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Economic aftermath

On economics, aftermath section is way too shallow, listing a bunch of countries whose economies grew. We can do better. Key to this section is that total war had necessitated the growth of the state, and increased nationalisation, in western democracies - and this was shown to have worked. Especially in western Europe, between 1945 and about 1980 government ownership of capital was a non-partisan issue, with even conservative parties backing the welfare state. The War was a direct cause. Someone please add this with citation. Also, in the late 1940s and 1950s, the communist economic miracle was no less impressive than the effects of direct aid from the Marshall Plan - again, the planned economy was having its heyday. Someone please add with citation.-Chumchum7 (talk) 12:26, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

Add the War also caused a baby boom, which had massive economic and social implications. We also ought to add a couple of lines on the War's lasting presence in culture: its prevalence in news media, film, literature and computer games. -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:47, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

We have that the WW2 logically caused the Cold War which ended 20 years ago, but we omit that WW2 has been causally linked to the creation of Israel and the related Middle East issues that exist to this day. That's another omission, which tightening allows us to repair. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:02, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

Text tightening

I've begun tightening the text, starting with the technology section, which is now leaner by about 90 words I think, freeing up space to add concise content elsewhere. -Chumchum7 (talk) 17:16, 27 December 2010 (UTC)

I don't think that there's any clear support for adding further material - the thrust of the above discussion was that the article needs to be trimmed. What do you suggest adding? I've just removed the addition of "and the region of Bessarabia in Romania." as this was already in the article. Nick-D (talk) 22:29, 27 December 2010 (UTC)

I see Bessarabia is mentioned in the context of the Nazi-Soviet Pact's plans for spheres of influence, but can't see where the occupation of Bessarabia is featured itself. I think we agreed a few weeks ago that it should go in, if the Soviet occupation of the Baltics is in. It only adds 7 words, 90 have been cut, so please restore the clause.

There's plenty more tightening possible, and several more potential additions. For example, as per above discussion, I'd add a clause to the line "During 1939 to early 1941, in a series of successful military campaigns and political treaties, Germany conquered or politically subdued most of continental Europe apart from the Soviet Union." The Soviet expansion 1939-41 is completely omitted from the lede, which leaves the reader thinking that the USSR was some uninvolved bystander like Switzerland or USA. A clause or a sentence can effectively cover it.

Earlier, after transcribing a large number of quotes from reliable sources, I proposed:

(a) "During 1939 to early 1941, in a series of successful military campaigns and political treaties, Germany conquered or politically subdued much of continental Europe, while its ally [7+ references to choose from here] the Soviet Union also occupied or invaded several European countries."

That gained some support but was controversial for others, who took issue with reliable sources' use of the word "ally". But I wasn't comfortable with the proposed alternative. I am a consensus editor so I want to find a solution. You made a useful note when you wrote 'I agree that the article should note that, whether officially or not, the pact was effectively an alliance, but it would be better just to state that this view exists and there's no need to cover whatever Stalin's self-serving propaganda publications claimed (the article doesn't cover the propaganda claims of other participants in the war).'

So one might modify it to

(b) "From late 1939 to early 1941, Germany conquered or politically subdued much of continental Europe; the nominally neutral Soviet Union, which has been described as an "ally" of Germany in this first phase of the War [7+ references to choose from here], also occupied or invaded several European countries."

The key here is the "has been described as", which is an important qualification showing that Wikipedia is not asserting fact but stating that the view exists. My recent request above for "quotes from reliable sources, overtly disputing the accuracy of the credible Western academics who use the term 'alliance'" was a sincere request and needn't be perceived as a challenge. I want to see how we can fold in an opposing thesis into the line, e.g.

(c) "From late 1939 to early 1941, Germany conquered or politically subdued much of continental Europe. During this first phase the Soviets were nominally neutral, but occupied or invaded six European countries while enjoying close ties with Germany that have been described as an "alliance" [7+ references to choose from here] - a view that is subject to scholarly debate.[citation needed]"

I am enthusiastic about seeing quotes that show us this opposition to the term "alliance". But I'm not prepared to engage in speculation about what these Oxford, Harvard and Yale history professors I've cited might 'really' mean by their use of the word "alliance", nor whether or not they don't know the meaning of the word nor whether they were being colloquial or flippant in their use of the word. The verifiable truth is that they use the word "alliance" to describe Nazi-Soviet relations. I will make requests for comment on my and others dispute resolution efforts here, if we cannot find it in ourselves to get through the impasse at this juncture. We've been talking about it for 2 months.

