the counterattack was repulsed, the Egyptian offensive was halted as Egypt changed its strategy from offensive to defensive.[108]
As the war progressed, the IDF managed to field more troops than the Arab forces. By July 1948, the IDF had 63,000 troops; by early spring 1949, they had 115,000. The Arab armies had an estimated 40,000 troops in July 1948, rising to 55,000 in October 1948, and slightly more by the spring of 1949.
All Jewish aviation assets were placed under the control of the Sherut Avir (Air Service, known as the SA) in November 1947 and flying operations began in the following month from a small civil airport on the outskirts of Tel Aviv called Sde Dov, with the first ground support operation (in an RWD-13[109]) taking place on 17 December. The Galilee Squadron was formed at Yavne'el in March 1948, and the Negev Squadron was formed at Nir-Am in April. By 10 May, when the SA suffered its first combat loss, there were three flying units, an air staff, maintenance facilities and logistics support. At the outbreak of the war on 15 May, the SA became the Israeli Air Force. With its fleet[110] of light planes it was no match for Arab forces during the first few weeks of the war with their T-6s, Spitfires, C-47s and Avro Ansons. It was also during this time that the balance of air power began to swing in favor of the Israeli Air Force following the purchase of 25 Avia S-199s from Czechoslovakia, the first of which arrived in Israel on 20 May. This created the ironic situation of the young Jewish state using derivatives of the Bf-109 designed in Nazi Germany to help counter the British-designed Spitfires flown by Egypt. The first raid on an Arab capital followed on the night of 31 May/1 June when three Israeli planes bombed Amman.[111] On 3 June, Israel scored its first victory in aerial combat when pilot Modi Alon shot down a pair of Egyptian bombers over Tel Aviv. During the war, a total of 15 Egyptian and 2 Syrian planes were shot down. By the fall of 1948, the IDF had achieved air superiority and had superior firepower and more knowledgeable personnel, many of whom had seen action in World War II.[112] Israeli planes also bombed targets in and around Arish, Gaza, Damascus, Amman and Cairo. Israeli B-17 bombers coming to Israel from Czechoslovakia bombed Egypt on their way to Israel.
At the outset of the war, the Israeli Navy consisted of four former Aliyah Bet ships that had been seized by the British and impounded in Haifa harbor. These ships were refurbished by a newly-formed naval repair facility with the assistance of two private shipbuilding and repair companies. In October 1948, a submarine chaser was purchased from the United States. The five warships were manned by former merchant seamen, former crewmembers of Aliyah Bet ships, Israelis who had served in the Royal Navy during World War II, and foreign volunteers. The newly refurbished and crewed warships served on coastal patrol duties and bombarded Egyptian coastal installations in and around the Gaza area all the way to Port Said.[113]
The heaviest fighting occurred in Jerusalem and on the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road, between Jordan's Arab Legion and Israeli forces.[114] As part of the redeployment to deal with the Egyptian advance, the Israelis abandoned the Latrun fortress overlooking the main highway to Jerusalem, which the Arab Legion immediately seized.[115] The Arab Legion also occupied the Latrun Monastery. From these positions, the Jordanians were able to cut off supplies to Israeli troops and civilians in Jerusalem. Though some supplies, mostly munitions, were airdropped into the city, the shortage of food, water, fuel and medicine was acute. King Abdullah ordered Glubb Pasha, the commander of the Arab Legion, to enter Jerusalem on 17 May, and heavy house-to-house fighting occurred between 19 and 28 May, with the Arab Legion eventually succeeding in pushing Israeli forces from the Arab neighborhoods of Jerusalem as well as the Jewish Quarter of the Old City.[116] The Israeli forces were seriously short of food, water and ammunition.[116] The Arab Legion fired 10,000 artillery and mortar shells a day.[116] The 1,500 Jewish inhabitants of the Old City's Jewish Quarter were expelled, and several hundred were detained.[117] The Arab Legion also attacked West Jerusalem with sniper fire. Israeli attempts to take the Latrun fortress were unsuccessful.[116] Israeli forces suffered some 586 casualties, among them Mickey Marcus, Israel's first general, who was killed by friendly fire. The Arab Legion had about 30 casualties, though among the Jordanian dead was the fort's commander. The Israeli position in Jerusalem was only saved via the opening of the so-called "Burma Road", a makeshift bypass road built by Israeli forces that allowed Israeli supply convoys to pass into Jerusalem.[116] Parts of the area where the road was built were cleared of Jordanian snipers in May and the road was completed on 14 June. Supplies had already begun passing through before the road was completed, with the first convoy passing through on the night of 1-2 June. The Jordanians spotted the activity and attempted to shell the road, but were ineffective, as it could not be seen. However, Jordanian sharpshooters killed several road workers, and an attack on 9 June left eight Israelis dead. On 18 July, elements of the Harel Brigade took about 10 villages to the south of Latrun to enlarge and secure the area of the Burma Road.
Iraqi forces failed in their attacks on Israeli settlements with the most notable battle taking place at Mishmar HaEmek, and instead took defensive positions around Jenin, Nablus, and Tulkarm, from where they could put pressure on the Israeli center.[87][118] On 25 May, Iraqi forces advanced from Tulkarm, taking Geulim and reaching Kfar Yona and Ein Vered on the Tulkarm-Netanya road. The Alexandroni Brigade then stopped the Iraqi advance and retook Geulim. On 1 June, the Carmeli and Golani Brigades captured Jenin from Iraqi forces. They were pushed out by an Iraqi counterattack, and lost 34 dead and 100 wounded.
On 21 May, the Syrian army was stopped at kibbutz Degania Alef in the north, where local militia reinforced by elements of the Carmeli Brigade halted Syrian armored forces with Molotov cocktails, hand grenades and a single PIAT. One tank that was disabled by Molotov cocktails and hand grenades still remains at the kibbutz. The remaining Syrian forces were driven off the next day with four Napoleonchik mountain guns—Israel's first use of artillery during the war.[119]
On 22 May, Arab forces attacked kibbutz Ramat Rachel south of Jerusalem. After a fierce battle in which 31 Arabs and 13 Israelis were killed, the defenders of Ramat Rachel withdrew, only to partially retake the kibbutz the following day. Fighting continued until 26 May, until the entire kibbutz was recaptured. Radar Hill was also taken from the Arab Legion, and held until 26 May, when the Jordanians retook it in a battle that left 19 Israelis and 2 Jordanians dead. A total of 23 attempts by the Palmach's Harel Brigade to capture Radar Hill in the war failed.
On 23 May, the Alexandroni Brigade captured Tantura, south of Haifa. The same day, Thomas C. Wasson, the US Consul-General in Jeruslaem and a member of the UN Truce Commission was shot dead in West Jerusalem. It was disputed whether Wasson was killed by the Arabs or Israelis.
