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// Copyright 2017 The Chromium Authors
// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
// found in the LICENSE file.
#include "sandbox/policy/features.h"
#include "base/feature_list.h"
#include "build/build_config.h"
#include "build/chromeos_buildflags.h"
#include "sandbox/features.h"
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
#include "base/win/windows_version.h"
#endif
namespace sandbox::policy::features {
#if !BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC) && !BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA)
// Enables network service sandbox.
// (Only causes an effect when feature kNetworkServiceInProcess is disabled.)
BASE_FEATURE(kNetworkServiceSandbox,
"NetworkServiceSandbox",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
// Enables a fine-grained seccomp-BPF syscall filter for the network service.
// Only has an effect if IsNetworkSandboxEnabled() returns true.
// If the network service sandbox is enabled and |kNetworkServiceSyscallFilter|
// is disabled, a seccomp-BPF filter will still be applied but it will not
// disallow any syscalls.
BASE_FEATURE(kNetworkServiceSyscallFilter,
"NetworkServiceSyscallFilter",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables a fine-grained file path allowlist for the network service.
// Only has an effect if IsNetworkSandboxEnabled() returns true.
// If the network service sandbox is enabled and |kNetworkServiceFileAllowlist|
// is disabled, a file path allowlist will still be applied, but the policy will
// allow everything.
BASE_FEATURE(kNetworkServiceFileAllowlist,
"NetworkServiceFileAllowlist",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
#endif // !BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC) && !BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
// Experiment for Windows sandbox security mitigation,
// sandbox::MITIGATION_EXTENSION_POINT_DISABLE.
BASE_FEATURE(kWinSboxDisableExtensionPoints,
"WinSboxDisableExtensionPoint",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables GPU AppContainer sandbox on Windows.
BASE_FEATURE(kGpuAppContainer,
"GpuAppContainer",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables GPU Low Privilege AppContainer when combined with kGpuAppContainer.
BASE_FEATURE(kGpuLPAC,
"GpuLPAC",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables Renderer AppContainer
BASE_FEATURE(kRendererAppContainer,
"RendererAppContainer",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables very high job memory limits for sandboxed renderer processes. This
// sets a limit of 1Tb, effectively removing the Job memory limits, except in
// egregious cases.
BASE_FEATURE(kWinSboxHighRendererJobMemoryLimits,
"WinSboxHighRendererJobMemoryLimits",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// If enabled, launch the network service within an LPAC sandbox. If disabled,
// the network service will run inside an App Container.
BASE_FEATURE(kWinSboxNetworkServiceSandboxIsLPAC,
"WinSboxNetworkServiceSandboxIsLPAC",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// If enabled, always launch the renderer process with Code Integrity Guard
// enabled, regardless of the local policy configuration. If disabled, then
// policy is respected. This acts as an emergency "off switch" for the
// deprecation of the RendererCodeIntegrityEnabled policy.
BASE_FEATURE(kWinSboxForceRendererCodeIntegrity,
"WinSboxForceRendererCodeIntegrity",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// If enabled, modifies the child's PEB to stop further application of
// appcompat in the child. Does not affect the browser or unsandboxed
// processes.
BASE_FEATURE(kWinSboxZeroAppShim,
"WinSboxZeroAppShim",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Enables pre-launch Code Integrity Guard (CIG) for Chrome network service
// process, when running on Windows 10 1511 and above. This has no effect if
// NetworkServiceSandbox feature is disabled, or if using a component or ASAN
// build. See https://blogs.windows.com/blog/tag/code-integrity-guard/.
BASE_FEATURE(kNetworkServiceCodeIntegrity,
"NetworkServiceCodeIntegrity",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH)
// Controls whether the Spectre variant 2 mitigation is enabled. We use a USE
// flag on some Chrome OS boards to disable the mitigation by disabling this
// feature in exchange for system performance.
BASE_FEATURE(kSpectreVariant2Mitigation,
"SpectreVariant2Mitigation",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// An override for the Spectre variant 2 default behavior. Security sensitive
// users can enable this feature to ensure that the mitigation is always
// enabled.
BASE_FEATURE(kForceSpectreVariant2Mitigation,
"ForceSpectreVariant2Mitigation",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS_ASH)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
// Enabling the kNetworkServiceSandbox feature automatically enables Spectre
// variant 2 mitigations in the network service. This can lead to performance
// regressions, so enabling this feature will turn off the Spectre Variant 2
// mitigations.
//
// On ChromeOS Ash, this overrides the system-wide kSpectreVariant2Mitigation
// feature above, but not the user-controlled kForceSpectreVariant2Mitigation
// feature.
BASE_FEATURE(kForceDisableSpectreVariant2MitigationInNetworkService,
"kForceDisableSpectreVariant2MitigationInNetworkService",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// Increase the renderer sandbox memory limit. As of 2023, there are no limits
// on macOS, and a 1TiB limit on Windows. There are reports of users bumping
// into the limit. This increases the limit by 2x compared to the default
// state. We are not increasing it all the way as on Windows as Linux systems
// typically ship with overcommit, so there is no "commit limit" to save us
// from egregious cases as on Windows.
BASE_FEATURE(kHigherRendererMemoryLimit,
"HigherRendererMemoryLimit",
base::FEATURE_DISABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_LINUX) || BUILDFLAG(IS_CHROMEOS)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
// Enables caching compiled sandbox profiles. Only some profiles support this,
// as controlled by CanCacheSandboxPolicy().
BASE_FEATURE(kCacheMacSandboxProfiles,
"CacheMacSandboxProfiles",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
// Enables the renderer on Android to use a separate seccomp policy.
BASE_FEATURE(kUseRendererProcessPolicy,
"UseRendererProcessPolicy",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// When enabled, this features restricts a set of syscalls in
// BaselinePolicyAndroid that are used by RendererProcessPolicy.
BASE_FEATURE(kRestrictRendererPoliciesInBaseline,
"RestrictRendererPoliciesInBaseline",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
// When enabled, restrict clone to just flags used by fork and pthread_create on
// android.
BASE_FEATURE(kRestrictCloneParameters,
"RestrictCloneParameters",
base::FEATURE_ENABLED_BY_DEFAULT);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_ANDROID)
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
bool IsNetworkSandboxSupported() {
// Network service sandbox uses GetNetworkConnectivityHint which is only
// supported on Windows 10 Build 19041 (20H1) so versions before that wouldn't
// have a working network change notifier when running in the sandbox.
// TODO(crbug.com/1450754): Move this to an API that works earlier than 20H1
// and also works in the LPAC sandbox.
static const bool supported =
base::win::GetVersion() >= base::win::Version::WIN10_20H1;
if (!supported) {
return false;
}
// App container must be already supported on 20H1, but double check it here.
CHECK(sandbox::features::IsAppContainerSandboxSupported());
return true;
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
bool IsNetworkSandboxEnabled() {
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC) || BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA)
return true;
#else
#if BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
if (!IsNetworkSandboxSupported()) {
return false;
}
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_WIN)
// Check feature status.
return base::FeatureList::IsEnabled(kNetworkServiceSandbox);
#endif // BUILDFLAG(IS_MAC) || BUILDFLAG(IS_FUCHSIA)
}
} // namespace sandbox::policy::features