-Chumchum7 (talk) 01:14, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

I also think that expansion of the territory of the USSR should be reflected in the lede. However, the wording is not satisfactory. It implies that the USSR was a German military ally, and that it participated in the war on the German side. That point of view is not supported by scholars (even by those cited by Chumchum7). In actuality the USSR was German co-belligerent during last half of Sept 1939, waged a separate war against Finland in 1939-40 and peacefully (although forcefully) annexed Bessarabia, Bukovina, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (last four without Hitler's consent and to his great displeasure). In addition, the proposed wording implies that six European countries were fully occupied by the USSR, which is simply not true. Since we cannot go into these details in the lede (in actuality, they are not discussed in the main article also), the most optimal wording would be:

"From late 1939 to early 1941, Germany conquered or politically subdued much of continental Europe, whereas nominally neutral Soviet Union fully or partially occupied and annexed territories of its six European neighbours."

Re Bessarabia, it should be added, but the complete story must be told: namely, Vienna awards + annexation of Bessarabia/Bukovina = Romanian decision to join the Axis.

I also think that the story of occupation of the Baltic states is misplaced: it should be moved to the next section, because it occurred during the Battle of France and it was connected to the latter (although different scholars see this connection differently).--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:11, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

I'd be willing for scholarly debates around "alliance" and "neutrality" to be moved lower into the article, but for that I'd need the line in the lede to be something more like this:

"From late 1939 to early 1941, Germany conquered or subdued much of continental Europe; while amid a series of Nazi-Soviet agreements, the Soviet Union fully or partially annexed its six European neighbours."

The preceding line, "Germany set out to establish a large empire in Europe" is both redundant (we know that Germany was on the warpath) and slightly inaccurate (sources state Hitler wanted Lebensraum in the east, not for e.g. France to be incorporated into a "German Empire"). The sentence ought to be deleted for these reasons.

While we're on the lede, "The Axis advance was stopped in 1942 after the defeat of Japan in a series of naval battles and after devastating defeats of European Axis troops in North Africa and at Stalingrad", overstates the importance of North Africa at the expense of Stalingrad. There is just no way that this Soviet victory, with its 2 million casualties, should share the podium equally with the important but less decisive North Africa campaign, which we have linked to the Battle of El Alamein, which literally had around 2% of the casualties that were at Stalingrad. We either simply delete "in North Africa and" (my preferred option) or add to the line with "...and after British-led successes in North Africa and the devastating Soviet victory at Stalingrad"

Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:30, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

There is no scholarly debates around nominal neutrality of the USSR: the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact was both de facto and de jure a non-aggression pact and didn't differ in that sense from other similar pacts signed during those times. The words "nominally neutral" are needed in the lede because otherwise the lede creates an impression that both the USSR and Germany waged the war in Europe during the whole period of 1939-41, although in actuality the only war the USSR officially participated in was the war with Finland (which was neither German nor Franco-British ally). In addition, omission of the word "occupied" is not correct, because these annexations were coercive (as a rule, by means of de facto occupation, or even military invasions, as in Poland and Finland). Omission of the word "territories" is also misleading, because "partial annexation" might be interpreted as a situation when the annexed state retained part of its sovereignity (which wasn't the case). In addition, the Baltic state maintain that whereas their territories were annexed by the USSR, the states were not (and continued to exist).

Re "while amid a series of Nazi-Soviet agreements..." Again, there is no consensus about the role of these agreements in Soviet expansion. North Bukovina was annexed despite the MRP. Annexation of the Baltic states had been considered by Hitler as a violation of the pact (and later was used as one of the pretexts for Barbarossa).

Re German Empire in Europe, the words are quite relevant, because "Empire" implies "Greater Germany plus subordinated territories". Yes, the Greater Germany was supposed to include mostly the territories in the East, however, other parts of Europe were also supposed to be subordinated to Germany in a form of protectorates (Bohemia), General Governments (part of Poland), puppet states (Croatia), minor Axis partners, etc. The phrase should stay, and probably be expanded to mention German plans of world dominance.

I agree that by scale and importance Stalingrad dwarfed both Pacific and African theatres. However, all these events were important, all of them are being discussed in the article, so the lede should pay attention to all these three events, although the accents may be somewhat shifted. With regard to your wording, a "devastating victory" sounds like a "Pyrrhic victory"; we probably should write "the devastating German defeat at Stalingrad", or "the calamitous German defeat at Stalingrad".--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:09, 28 December 2010 (UTC)

After 2 months of discussion, it's time to run a test to gauge consensus, by adding the line to the lede, in some shape or form. There are thousands of editors out there whose collective opinion will pale our discussion into insignificance. I can support the maintenance of your sentence in the main, but it needs to be tweaked to include Nazi-Soviet agreements. Without it, German and Soviet expansion are presented as unrelated, which isn't what sources say. The evidence shows that as late as late as 1941 the Nazis and Soviets recognised each others' borders in the German–Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement. That article has a line (with a citation from Nekrich, Aleksandr Moiseevich; Ulam, Adam Bruno; Freeze, Gregory L; 1997) which reads: "On June 26, the Soviet Union issued an ultimatum demanding Bessarabia, Bukovina, and the Hertza region from Romania. After the Soviets agreed with Germany that they would limit their claims in Bukovina to northern Bukovina, Germany urged Romania to accept the ultimatum." This, and the WW2 books I've seen, also say that the Soviet annexation of Bessarabia was agreed to by the Nazis. If you think the sources are mistaken, please help us establish why they are mistaken, by pointing us to sources that can be cross-referenced.