Throughout the following days, the Arabs were only able to make limited gains due to fierce Israeli resistance, and were quickly driven off their new holdings by Israeli counterattacks, though the Arab Legion was able to repel an Israeli attack on Latrun. On 2 June, Holy War Army commander Hasan Salama was killed in a bref name="navy">http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Society_attle with Israeli forces at Ras al-Ein, north of Jaffa. The Jordanians launched two counterattacks, temporarily taking Beit Susin before being forced back, and capturing Gezer after a fierce battle. On 6 June, nearly two brigades of the Arab Liberation Army and the Lebanese Army took Malkiya and Kadesh, while Syrian forces attacked Mishmar HaYarden, but were repulsed. In the Battle of Nitzanim, Egyptian forces attacked the kibbutz of Nitzanim on the same day, and the Israeli defenders surrendered after resisting for five days. On 10 June, the Syrians overran Mishmar HaYarden and advanced to the main road, where they were stopped by units of the Oded Brigade.[87]
The UN declared a truce on 29 May, which came into effect on 11 June and lasted 28 days. The ceasefire was overseen by UN mediator Folke Bernadotte and a team of UN Observers made up of army officers from Belgium, United States, Sweden and France.[120] Bernadotte was voted in by the General Assembly to "assure the safety of the holy places, to safeguard the well being of the population, and to promote 'a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine'".[121] The truce was designed to last 28 days and an arms embargo was declared with the intention that neither side would make any gains from the truce. Neither side respected the truce; both found ways around the restrictions placed on them.[122] Both the Israelis and the Arabs used this time to improve their positions, a direct violation of the terms of the ceasefire. "The Arabs violated the truce by reinforcing their lines with fresh units and by preventing supplies from reaching isolated Israeli settlements; occasionally, they opened fire along the lines".[123]
At the time of the truce, the British view was that "the Jews are too weak in armament to achieve spectacular success".[122] As the truce commenced, a British officer stationed in Haifa stated that the four-week-long truce "would certainly be exploited by the Jews to continue military training and reorganization while the Arabs would waste [them] feuding over the future divisions of the spoils".[123] During the truce, the Israelis sought to bolster their forces by massive import of arms.[122] The IDF was able to acquire weapons from Czechoslovakia as well as improve training of forces and reorganization of the army during this time. Yitzhak Rabin, an IDF commander at the time of the war and later Israel's fifth Prime Minister, stated "[w]ithout the arms from Czechoslovakia... it is very doubtful whether we would have been able to conduct the war".[124] The Israeli army increased its manpower from approximately 30,000-35,000 men to almost 65,000 during the truce. It was also able to increase its arms supply to more than 25,000 rifles, 5,000 machine guns, and fifty million bullets.[123] As well as violating the arms and personnel embargo, they also sent fresh units to the front lines like the Arabs.[123]
After the truce was in place, Bernadotte began to address the issue of achieving a political settlement. The main obstacles in his opinion were "the Arab world's continued rejection of the existence of a Jewish state, whatever its borders; Israel's new 'philosophy', based on its increasing military strength, of ignoring the partition boundaries and conquering what additional territory it could; and the emerging Palestinian Arab refugee problem".[123] Taking all the issues into account, Bernadotte presented a new partition plan. He proposed there be a Palestinian Arab state alongside Israel and that a "Union" "be established between the two sovereign states of Israel and Jordan (which now included the West Bank); that the Negev, or part of it, be included in the Arab state and that Western Galilee, or part of it, be included in Israel; that the whole of Jerusalem be part of the Arab state, with the Jewish areas enjoying municipal autonomy and that Lydda Airport and Haifa be 'free ports'—presumably free of Israeli or Arab sovereignty".[123] Israel rejected the proposal, in particular the aspect of losing control of Jerusalem, but they did agree to extend the truce for another month. The Arabs rejected both the extension of the truce and the proposal.[123]
On 8 July, the day before the expiration of the truce, Egyptian forces under General Muhammad Naguib renewed the war by attacking Negba.[125] The following day, Israeli forces launched a simultaneous offensive on all three fronts. The fighting continued for ten days until the UN Security Council issued the Second Truce on 18 July.[123] During the fighting, the Israelis were able to open a lifeline to a number of besieged kibbutzim.[122]
The fighting that followed was dominated by large-scale Israeli offensives and a defensive posture from the Arab side. Operation Danny was the most important Israeli offensive, aimed at securing and enlarging the corridor between Jerusalem and Tel Aviv by capturing the roadside cities Lod (Lydda) and Ramle.
In a second planned stage of the operation the fortified positions of Latrun—overlooking the Tel Aviv-Jerusalem highway—and the city of Ramallah were also to be captured. Hadita, near Latrun, was captured by the Israelis at a cost of 9 dead.
The second plan was Operation Dekel, which was aimed at capturing the lower Galilee including Nazareth. The third plan, to which fewer resources were allocated, Operation Kedem, was to secure the Old City of Jerusalem, but failed.[126] To the north, Operation Brosh was launched in a failed attempt to dislodge Syrian forces from the Eastern Galilee and the Benot Yaakov Bridge. During the operation, 200 Syrians and 100 Israelis were killed. The Israeli Air Force also bombed Damascus for the first time.
In the south, the IDF carried out several offensives, including Operation An-Far and Operation Death to the Invader. On 12 July, the Egyptians launched an offensive action, and again attacked Negba, which they had previously failed to capture, using three infantry battalions, an armored battalion, and an artillery regiment. In the battle that followed, the Egyptians were repulsed, suffering 200–300 casualties, while the Israelis lost 5 dead and 16 wounded.[127] After failing to take Negba, the Egyptians turned their attention to more isolated settlements and positions. On July 14, an Egyptian attack on Gal On was driven off by a minefield and by resistance from Gal On's residents.[128] The Egyptians then assaulted the lightly defended village of Be'erot Yitzhak. The Egyptians managed to penetrate the village permimeter, but the defenders concentrated in an inner position in the village and fought off the Egyptian advance until IDF reinforcements arrived and drove out the attackers. The Egyptians suffered an estimated 200 casualties, while the Israelis had 17 dead and 15 wounded. The battle was one of Egypt's last offensive actions during the war, and the Egyptians did not attack any Israeli villages following this battle.
ダニー攻勢
The objectives of Operation Danny were to capture territory east of Tel Aviv and then to push inland and relieve the Jewish population and forces in Jerusalem. Lydda had become an important military center in the region, lending support to Arab military activities elsewhere, and Ramle was one of the main obstacles blocking Jewish transportation. Lydda was defended by a local militia of around 1,000 residents, with an Arab Legion contingent of 125–300.[129] The IDF forces gathered to attack the city numbered around 8,000. It was the first operation where several brigades were involved. The city was attacked from the north via Majdal al-Sadiq and al-Muzayri'a and from the east via Khulda, al-Qubab, Jimzu and Daniyal. Bombers were also used for the first time in the conflict to bombard the city. The IDF captured the city on 11 July.[122] Up to 450 Arabs and 9-10 Israeli soldiers were killed. The next day, Ramle fell.[122] The civilian populations of Lydda and Ramle fled or were expelled to the Arab front lines, and following resistance in Lydda, the population there was expelled without provision of transport vehicles; some of the evictees died on the long walk under the hot July sun.[130]
On 15–16 July, an attack on Latrun took place but did not manage to occupy the fort.[122] A desperate second attempt occurred on 18 July by units from the Yiftach Brigade equipped with armored vehicles, including two Cromwell tanks, but that attack also failed. Despite the second truce, which began on 18 July, the Israeli efforts to conquer Latrun continued until 20 July.
デケル攻勢
While Operation Danny proceeded in the centre, Operation Dekel was carried out in the north. Nazareth was captured on 16 July, and by the time the second truce took effect at 19:00 18 July, the whole lower Galilee from Haifa Bay to the Sea of Galilee was captured by Israel.
ケデム攻勢
Originally Operation Kedem was to begin on 8 July, immediately after the first truce, by Irgun and Lehi forces. However, it was delayed by David Shaltiel, possibly because he did not trust their ability after their failure to capture Deir Yassin without Haganah assistance.
Irgun forces commanded by Yehuda Lapidot were to break through at the New Gate, Lehi was to break through the wall stretching from the New Gate to the Jaffa Gate, and the Beit Horon Battalion was to strike from Mount Zion.
The battle was planned to begin on the Sabbath, at 20:00 on 16 July, two days before the second ceasefire of the war. The plan went wrong from the beginning and was postponed first to 23:00 and then to midnight. It was not until 02:30 that the battle actually began. The Irgun managed to break through at the New Gate, but the other forces failed in their missions. At 05:45 on 17 July, Shaltiel ordered a retreat and to cease hostilities.
On 14 July 1948, Irgun occupied the Arab village of Malha after a fierce battle. Several hours later, the Arabs launched a counterattack, but Israeli reinforcements arrived, and the village was retaken at a cost of 17 dead.
At 19:00 on 18 July, the second truce of the conflict went into effect after intense diplomatic efforts by the UN.
On 16 September, Count Folke Bernadotte proposed a new partition for Palestine in which the Negev would be divided between Jordan and Egypt, and Jordan would annex Lydda and Ramla. There would be a Jewish state in the whole of Galilee, with the frontier running from Faluja northeast towards Ramla and Lydda. Jerusalem would be internationalized, with municipal autonomy for the city's Jewish and Arab inhabitants, the Port of Haifa would be a free port, and Lydda Airport would be a free airport. All Palestinian refugees would be granted the right of return, and those who chose not to return would be compensated for lost property. The UN would control and regulate Jewish immigration.[131] The plan was once again rejected by both sides. On the next day, 17 September, Bernadotte was assassinated in Jerusalem by the militant Zionist group Lehi. A four-man team ambushed Bernadotte's motorcade in Jerusalem, killing him and a French UN observer sitting next to him. Lehi saw Bernadotte as a British and Arab puppet, and thus a serious threat to the emerging State of Israel, and feared that the provisional Israeli government would accept the plan, which it considered disastrous. Unbeknowest to Lehi, the government had already decided to reject it and resume combat in a month. Bernadotte's deputy, American Ralph Bunche, replaced him.[132][133][134][135]
ジャバ攻勢
The Arabs had blocked Israeli traffic along the Tel Aviv-Haifa highway. Assaults on 18 June and 8 July failed due to poor planning and stiff resistance by Arab militia in superior positions.
Operation Shoter was launched a week after the truce came into effect against an area known as the "Little Triangle" south of Haifa, with the aim of taking the final Arab pocket on the Tel Aviv-Haifa road. The Arabs had blocked the road to Israeli traffic along the highway, and poorly-planned assaults on 18 June and 8 July had failed to dislodge Arab militia from their superior positions. The operation was launched on 24 July, in response to the killings of two Israeli civilians. Israeli assaults on 24 and 25 July were beaten back by stiff resistance. The Israelis then broke the Arab defenses with an infantry and armour assault backed by heavy artillery shelling and aerial bombing. Three Arab villages surrendered, and Israeli soldiers and aircraft struck at one of the Arab retreat routes, killing 60 Arab soldiers. The Arabs claimed that the Israelis had massacred Arab civilians, but the Israelis rejected the claims. A United Nations investigation found no evidence of a massacre. Following the operation, the Tel Aviv-Haifa road was open to Israeli military and civilian traffic, and Arab roadblocks along the route were removed. Traffic along the Haifa-Hadera coastal railway was also restored.
イスラエル軍の攻勢計画
Israel launched a series of military operations in order to drive out the Arab armies and secure the borders of Israel.
On 15 October, the IDF launched Operation Yoav in the northern Negev.[122] Its goal was to drive a wedge between the Egyptian forces along the coast and the Beersheba-Hebron-Jerusalem road and ultimately to conquer the whole Negev.[122] This was a special concern on the Israeli part because of a British diplomatic campaign to have the entire Negev handed over to Egypt and Jordan, and which thus made Ben-Gurion anxious to have Israeli forces in control of the Negev as soon as possible.[122] Yoav was headed by the Southern Front commander Yigal Allon. Committed to Yoav were three infantry and one armoured brigades, who were given the task of breaking through the Egyptian lines.[136] The Egyptian positions were badly weakened by the lack of a defense in depth, which meant that once the IDF had broken through the Egyptian lines, there was little to stop them.[136] The operation was a huge success, shattering the Egyptian ranks and forcing the Egyptian Army from the northern Negev, Beersheba and Ashdod.[136] In the so-called "Faluja Pocket", an encircled Egyptian force was able to hold out for four months until the 1949 Armistice Agreements, when the village was peacefully transferred to Israel and the Egyptian troops left.[136] Four warships of the Israeli Navy provided support by bombarding Egyptian shore installations in the Ashkelon area, and preventing the Egyptian Navy from evacuation retreating Egyptian troops by sea.[113] On 19 October, a naval battle took place between three Israeli warships near Majdal, and an Egyptian corvette with air support. An Israeli sailor was killed and four wounded, and two of the ships were damaged. One Egyptian plane was shot down, but the corvette escaped. Israeli naval vessels also shelled Majdal on 17 October, and Gaza on 21 October, with air support from the Israeli Air Force. The same day, the IDF captured Beersheba, and took 120 Egyptian soldiers prisoner. On 22 October, Israeli naval commandos using explosive boats sank the Egyptian flagship Emir Farouk, and damaged an Egyptian minesweeper.[136]
On 22 October, the third truce went into effect.[137] Irregular Arab forces refused to recognize the truce, and continued to harass Israeli forces and settlements in the north. On the same day that the truce came into effect, the Arab Liberation Army violated the truce by attacking Manara, capturing the strongpoint of Sheikh Abed, repulsing counterattacks by local Israeli units, and ambushed Israeli forces attempting to relieve Manara. The IDF's Carmeli Brigade lost 33 dead and 40 wounded.[138] Manara and Misgav Am were totally cut off, and Israel's protests at the UN failed to change the situation.