In the meantime, you can have the line all the way you want it, with one additional clause:

"From late 1939 to early 1941, Germany conquered or politically subdued much of continental Europe; amid Nazi-Soviet agreements, the nominally neutral Soviet Union fully or partially occupied and annexed territories of its six European neighbours."

As I say, it may not stand the test of WP:CONS anyway, so let's add the line and see what happens and why. Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:54, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

After 4 days of silence on this, I'm adding the line to gauge consensus per WP:CONS. Humble request: eds I've engaged in discussion with here please hold off for a couple of days to allow for fresh outside interest. I am also going to take a break and look forward to working with you in the future. Many thanks -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:55, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

Nekrich does not express the opinion of whole scholarly community. For instance, the central point of his concept was that even before 1939 the strategic goal of the USSR was an alliance with Germany, the point that is not shared by, e.g., Gorodetsky, Roberts, Carley, Watson and others. These authors say that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact defined just spheres of influence, and was not a mutual approval of occupation of anything.

Re German–Soviet Border and Commercial Agreement, it just confirmed the status quo (with minor modifications).

The way you presented Nazi-Soviet agreements is hardly satisfactory, because, according to your wording they opened an avenue just for Soviet expansion, which is not correct, because the major and direct result was that Germany got a strategic initiative in the war it started.

Re Bukovina, it was not mentioned in the secret protocol, and there were no other agreement between Germany and the USSR on that account. Germany simply let Romania know the latter had no alternative other than to accept this ultimatum.

In summary, I am still not satisfied with this wording, however, since I believe that the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact should be mentioned, I have no objections (unless better wording is proposed).

PS. I am not sure the ref is needed here, because, as a rule, the refs are not required in the lede: it just reflects what the article says, so all refs can be found in the main article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:06, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

Second front

Rees (2009) and others emphasise the delays in opening the second front in France as the most problematic issue in Soviet-western relations. Am also inclined to highlight casualties for the Big Three: US 0.4M, UK 0.4M, USSR 27M. -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:45, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

I'm not sure how accurate it is to say that the British "refused Soviet requests for an immediate second front in France [in 1941] and continued to do so (causing diplomatic tension between the USSR and the Western allies for the next three years to D-Day)". This suggests that Britain refused to do something which was within its powers, when in reality an invasion of France was impossible until 1943 at the absolute earliest and not a practical undertaking until 1944 (the British also had to hose down American desires to land in France during 1942, something the Americans were later grateful for once they realised how difficult an undertaking it would be). Moreover, it falls into the trap of dismissing the Italian Campaign as somehow not being significant, even though it involved a large chunk of the Allied armies and tied down a reasonable number of good quality German divisions - Stalin may not have seen it as an important 'second front', but most modern historians do. The extent to which these tensions mattered also seems questionable - did Stalin's unhappiness have any concrete results? - Allied material aid kept increasing during this period and the combined bomber offensive tied down enormous German resources from 1943. I'm reverting the wording out of the article - can you please discuss this kind of change before making them? Nick-D (talk) 22:14, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

We can work on the wording, say instead: "refused Soviet requests for an immediate second front in France [in 1941] and continued to do so for the next three years to D-Day"

But please don't to remove the inline citation - per Wikipedia guidelines its from an accurate, relevant, verifiable, reliable source; namely Laurence Rees (2009) World War Two Behind Closed Doors, BBC Books, e.g. p. 406-7, "Stalin always believed that Britain and America were delaying the second front so that the Soviet Union would bear the brunt of the war". Rees states second front was a big deal, from 1941. 27,000,000 Soviets died, about 1,000,000 Western allies died. Yes these tensions mattered per origins of the Cold War, also Rees draws a connection between the tensions and the progress of the World War II peace conferences. The book is in your nearest good book store, check the index for "second front" and you get about 20 page references. In any case, I'd rather not debate this per WP:NOR but highly recommend the whole book and the TV series http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/ (all episodes have been up on Youtube and may still be). It would be nice to know what you think of it. Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 23:42, 1 January 2011 (UTC)

I haven't removed that, or the extra text about three years of Soviet requests it references. Getting into inter-Allied tensions over the landings in France is very complex - the British and American governments also disagreed greatly about the timing and location for the second front as well, with Churchill leaning towards expanding operations in the Mediterranean and Balkans and Roosevelt had to rather forcefully push for the main effort to be on the Atlantic Coast of France until they reached agreement in mid-1943 to land in France in mid-1944. This was a major source of tensions between the UK and USA and also took several major conferences to resolve. As we don't have the space for this kind of discussion here, it seems best to leave it to the appropriate sub-articles. Nick-D (talk) 00:11, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