On 24 October, the IDF launched Operation Hiram and captured the entire upper Galilee, driving the ALA, and Lebanese army back to Lebanon, and successfully ambushing and destroying an entire Syrian battalion.[136] The Israeli force of four infantry brigades were commanded by Moshe Carmel.[136] The entire operation lasted just 60 hours, during which numerous villages were captured, often after locals or Arab forces put up resistance.[136] Arab losses were estimated at 400 dead and 550 taken prisoner, with low Israeli casualties.[136] Some prisoners were reportedly executed by the Israeli forces. An estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees fled into Lebanon, some of them fleeing ahead of the advancing forces, and some expelled from villages which had resisted, while the Arab inhabitants of those villages which had remained at peace were allowed to remain and became Israeli citizens. The villagers of Iqrit and Birim were persuaded to leave their homes by Israeli authorities, who promised them that they would be allowed to return. Israel eventually decided not to allow them to return, and offered them financial compensation, which they refused to accept. At the end of the month, the IDF had captured the whole Galilee, driven all Lebanese forces out of Israel, and had advanced 5マイル (8.0 km) into Lebanon to the Litani River,[139] pccupying thirteen Lebanese villages. In the village of Hula, two Israeli offiers killed between 35 and 58 prisoners in a house and then blew up the house on top of them as retaliation for the Haifa Oil Refinery massacre. Both officers were later put on trial for their actions.
On 9 November 1948, the IDF launched Operation Shmone to capture the Tegart fort in the village of Iraq Suwaydan. The fort's Egyptian defenders had previously repulsed eight attempts to take it, including two during Operation Yoav. Israeli forces bombarded the fort before an assault. After breaching the outlying fences without resistance, the Israelis blew a hole in the fort's outer wall, prompting the 180 Egyptian soldiers manning the fort to surrender without a fight. The defeat prompted the Egyptians to evacuate several nearby positions, including hills the IDF had failed to take by force. Meanwhile, IDF forces were met with stiff resistance in Iraq Suwaydan itself, losing 6 dead and 14 wounded.
From 5 to 7 December, the IDF conducted Operation Assaf to take control of the Western Negev. The main assaults were spearheaded by mechanized forces, while Golani Brigade infantry covered the rear. An Egyptian counterattack was repulsed. The Egyptians planned another counterattack, but it failed after Israeli aerial reconnaissance revealed Egyptian preparations, and the Israelis launched a preemptive strike. About 100 Egyptians were killed, and 5 tanks were destroyed, with the Israelis losing 5 killed and 30 wounded.[87]
On 22 December, the IDF drove the remaining Egyptian forces out of Israel with Operation Horev (also called Operation Ayin).[136] The goal of the operation was to secure the entire Negev from Egyptian presence, destroying the Egyptian threat on Israel's southern communities and forcing the Egyptians into a ceasefire. During five days of fighting, the Israelis expelled the Egyptians from the Negev.[136]
Israeli forces subsequently launched raids into the Nitzana area, and entered the Sinai Peninsula on 28 December. The IDF captured Umm Katef and Abu Ageila, and advanced north towards Al Arish, with the goal of encircling the entire Egyptian expeditionary force. Israeli forces pulled out of the Sinai on 2 January 1949 following joint British-American pressure and a British threat of military action. IDF forces regrouped at the border with the Gaza Strip. Israeli forces attacked Rafah the following day, and after several days of fighting, Egyptian forces in the Gaza Strip were surrounded. The Egyptians agreed to negotiate a ceasefire on 7 January, and the IDF subsequently pulled out of Gaza.[136]
On 28 December, the Alexandroni Brigade failed to take the Falluja Pocket, but managed to seize Iraq el-Manshiyeh and temporarily hold it. The Egyptians counterattacked, but were mistaken for a friendly force and allowed to advance, trapping a large number of men. The Israelis lost 87 soldiers.[87]
On 5 March, Operation Uvda was launched following nearly a month of reconnaisance, with the goal of capturing the southern Negev from Jordan. The IDF entered and secured the territory, but did not meet significant resistance along the way, as the area was already designated to be part of the Jewish state in the UN Partition Plan, and the operation meant to establish Israeli sovereignty over the territory rather than actually conquer it. The Golani, Negev, and Alexandroni brigades participated in the operation, together with some smaller units and with naval support. On 10 March, Israeli forces reached Umm Rashrash on the Red Sea (where Eilat was built later) and took it without a battle. Israeli soldiers raised a hand-made Israeli flag ("The Ink Flag") at 16:00 hours on 10 March, claiming Umm Rashrash for Israel. The raising of the Ink Flag is considered to be the end of the war.[87]
衝突事故
As the fighting progressed and Israel mounted an incursion into the Sinai, the Royal Air Force began conducting almost daily reconnaissance missions over Israel and the Sinai. RAF reconnaisance aircraft took off from Egyptian airbases and sometimes flew alongside Royal Egyptian Air Force planes. High-flying British aircraft frequently flew over Haifa and Ramat David Airbase, and became known to the Israelis as the "shuftykeit".[101]
On 20 November 1948, an unarmed RAF photo-reconnaissance De Havilland Mosquito of No. 13 Squadron RAF was shot down by an Israeli Air Force P-51 Mustang flown by American volunteer Wayne Peake as it flew over the Galilee towards Hatzor Airbase. Peake opened fire with his cannons, causing a fire to break out in the port engine. The aircraft turned to sea and lowered its altitude, then exploded and crashed off Ashdod. Both of the crew were killed.[101][140]
Just before noon on 7 January 1949, four Spitfire FR. 18s from No. 208 Squadron RAF on a reconnaisance mission in the Deir al-Balah area flew over an Israeli convoy that had been attacked by five Egyptian Spitfires fifteen minutes earlier. The pilots had spotted smoking vehicles, and were drawn to the scene out of curiosity. Two planes dived to below 500 feet altitude to take pictures of the convoy, while the remaining two covered them from 1,500 feet. Israeli soldiers on the ground, alerted by the sound of the approaching Spitfires and fearing another Egyptian air attack, opened fire with machine guns. One Spitfire was shot down by a tank-mounted machine gun, while the other was lightly damaged and rapidly pulled up. The remaining three Spitfires were then attacked by patrolling IAF Spitfires flown by Slick Goodlin and John McElroy, volunteers from the United States and Canada respectively. All three Spitfires were shot down, and one pilot was killed. Two pilots were captured by Israeli soldiers and taken to Tel Aviv for interrogation, and were later released. Another was rescued by Bedouins and handed over to the Egyptian Army, which turned him over to the RAF. Later that day, four RAF Spitfires from the same squadron escorted by seven No. 213 Squadron RAF and eight No. 6 Squadron RAF Hawker Tempests went searching for the lost planes, and were attacked by four IAF Spitfires. The Israeli formation was led by Ezer Weizman. The remaining three were manned by Weizman's wingman Alex Jacobs and American volunteers Bill Schroeder and Caesar Dangott. The Tempests found they could not jettison their external fuel tanks, and some had non-operational guns. Schroeder shot down a British Tempest, killing pilot David Tattersfield. Weizmann severely damaged a British plane flown by Douglas Liquorish, but his own plane was lightly damaged by RAF pilot Brian Spragg. Two other British aircraft were lightly damaged during the engagement. The battle ended after the British wiggled their wings to be more clearly identified, and the Israelis eventually realized the danger of their situation and disengaged, returning to Hatzor Airbase.[101][141]