...and I see that you've reverted me. Can you please not edit war? - it's really unhelpful and doesn't contribute to collaborative editing of this very high profile article. What you've added is also not accurate - the US and UK didn't reject "Soviet requests for the next three years to D-Day" - they agreed to conduct the invasion in mid 1943 and it took place roughly when it was originally scheduled to do so. What you've added implies that the western Allies only decided to invade France on 6 June 1944. Nick-D (talk) 00:49, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

Who is warring? That was a single tweak to the line, and an addition of a direct quote from the citation, precisely to address your concern, per WP:CONS. That was done in good faith. Also I've stated above I'm happy to reword the line with you. With regard to warring, I've replied at your talk page. As I say, please take a look at the reliable source, which I am trying to accommodate and I think you'll enjoy. It states, as its central thesis, that the lack of a second front in France dominated Soviet-Western Allied relations for 3 years to D-Day, and had a lasting impact on the peace conferences and postwar history. The source shows that Stalin's first request for an immediate front came in summer 1941, and his requests continued past 1943 when at last an agreement was made in principle, then D-Day followed in summer 1944. The line can reflect this. I agree the line should not be open to interpretation that the western Allies only decided to invade France on 6 June 1944, and that wasn't my intention in the first place. Thanks -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:56, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

Accordingly, I've tweaked the line for clarification. Let's all, myself included, have another read of WP:CONS, WP:V, WP:DR, WP:OWN, WP:AGF, WP:AAGF. I'm taking a Wikibreak for a month. Happy New Year all, and happy editing. Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 12:47, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

Firstly, repeated and constant references to well known WP policy (WP:CONS, WP:V, WP:DR, WP:OWN) during the discussion with experienced editors are redundant and have an effect that is opposite to what one wants to achieve (similarly to the well known fact that unneeded refs to WP:AGF may be interpreted as a sign of the lack of good faith).

Secondly, in my opinion, t We must remember (i) that British land troops were simply insufficient for launching any serious invasion of continental Europe, (ii) that Britain, along with France, had already been defeated in Europe in 1940, and invasion of Europe was much more complicated task than defensive operations against Wehrmacht along with France, (iii) that by this moment Britain didn't enjoy air superiority, which would made landing almost impossible, (iv) that Britain had already been involved in the major conflict in North Africa, which was tying down a considerable part of its land troops. In this situation we simply cannot speak seriously about British "refusal" to open the Second Front: Britain was simply unable to do that, and disastrous Dieppe raid demonstrated that perfectly.

With regard to the US, we must remember that this country, despite its enormous economical power, had virtually no land troops and no experience of land war by that moment, so the US were also unable to launch a large scale invasion of Europe in 1942-43 without a danger to sustain million and million casualties (which would be a suicide for every democratic leader).

In connection to all said above, I remove the wording proposed by Chumchum7 as amateurish and superficial. However, the point is valid in general, so I put it here (see below) and I propose to modify it to reflect the fact that both inability and unwilling of the Western leaders to open a second major land theatre of war in Europe (the war in Mediterranean was hardly a major theatre) lead to constant tensions between the Western allies and Stalin (as well as between the Western Allies themselves). Below is the Chumchum7's text without any modifications:

"On 19 July 1941 Britain refused a Soviet demand for an immediate second front in France, and (later with the US) received repeated Soviet requests for the next three years until D-Day, an issue which came to dominate Big Three conferences."

Let's think how to improve it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:28, 2 January 2011 (UTC)

The underlying issue seems to be Soviet complaints that the Western Allies weren't pulling their weight. From what I've read, many historians are pretty skeptical about the validity of these claims on the grounds that Stalin unduly dismissed the bombing offensive against Germany and the large numbers of good quality German Army units tied down and destroyed in Tunisia and Italy (which together made a significant 'second front', even before the Normandy landings) and that it was impractical for the Western Allied to invade France anyway. I've also read - but I can't find the source at the moment - that Stalin was aware that his demands for a 'second front' were impossible for the western Allies to fill, but instructed the Communist parties in the western Allied countries to keep repeating the demands as a propaganda tactic. To cut a long story short, if this goes into the article it should focus on the tensions over planning and be based on an independent assessment rather than Stalin's perspective. Nick-D (talk) 01:51, 3 January 2011 (UTC)

Re bombing. Cannot agree. In actuality, the effect of the bombing campaign of German cities and military objects was surprisingly modest until late 1944, when the Allies shifted the main focus on bombing of fuel transportation facilities.

Re Italy and Tunisia. Since the ratio between the total amount of the Axis troops destroyed in the East and in the West (including Western Europe) is ca 1 to 4, I don't think this point of view has a serious ground. Many scholars disagree with that.

Re Stalin's demands for a 'second front' that were impossible for the western Allies to fill. That depends on the definition of the word "impossible". If we understand that as "something that cannot be done without tremendous losses", than, yes, that was impossible. However, one must remember that that was exactly what the Soviet Union was doing in the East: it was grinding down a huge war machine of united Europe at cost of tremendous losses. In other words, the USSR, that was doing impossible things, was in a position when it had a right to expect the same from its allies.

In summary, the fact that the USSR had made impossible thing, thereby providing the Western allies with an opportunity to prepare for invasion of Europe in suitable time and suitable place, and to save the lives of millions of British and American soldiers should be stressed in the article, and it would be absolutely incorrect to reduce this objective issue to Stalin's blindness or his (really) terrible character.--Paul Siebert (talk) 06:01, 3 January 2011 (UTC)

I think that you've misinterpreted my comment Paul. There's no question that the USSR did the bulk of the heavy lifting in defeating Germany, but we shouldn't simply be portraying the Soviet Government POV in regards to the Western Allies contribution, which was also huge, as was being done in the above text. Nick-D (talk) 09:35, 3 January 2011 (UTC)

The problem is that that was a rare case when the Soviet Government's POV almost adequately reflected the real state of things, whereas the attempts to present the bombing campaign (that was relatively inefficient) or the Mediterranean theatre as a major Allied contribution into the joint war efforts reflect the Western Allies Governments' POV (that was farther from the reality).--Paul Siebert (talk) 12:19, 3 January 2011 (UTC)

Comments on recent changes

Stor stark7 (talk · contribs) recently introduced what I think are some significant changes to the article without discussion (diffs: [1], including some minor changes by Habap (talk · contribs) in the middle). I think that they might require some changes, and would be interested in other editors' views. My comments on these changes are:

• It's good that the wording around the Bombing of Guernica has been improved. However, the citation given (Inflated by Air. Common perceptions of civilian casualties from bombing - which is available here as a 2 Mb PDF)) isn't great as it it appears to be a masters or PhD thesis and is only one person's estimate (on page 10), so can't support a statement that "modern estimates" (emphasis added) support figures of 300-400 deaths. I'd suggest using citing page 258 of the 2006 edition of Antony Beevor's The Battle for Spain (ISBN 0753821656) as this is a professionally published and recent book by a well regarded historian which also provides these figures as the findings of "recent research" and cites it back to two different sources in the end notes. Moreover, neither Beevor or Inflated by Air state that the range of 300-400 deaths is "at the high-end", so this proviso should be dropped.
• The claim that there was "an almost implemented British invasion of Norway and possibly also northern Sweden" which formed part of efforts disrupt the flow of iron ore to Germany (Plan R 4) isn't supported by the citation given, which states that the landings in Norway under Plan R 4 were to be implemented after the Germans first invaded Norway in response to planned (and almost conducted) Allied minelaying campaign in Norwegian waters (page 69, about 2/3 down the website page). The current text seems to say that the Allies almost invaded Norway prior to any German actions. Moreover, the source says that the primary goals of Operation R 4 were to capture "Narvik and the railroad to the Swedish frontier" and that "Trondheim and Bergen" would have also been captured an a "a raid on Stavanger" conducted by British troops (also page 69) - there's no mention at all of plans to cross the Swedish frontier. In addition, it also states that Hitler was unaware of Operation R 4 (page 71) so this can't have been one of the reasons why the Germans invaded Norway. As such, I think that the previous text was adequate, though a link to the an article on the British minelaying plans (Operation Wilfred) should be added (this article also includes a link to Plan R 4 as part of an explanation of how the two plans related).
• Including the British invasion of Iceland seems like a good idea to me, but it needs a citation. Page 436 of the Oxford Companion to World War II states that the British landed in Iceland against the locals wishes so would be a good source. This also states that the British invasion sought to preempt a German invasion (which, from memory, the Germans were considering but couldn't pull off at the time).
• The addition of File:Colonization_1945.png and its caption look like good moves to me.
• The addition of a statement that Germany "was subjected to industrial restrictions and dismantling" didn't include the addition of a supporting citation and I don't understand why a quote that the country recovered "miraculously" was added in the place of recovering taking place 'quickly' - who is this quoting? Moreover, the article this links to says that the Allies ended their policies of reducing German industry in 1947 and provided aid from 1948 onwards, so some acknowledgement of this seems preferable to stating that Germany's industry was reduced before a vague 'miracle' took place.