An RAF salvage team was deployed to recover the wrecks of the aircraft that had been shot down, entering Israeli territory during their search. Two were discovered inside Egypt, and it was later confirmed by local Arabs that Israeli troops had visited the crash sites, removed various parts from the wrecks, and buried the other aircraft. Tattersfield's Tempest was found north of Nirim, four miles inside Israel. Tattersfield was initially buried near the wreckage, but his body was later removed and reburied at the British War Cemetery in Ramla.[101]
In response, the RAF readied all Tempests and Spitfires to attack any IAF aircraft they encountered and bomb IAF airfields, but Air HQ refused to authorize retaliation. All British troops in the Middle East were placed on high alert, all leave for British troops was cancelled, and British citizens were advised to leave Israel. The day following the incident, British pilots were issued a directive to regard any Israeli aircraft infiltrating Egyptian or Jordanian airspace as hostile and to shoot them down, but were also ordered to avoid activity close to Israel's borders. At Hatzor Airbase, the general consensus among pilots, most of whom had flown with or alongside the RAF during World War II, was that the RAF would not allow the loss of five aircraft and two pilots to go without retaliation, and would probably attack the base at dawn the next day. That night, in anticipation of an impending British attack, some pilots decided not to offer any resistance and left the base, while a number of pilots prepared their Spitfires and were strapped into the cockpits at dawn, preparing to repel a retaliatory airstrike. However, British commanders refused to authorize any retaliation.[101][142]
イギリス介入
Britain, which at the time was one of the major powers in the Middle East, supported the Arabs.[99] The reasons for this was laid out in a British staff memo which stated "No solution of the Palestine problem should be proposed which would alienate the Arab states. If one of the two communities had to be antagonised, it was preferable, from the purely military angle, that a solution should be found which did not involve the continuing hostility of the Arabs; for in the that event our difficulties would not be confined to Palestine, but would extend throughout the whole of the Middle East".[143] The diplomat Sir John Toutbeck wrote:
"We [and the Arabs] are partners in adversity on this question. A Jewish state is no more in our interest than it is in the Arabs.... Our whole strategy in the ME is founded upon holding a secure base in Egypt, but the usefulness of the base must be gravely impaired if we cannot move out of it except through a hostile country".[144]
Moreover, it was an article of faith for most British policy-makers that most Jews were Communists, and that Israel would be bound to become a Communist state, thus giving the Soviet Union a toe-hold in the Middle East.[144] For these reasons, the British in the months before May 1948 did their best to encumber and block partition.[144] Trygve Lie wrote in his memoirs with some anger:
"Great Britain had placed the Palestine matter before the Assembly with the declared conviction that agreement between the Arabs and Jews was unattainable. This did not deter the British representative, [Colonial Secretary] Arthur Creech Jones, from informing the Assembly that Britain would give effect only to a plan accepted by the Arabs and the Jews.... The British approach proved to be not in accord, in my opinion with the either the letter or the spirit of the partition plan.
The United Kingdom could not progressively turn over authority to the Palestine Commission as the Assembly resolution provided, but only abruptly and completely on 15 May. Neither did it "regard favourably any proposal by the Commission to proceed to Palestine earlier than two weeks before the date of the termination of the Mandate". London would not permit the formation of the militia which the Assembly's resolution called for, nor would it facilitate frontier delimitation. The Assembly had further recommended that the United Kingdom endeavour to evacuate by 1 February a seaport and hinterland in the area of the Jewish state adequate to provide facilities for immigration".[144]
General Sir Alan Cunningham wrote to Creech Jones at this time to complain "It appears to me that H.M.G.'s policy is now simply to get out of Palestine as quickly as possible without regard to the consequences in Palestine".[144] In February 1948, the British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin assured the Jordanian Prime Minister Tawfiz Abu al-Huda of British support for a Jordanian invasion once the British left Palestine.[145] British officials regarded the prospect of an Arab invasion favorably as offering an excellent chance to overturn the UN partition resolution and cut Israel "down to size".[146] Bernard Burrows of the British Foreign Office's Middle East Department wrote:
"It is tempting to think that Transjordan might transgress the boundaries of the United Nations' Jewish state to the extent of establishing a corridor across the Southern Negev joining the existing Transjordan territory to the Mediterranean and Gaza. This would have immense strategic advantages for us, both in cutting the Jewish State, and therefore Communist influence, off from the Red Sea and by extending up to the Mediterranean the area in which our military and political influence is predominant by providing a means of sending the necessary military equipment etc. into Transjordan other than by the circuitous route through Aqaba".[131]
On 20 May, Bevin informed Baron Inverchapel, the British Ambassador to the United States:
"I do not (repeat not) intend in the near future to recognise the Jewish State and still less to support any proposal that it should become a member of the United Nations. In this connection I hope that even through the Americans have recognised the Jewish State de facto they will not commit themselves to any precise recognition of boundaries. It might well be that if the two sides ever accept a compromise it would be on the basis of boundaries differing from those recommended in the Partition Plan of the General Assembly".[131]
In this regard, the British launched a sustained diplomatic offensive to have the United Nations recognize all of the areas taken by the Arabs as belonging to those Arab states, especially Jordan and to reduce the borders of Israel to being more or less what the Peel Plan of 1937 had advised.[131] In the early days of the war, the British delegation at the UN blocked all efforts at a ceasefire (which was felt to hurt the Arabs, who winning the war at this point more than the Israelis) and because of fears that Article 39 of the Chapter 7 of the UN Covenant might involve sanctions against the Arab states.[147] The British changed position on the ceasefire in the spring of 1948 when the Arab armies were in possession of substantial chunks of Palestine with the Egyptians holding much of the Negev and the Jordanians holding a large section of central Palestine.[147] Sir Ronald Ian Campbell, the British Ambassador to Egypt was instructed by Bevin to tell the Egyptian government after the first ceasefire:
"It might be presumed that the period of truce will be utilised by the Jews to establish an effective administration not only in those parts of their November State which are behind the military lines, but also in the Arab areas which they have occupied, such as the Central and Northern Galilee. If the Arabs are to be in a position to bargain on equal terms, it is essential that they should establish some real authority in the areas behind the lines occupied by their forces. This is particularly important in the area to the south of the Egyptian front line. The greater part of this area was awarded to the Jews last November and the Jewish settlements there are still holding out and presumably maintaining contact with Tel Aviv. We shall have great difficulty in supporting the Arab claim to retain this part of Palestine unless it can be shown that it is in fact and not in name only under Arab administration during the truce...."[148]
Finally as part of the diplomatic effort to support the Arab war effort, the British supported an arms embargo, which was felt to favour the Arabs more than the Israelis.[149] The British reasoning behind the arms embargo was that it was long it was in place, the United States would be prevented from supplying arms to Israel, and if the embargo were lifted the United States could supply vastly greater number of weapons to the Israelis than the British could supply arms to the Arabs.[149]
国連休戦協定
In December 1948, the United Nations General Assembly passed Resolution 194 which declared (amongst other things) that in the context of a general peace agreement "refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors should be permitted to do so" and that "compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return." The resolution also mandated the creation of the United Nations Conciliation Commission. However, parts of the resolution were never implemented, resulting in the Palestinian refugee crisis.
結果
グリーンライン
In 1949, Israel signed separate armistices with Egypt on 24 February, Lebanon on 23 March, Jordan on 3 April, and Syria on 20 July. The Armistice Demarcation Lines, as set by the agreements, saw the territory under Israeli control encompassing approximately three-quarters of Mandate Palestine. This was about one-third more than was allocated to the Jewish State under the UN partition proposal.[150] The armistice lines were known afterwards as the "Green Line". The Gaza Strip and the West Bank were occupied by Egypt and Jordan respectively. The United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and Mixed Armistice Commissions were set up to monitor ceasefires, supervise the armistice agreements, to prevent isolated incidents from escalating, and assist other UN peacekeeping operations in the region.
死傷者
Israel lost 6,373 of its people, about 1% of its population, in the war. About 4,000 were soldiers and the rest were civilians.[151] The exact number of Arab losses is unknown, but is estimated at between 8,000[12] and 15,000.[13]
人口
Template:Plitim During the 1947-1948 Civil War in Mandatory Palestine and the 1948 Arab–Israeli War that followed, around 750,000 Palestinian Arabs fled or were expelled from their homes, out of approximately 1,200,000 Palestinians living in former Mandate Palestine. In 1951, the UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine estimated that the number of Palestinian refugees displaced from Israel was 711,000.[152] This number did not include displaced Palestinians inside Israeli-held territory. More than 400 Arab villages, and about ten Jewish villages and neighbourhoods, were depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite these figures, the British census in 1946 had listed only 467,000 Muslim Palestinians in the entire British Mandate (although there was some controversy as to how thorough that census was). The causes of the 1948 Palestinian exodus are a controversial topic among historians.[153]
Displaced Palestinian Arabs, known as Palestinian refugees, were settled in Palestinian refugee camps throughout the Arab world. The United Nations established UNRWA a relief and human development agency tasked with providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinian refugees. Arab nations refused to absorb Palestinian refugees, instead keeping them in refugee camps while insisting that they be allowed to return. Refugee status was also passed on to their descendants, who were also largely denied citizenship in Arab states. The descendants of refugees are also denied citizenship in their host countries. The Arab League instructed its members to deny Palestinians citizenship "to avoid dissolution of their identity and protect their right of return to their homeland." More than 1.4 million Palestinians still live in 58 recognized refugee camps.[154][155]
The Palestinian refugee problem and the debate around their claimed right of return are also major issues of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Palestinian Arabs and their supporters have staged annual demonstrations and commemorations on 15 May of each year, which is known to them as "Nakba Day". The popularity and number of participants in these annual al Nakba demonstrations has varied over time. During the Second Intifada after the failure of the Camp David 2000 Summit, the attendance at the demonstrations against Israel increased.
During the 1948 War, around 10,000 Jews were forced to evacuate their homes in Palestine or Israel,[156] but in the three years following the war, 700,000 Jews settled in Israel, mainly along the borders and in former Arab lands.[157] Around 136,000 came from the 250,000 displaced Jews of World War II.[158] About another 270,000 came from Eastern Europe. Another 300,000 arrived from the Arab and Muslim world as part of the Jewish exodus from Arab and Muslim countries. Many of these immigrants were forcibly expelled by their governments, while others voluntarily left, fleeing either antisemitic violence and pogroms and government persecution brought on by the war or by political instability, or left to settle in Israel of Zionist convictions or find better a economic and secure home in the West. They constituted the first wave of a total of 800,000-1,000,000 Jews who over the course of the next thirty years would flee or be expelled from the Arab world.[159] Approximately 680,000 of them immigrated to Israel; the rest mostly settled in Europe (mainly France) or the Americas.[160]
Israel initially relied on Jewish Agency-run tent camps known as immigrant camps to accommodate displaced Jews from Europe and Muslim nations. In the 1950s, these were transformed into transition camps, where living conditions were improved and tents were replaced with tin dwellings. Unlike the situation in the immigrant camps, when the Jewish Agency provided for immigrants, residents of the transition camps were required to provide for themselves. These camps began to decline in 1952, with the last one closing in 1963. The camps were largely transformed permanent settlements known as development towns, while others were absorbed as neighborhoods of the towns they were attached to, and the residents were given permanent housing in these towns and neighborhoods.[161] Most development towns eventually grew into cities. Some Jewish immigrants were also given the vacant homes of Palestinian refugees. There were also attempts to settle Jewish refugees from Arab and Muslim countries in moshavim (cooperative farming villages), though these efforts were only partially successful, as they had historically been craftsmen and merchants in their home countries, and did not traditionally engage in farm work.