Do other editors have thoughts on this? Nick-D (talk) 10:43, 21 December 2010 (UTC)

• Guernica. The autor given for Inflated by Air. Common perceptions of civilian casualties from bombing is James Corum, it says so on the front page. There it also states him to be a Professor, and the paper to be a Research Report. I would certainly give this air power historian heavy credibility. By the way, does beevor even have a PhD.? Recent estimates, per the guernica Article list 200 - 400 dead. As to high end, exactly how did you read the paper? He clearly writes "However, even a realistic estimate on the high side of bombing effectiveness (7-12 fatalities per ton of bombs) would yield a figure of perhaps 300-400 fatalities in Guernica." and he also provides figures for bombings where the Allies achieved the killer firestorms: "Hamburg bombing 7.5 fatalities per ton of bombs, Dresden 7.2 - 10.2 fatalities per ton of bombs.". I don't see how you read the paper.
• Norway. Again, I don't see how you read the chapter. Selectively? Did you just browse through it? "The supposition was that WILFRED would provoke German counteraction, and Plan R 4 was to become effective the moment the Germans landed in Norway 'or showed they intended to do so.'" The plan was to provoke the Germans so severelly that they felt they needed to take action, and at first sign of German reaction the Brittish would invade first using the pretext that the Germans were about to move in. "Five battalions were to be employed in occupying Trondheim and Bergen and in a raid on Stavanger to destroy Sola airfield". Add to this all the earlier Brittish attempts that had to be cancelled due to circumstances. For example the Help to Finland pretext, and also the direct surprize Blitzkrieg invasion plan that almost got underway and that the Germans found out about: "A landing was to be made at Narvik; if it succeeded, it would be followed by one at Trondheim. Forces for Bergen and Stavanger were to be held ready. The objectives were to take Narvik, the railroad, and the Swedish ore fields; but the landing and the advance into Norway and Sweden were to take place only if they could be accomplished without serious fighting. The troops were not to fight their way through either Norway or Sweden and were to use force only "as an ultimate measure of self-defense." The signing of the peace treaty between Russia and Finland in Moscow on the night of 12 March put an end to the Allied plans. The Germans observed British submarines concentrated off the Skagerrak on the 13th, and an intercepted radio message setting March as the deadline for preparation of transport groups indicated that the Allied operation was getting under way. But another message, intercepted on the 15th, ordering the submarines to disperse revealed that the peace had disrupted the Allied plan."
• Wirtschaftswunder is German for "Economic Miracle" which is the standard term for this, and the title of the article. Didn't you know/check this? The bulk of the German recovery took place in the 1950's. Again I think you are reading the article, in this case the wikipedia article, quite selectively. You had many different policies going on at the same time, with what you call aid mainly refering to emergency food rations and therefore not really associated with industry. Mashall plan loans (comparatively limited in size) for the economy did not become available to West Germany until late 1948 or 1949. The Western Allies were still dismantling German factories in 1950. In the article you even have a link to demonstrations from 1949, and a letter from the UK foreign minister explaining why they need to reconsider the scale of the economic dismantling. Once the German economy started to recover properly it had a very steep recovery curve, hence the "miracle", but to state the economy recovered quickly after the war is a very missleading statement that someone had inserted.

• Letter from Ernest Bevin to Robert Schuman (30 October 1949) British and French foreign ministers. Bevin argues that they need to reconsider the Allies' dismantling policy in the occupied zones (Adobe Flash Player)
• Picture of demonstration against dismantling (June 7, 1949) Workers in the Ruhr demonstrate against the dismantling of their factories by the Allied forces of occupation. (Adobe Flash Player)
• Picture: dismantling the Iron and Steel Industry ‘We want to work, we will help you to rebuild Europe' Workers at dismantled plant protest. (Adobe Flash Player)
• Picture: 12,000 factory workers demonstrate against the dismantling of German industry (August 19, 1949) (Adobe Flash Player)

--Stor stark7 ^Speak 11:31, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

Agree with Nick regarding the terror bombing of Guernica-also i would reintroduce the removed mention that bombing of innocent civilians during a sunday market was considered a horrific event-this was removed by SS7.Corum seems to be a pushing a fringe view regarding Luftwaffe's terror bombings not supported by mainstream sources, and this shouldn't dominate the article.I would remove the POV claim of dismantling Germany, it doesn't stand up to scrutiny. The fact that British protected the countries mentioned from Nazi invasion or in reaction to it needs to be mentioned quite certainly.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:03, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

• Guernica: I'm actually basically agreeing with you here, and providing a source which supports the claim that more than one estimate has put deaths at 300-400. What's the problem with Antony Beevor's book? - its one of the standard English-language works on the war and he's a prizewinning and well regarded historian.
• Norway: You seem to be confusing the earlier Allied plans to assist Finland with the Operation R 4, which came a few weeks later. The planned landing in Norway and advance through Sweden aimed to get troops to Finland (pp. 67-68), and not break off the ore shipment to Germany as the text you've added to the article claims. Moreover, it was cancelled before it began, so wasn't "almost implemented". Plan R 4 came after the end of the Winter War and had quite different objectives (the source calls it part of "The new Scandinavian undertaking" before specifying its objectives - p. 69).
• Post War Germany: Can you please provide something other than primary sources to support these claims? Nick-D (talk) 22:47, 22 December 2010 (UTC)

On Norway, Sweden and Finland, its worth looking a wide range of specialist sources. General histories and WW2 encyclopaedias tend to generalize to the point of omission on this subject, and Wikipedia can to better. As Nick-D says, the Allied plan was indeed to get British and French troops to Finland to fight against the Soviets; but Swedish iron ore supplies to Germany were always a simultaneous strategic consideration for them. Just like in a good chess move, the Allies wanted to achieve two objectives at the same time. The Allied plan is notable not because it almost happened, but because it then had a causal effect on next moves by the Soviets and Nazis (in fact this was the third strategic objective, to put the frighteners on the Soviets without firing a shot). I would need to dig up the quotes with all this, but I am on reduced time because of the Chumchum7 plan of attack against a large Christmas salmon and its notorious ally, a bottle of cheap champagne. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:15, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

Instead of cheap champagne, I'd suggest a sparkling Vouvray or Prosecco which are both better "bang for the buck", though recently someone mentioned that the article exceeds Wikipedia standards for length, so Scandinavia might be too much.... --Habap (talk) 16:03, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

I wholeheartedly agree about the festive consumption of Prosecco or indeed Cava over cheap champagne (which is the only bubbles they had at my local store); but Scandinavia can be added in a nutshell without increasing word count. Some of the length of the article is created by its loose, flabby writing: all additions can be made with tightening of the text. Word count shouldn't be increased. Cheers. -Chumchum7 (talk) 17:07, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

I agree completely that a general trim of the article is in order and would be a good priority (though at 175 Kb including references it's not that much over the limits recommended at Wikipedia:Article size). I also recommend a barbecue for Christmas dinner, but I am Australian and hence able to go outside at this time of year ;) Nick-D (talk) 21:58, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

I concur that some of the prose is overly flowery. As for drinks I go for Boizel for the bubbles, and to strengthen me before going outside the comming days I have someGlögg on standby.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 22:22, 23 December 2010 (UTC)

I recommend Zinfandel and Paul W. Doerr's article "'Frigid but Unprovocative': British Policy towards the USSR from the Nazi-Soviet Pact to the Winter War, 1939" (Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 36, No. 3 (Jul., 2001), pp. 423-439). The author writes:

"By March 1940 public pressure and pressure from the French forced the British government to agree to a wild plan to send British troops to Finland. In fact, the real purpose of this expedition was to have British and French troops occupy northern Norway and Sweden in order to deprive Germany of Swedish iron ore supplies. Only one brigade of British troops would cross the border into northern Finland, where they would have absolutely no impact on the fighting in the south. In any event, the Finnish military collapse in mid-March ruled out the necessity of military action. This was a development greeted with a huge sigh of relief by British leaders, especially the Chiefs of Staff, who had opposed the venture all along."

The British and French plans were too vague, and the scale of the prospective invasion was too limited that it is hardly deserves mention in the WWII article. Generally speaking, I don't think we can afford to devote any space in the article to the plans that were not implemented (similar to our approach to the treaties that had never been signed, failed negotiations, etc).
In summary, I recommend to think seriously about Zinfandel...--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:45, 24 December 2010 (UTC)

Yes, that's my view as well. Nick-D (talk) 04:02, 24 December 2010 (UTC)

I've removed the material about the proposed Allied invasion of Sweden and Norway and replaced it with a link to Operation Wilfred per the above discussion. I've also reverted the changed material on German post-war reconstruction as no references have been provided for this. I've also added the above reference for the invasion of Iceland. Nick-D (talk) 09:50, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

I've also added a reference to Antony Beevor's book per the above (but not changed the text and retained the existing ref) Nick-D (talk) 09:55, 29 December 2010 (UTC)

A Question to Nick-D regarding his changes during the Christmas vacations, specifically on the German post war recovery.[2] Please explain why you have

• 1. inserted the POV adjective massive American economic aid.
• 2. deleted recovered "miraculously" in the 50s, and had doubled production from its pre-war levels by the late 1950s

and replaced it with

recovered quickly.