歴史
After the war, Israeli and Palestinian historiographies differed on the interpretation of the events of 1948. In the West the majority view was of a tiny group of vastly outnumbered and ill-equipped Jews fighting off the massed strength of the invading Arab armies. It was also widely believed that the Palestinian Arabs left their homes on the instruction of their leaders. From 1980, with the opening of the Israeli and British archives, some Israeli historians have developed a different account of the period. In particular, the role played by Abdullah I of Jordan, the British government, the Arab aims during the war, the balance of force and the events related to the Palestinian exodus have been nuanced or given new interpretations.[162] Some of them are still hotly debated among historians and commentators of the conflict today.[163]
地図
関連項目
- 1948 Palestinian exodus
- Jewish exodus from Arab lands
- Killings and massacres during the 1948 Palestine War
- List of Israeli military operations in the 1948 Arab-Israeli war
- List of villages depopulated during the Arab-Israeli conflict
- List of modern conflicts in the Middle East
資料
引用
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- ^ Pappe, 2006, p. 35 Pappe sources this to a speech given by the Pakistani representative to the United Nations Sir Zafrullah Kahn on 28 November 1947 which can be read here
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- ^ Mordechai Weingarten
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- ^ Cowell, Alan (2 November 1991). “THE MIDDLE EAST TALKS: REPORTER'S NOTEBOOK; Syria Offers Old Photo To Fill an Empty Chair”. The New York Times 28 December 2008閲覧. "In recent years, several members of the group known by the British as the Stern Gang have acknowledged responsibility for the killing. Mr. Shamir, who was a member of the Stern Gang, has declined to discuss the killing, and one of his spokesman has said he had no role in it."
- ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Karsh 2002, p. 68
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- ^ Operation Hiram
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- ^ Adrian, Natan: Britain, Israel and Anglo-Jewry: 1949-57
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- ^ Karsh 2002, p. 74
- ^ a b Karsh 2002, p. 77
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- ^ a b Karsh 2002, pp. 76–77
- ^ Leon Carl Brown (2004). Diplomacy in the Middle East: the international relations of regional and outside powers. I.B.Tauris. pp. 126–. ISBN 978-1-86064-899-1 6 April 2011閲覧。 "...when the war ended in 1949, Israel was in control of about one-third more territory (some 2,500 square miles) than it had been allocated by the United Nations partition plan"
- ^ Politics and society in modern Israel: myths and realities. Google Books 28 March 2011閲覧。
- ^ General Progress Report and Supplementary Report of the United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Covering the Period from 11 December 1949 to 23 October 1950, published by the United Nations Conciliation Commission, 23 October 1950. (U.N. General Assembly Official Records, 5th Session, Supplement No. 18, Document A/1367/Rev. 1) アーカイブ 2009年4月5日 - ウェイバックマシン
- ^ http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/paper/hughesMatthew.html The War for Palestine. Rewriting the History of 1948 by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim . Accessed 2009-08-08. Archived 11 August 2009.
- ^ http://unrwa.org/etemplate.php?id=86
- ^ http://www.thejerusalemfund.org/ht/display/ContentDetails/i/2591
- ^ “Jewish Refugees of the Israeli Palestinian Conflict”. Mideast Web. 13 July 2008閲覧。
- ^ Benny Morris, Righteous Victims, chap.VI.
- ^ Displaced Persons retrieved on 29 October 2007 from the U.S. Holocaust Museum.
- ^ Sachar, pp. 395–403.
- ^ VI- THE ARAB REFUGEES - INTRODUCTION
- ^ http://lib.cet.ac.il/pages/item.asp?item=12939
- ^ Avi Shlaim, "The Debate about 1948", International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Aug., 1995), pp.287–304.
- ^ Benny Morris, "Benny Morris on fact, fiction, & propaganda about 1948", The Irish Times, 21 February 2008, reported by Jeff Weintraub アーカイブ (14 August 2009) - WebCite
出典
- Bickerton, Ian and Hill, Maria (2003). Contested Spaces: The Arab-Israeli Conflict. McGraw-Hill. ISBN 978-0-07-471217-7
- Black, Ian (1992). Israel's Secret Wars: A History of Israel's Intelligence Services. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3286-4
- Bowyer Bell, John (1996). Terror Out of Zion: The Fight For Israeli Independence. Transaction Publishers. ISBN 978-1-56000-870-5
- Bregman, Ahron (2002). Israel's Wars: A History Since 1947. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-28716-6
- Brown, Judith and Louis, Roger (1999). The Oxford History of the British Empire. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-820564-7
- van Creveld, Martin (2004). Moshe Dayan. Weidenfeld & Nicholson. ISBN 978-0-297-84669-7
- lapierre collinsCollins, Larry and Lapierre, Dominique (1973) O Jerusalem!", Pan Books. ISBN 978-0-330-23514-3
- El-Nawawy, Mohammed (2002), The Israeli-Egyptian Peace Process in the Reporting of Western Journalists, Ablex/Greenwood, ISBN 978-1-56750-544-3
- Geddes, Charles L. (1991). A Documentary History of the Arab-Israeli Conflict. Praeger. ISBN 978-0-275-93858-1
- Gelber, Yoav (1997). Jewish-Transjordanian Relations 1921–48: Alliance of Bars Sinister. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4675-6
- Gelber, Yoav (2006). Palestine 1948. War, Escape and the Emergence of the Palestinian Refugee Problem. Sussex Academic Press. ISBN 978-1-84519-075-0
- Gilbert, Martin (1998). Israel: A History. Black Swan. ISBN 978-0-552-99545-0
- Gold, Dore (2007), The Fight for Jerusalem: Radical Islam, the West, and the Future of the Holy City, Regnery Publishing, ISBN 978-1-59698-029-7
- Israel Foreign Ministry, Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Israel State Archives, Russian Federal Archives, Cummings Center for Russian Studies Tel Aviv University, Oriental Institute (2000). Documents on Israeli Soviet Relations, 1941–53. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-4843-9
- Joseph, Dov. The Faithful City – The Siege of Jerusalem, 1948. Simon and Schuster, 1960. Congress # 60 10976
- Kaniuk, Yoram (2001). Commander of the Exodus. Grove Press. ISBN 978-0-8021-3808-8
- Karsh, Efraim (2002). The Arab-Israeli Conflict. The Palestine War 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-372-9
- Karsh, Inari & Karsh, Efraim (1999). Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East, 1789–1923. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-00541-9
- Katz, Sam (1988). Israeli Units Since 1948. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-0-85045-837-4
- Khalidi, Rashid (2001). The Palestinians and 1948: the underlying causes of failure. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 12–36). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
- Khalidi, Rashid (2006). The Iron Cage:The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood. Boston, MA:Beacon Press. ISBN 978-0-8070-0309-1
- Khalidi, Walid (1987). From Haven to Conquest: Readings in Zionism and the Palestine Problem Until 1948. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-155-6
- Khalidi, Walid (ed.) (1992). All that remains. Institute for Palestine Studies. ISBN 978-0-88728-224-9
- Kurzman, Dan (1970), Genesis 1948—the first Arab-Israeli war, New American Library, New York, Library of Congress CCN: 77-96925
- Levenberg, Haim (1993). Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine: 1945–1948. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-3439-5
- Levin, Harry. Jerusalem Embattled – A Diary of the City under Siege. Cassels, 1997. ISBN 0 304 33765
- Morris, Benny (1988), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949, Cambridge Middle East Library
- Morris, Benny (1994), 1948 and after; Israel and the Palestinians
- Morris, Benny (2001). Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist-Arab Conflict, 1881–2001. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0-679-74475-7
- Morris, Benny (2004), The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, ISBN 978-0-521-81120-0
- Morris, Benny (2008), "1948: The First Arab-Israeli War", Yale University Press, New Haven, ISBN 978-0-300-12696-9
- Oring, Elliott (1981). Israeli Humor—The Content: The Content and Structure of the Chizbat of the Palmah. SUNY Press. ISBN 978-0-87395-512-6
- Pappe, Ilan (2006), The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine, Oneworld Publications, Oxford, England, ISBN 978-1-85168-467-0
- Penkower, Monty Noam (2002). Decision on Palestine Deferred: America, Britain and Wartime Diplomacy, 1939–1945. London: Routledge. ISBN 978-0-7146-5268-9
- Pollack, Kenneth (2004). Arabs at War: Military Effectiveness, 1948–1991. University of Nebraska Press. ISBN 978-0-8032-8783-9
- Richelson, Jeffrey T. (1997). A Century of Spies: Intelligence in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-511390-7
- Rogan, Eugene L., ed., and Avi Shlaim, ed. The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2001
- Rogan, Eugene L. "Jordan and 1948: the persistence of an official history." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 104–124
- Sadeh, Eligar (1997). Militarization and State Power in the Arab-Israeli Conflict: Case Study of Israel, 1948–1982. Universal Publishers. ISBN 978-0-9658564-6-1
- Sachar, Howard M. (1979). A History of Israel, New York: Knopf. ISBN 978-0-679-76563-9
- Sayigh, Yezid (2000). Armed Struggle and the Search for State: The Palestinian National Movement, 1949–1993. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-829643-0
- Sela, Avraham. "Abdallah Ibn Hussein." The Continuum Political Encyclopedia of the Middle East. Ed. Avraham Sela. New York: Continuum, 2002. pp. 13–14.
- Shapira, Anita (1992). Land and Power: Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-506104-8
- Shlaim, Avi (2001). Israel and the Arab Coalition. In Eugene Rogan and Avi Shlaim (eds.). The War for Palestine (pp. 79–103). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-79476-3
- Sicker, Martin (1999). Reshaping Palestine: From Muhammad Ali to the British Mandate, 1831–1922. Praeger/Greenwood. ISBN 978-0-275-96639-3
- Stearns, Peter N. Citation[リンク切れ] from The Encyclopedia of World History Sixth Edition, Peter N. Stearns (general editor), 2001 Houghton Mifflin Company, at Bartleby.com.
- Tripp, Charles. "Iraq and the 1948 War: mirror of Iraq's disorder." Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 125–150.
- JVL: Casualties in Arab-Israeli Wars
副次的資料
- Aloni, Shlomo (2001). Arab-Israeli Air Wars 1947–82. Osprey Publishing. ISBN 978-1-84176-294-4
- Beckman, Morris (1999). The Jewish Brigade: An Army With Two Masters, 1944–45. Sarpedon Publishers. ISBN 978-1-86227-423-5
- Ben-Ami, Shlomo (2006). Scars of War, Wounds of Peace: The Israeli-Arab Tragedy. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-518158-6
- Benvenisti, Meron (2002). Sacred Landscape. University of California Press. ISBN 978-0-520-23422-2
- Flapan, Simha (1987), 'The Birth of Israel: Myths and Realities', Pantheon Books, New York.
- Gilbert, Martin (1976). The Arab-Israeli Conflict: Its History in Maps Weidenfeld & Nicolson. ISBN 978-0-297-77241-5
- Landis, Joshua. "Syria and the Palestine War: fighting King 'Abdullah's 'Greater Syria plan.'" Rogan and Shlaim. The War for Palestine. 178–205.
- Masalha, Nur (1992). Expulsion of the Palestinians: The Concept of 'Transfer' in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948, Institute for Palestine Studies, ISBN 978-0-88728-235-5
- Morris, Benny, 1948: A History of the First Arab-Israeli War, (2009) Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-15112-1
- Reiter, Yitzhak, National Minority, Regional Majority: Palestinian Arabs Versus Jews in Israel (Syracuse Studies on Peace and Conflict Resolution), (2009) Syracuse Univ Press (Sd). ISBN 978-0-8156-3230-6
- Sheleg, Yair (2001). A Short History of Terror Haaretz.
- Zertal, Idith (2005). Israel's Holocaust and the Politics of Nationhood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-85096-4
創作作品
- The Hope by Herman Wouk, a historical novel that includes a fictionalized version of Israel's War of Independence.
External links
- Overview of The 1948 Israeli War of Independence (documentary)
- Resources > Modern Period > 20th Cent. > History of Israel > State of Israel > The Wars > War of Independence The Jewish History Resource Center, Project of the Dinur Center for Research in Jewish History, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
- About the War of Independence
- United Nations: System on the Question of Palestine
- Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
- Timeline: Israel War of Independence (First Arab-Israeli War)
- > Some of them are still hotly debated among historians and commentators of the conflict today.astweb.org/briefhistory.htm History of Palestine, Israel and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
- Palestinian viewpoint concerning the context of the 1948 war
- The BBC on the UN Partition Plan
- The BBC on the Formation of Israel
- Israeli War of Independence: an autobiographical account by a South African participant
- Israel and the Arab Coalition in 1948
- “I Have Returned.”. Time Magazine. (15 March 1948) 31 October 2009閲覧。
- “War for Jerusalem Road.”. Time Magazine. (19 April 1948) 31 October 2009閲覧。
Template:Israeli wars Template:Arab–Israeli conflict Template:Anti-Jewish pogroms during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War ja:第一次中東戦争