• 3. Where in the given source, ("Postwar economic reconstruction and lessons for the East today" p. 29) did you find support for your insertions of "massive", and "quickly"?--Stor stark7 ^Speak 20:23, 5 January 2011 (UTC)

I noted above that my edit was to revert the previous material back in as you hadn't provided any sources to support your changes (other than primary sources on this talk page). I'm assuming good faith that the source provided for the previous material supported it per the normal practices. Nick-D (talk) 07:27, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

The only source you (vaguely) had requested a cite for in the text above was the sentence "was subjected to industrial restrictions and dismantling", and you expressed confusion as to why "quickly" was replaced with "miraculously". This later was explained to you to be due to the term German economic miracle. For the former, dismantling of industry, you even claimed to have read the linked to article in question which with cites shows that dismantling of west German factories continued until 1951. This is a no-brainer fact by the way. Do we really need a cite for every no-brainer? The pictures of Ruhr worker demonstrations in 1949 that I linked to, from the European Union history site were only complementary. Thank god they had some affect at least then.[3]. Per your statement above about good faith, I take it you are therefore assuming bad faith whenever you check a given source, or were assuming bad faith about my edit.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 09:56, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

Can you please provide a source to be included in this article which supports your proposed text? There's no need to attack me - please just source what you propose to add per the normal procedure. Nick-D (talk) 11:01, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

Fine, lets do it step by step. This is the text as it stands right now:

However, economic recovery following the war was fast. In most of Western Europe, recovery was helped by massive American economic aid: heavily devastated West Germany recovered quickly;[252] the Italian[253][254] French economies rebounded.[255].

I couldn't check the sources for the Italian bit, but the French mainly talks in vague terms about French recovery 1945 - 1970, and how the Planning Commissariat set up in 1948 outlined how the recovery should take place. The bit on Germany and Marshall is completely false. The given source says nothing about Marshall, at least not in that chapter, and it does not say Germany recovered quickly, it says it recovered "sprightly" and that this was all the more surprising considering the very bleak prospects seen in 1948.

For a quick and dirty introduction to the Europan economy of mid 1947, and the start of the Marshall plan, and the importance of Germany to recovery, this online article can be recommended.

• CONFERENCES: Pas de Pagaille!

Now. What I would like to replace the text quoted above with is the following:

During the first three years of occupation of Germany the UK and US vigorously pursued an industrial disarmament program in Germany, partly by removal of equipment but mainly through an import embargo on raw materials and deliberate economic neglect. As a consequence of the industrial disarmament of Germany, whose economy by mid-1947 was deteriorating rapidly, the economic stagnation of Europe became inevitable. By shutting down the German industry the Allies disrupted the intra-European trade, a trade that was vital for European recovery, and they thereby delayed the economic recovery.

Vladimir Petrov concludes that as a result of the early punitive occupation of Germany the Allies "delayed by several years the economic reconstruction of the wartorn continent, a reconstruction which subsequently cost the United States billions of dollars." In the decade following 1948 Germany recovered strongly, the change to what has been called the German economic miracle began with the Monetary reform in mid 1948. However, steady growth was not attained until 1951

The Marshall plan (1948) included the removal of the "the early postwar economic chains of Germany". The plan also supported European recovery in other ways, mainly thanks to the change in European economic policy that it forced. Also the Italian and French economies rebounded.

However, seeing that the word-count perhaps is a bit excessive, I could perhaps be convinced to condense it to the following:

The UK and US pursued a policy of industrial disarmament in Germany in the years 1945 – 1948. Due to international trade interdependencies this led to European economic stagnation and delayed European recovery for several years. The turn came in 1948 with the currency reform in Germany, and the Marshall plan which forced a change in European economic policy. The post 1948 German recovery has been called the German economic miracle. Also the Italian and French economies rebounded.

--Stor stark7 ^Speak 21:21, 10 January 2011 (UTC)

The proposed text looks less amateurish than the current version; although I had no time to check the text with sources, it does not contradict to what I know about that. However, the first version is too long, moreover, a direct attribution to one scholar (Petrov) is hardly acceptable in such a summary start article. Therefore, the second version is definitely an improvement, and I support its addition to the article, although it is necessary to specify that we are speaking about West Germany only.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:07, 10 January 2011 (UTC)

The second option looks OK to me as well, though "The turn came in 1948 with the currency reform in Germany, and the Marshall plan which forced a change in European economic policy" is unclear - what's meant by this? (it's written in the passive voice and doesn't indicate what caused this change). We should probably try to include East Germany and the industrialised parts of Poland as well though - the Soviets shipped much of the capital equipment they captured there to the USSR in the years after the war. Nick-D (talk) 09:40, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

The Ruhr and surrounding areas in West Germany seem to have been of key importance to Western Europe. I don't think we need to bother with East Germany and Poland, they don't seem to have had much effect on anyone else but themselves, but if anyone has good sources then by all means add something on them. As far as I know the Russians split their half of Germany in 2, and gave the good half to Poland, minus its 9 million German inhabitants. As far as Poland is concerned this seems to have been a huge economic bonus: "One authority has indicated that the acquisitions in the West were so significant that even when war damages are factored, by 1946 Poland had an industrial production capacity one-third greater than prewar Poland."[4] The rump of what was left of East Germany (the former middle-Germany) was rather insignificant, by 1990 it had a population of only 16 million, when Western Germany had 63 million inhabitants. The US was also for a long time trying to keep friendly with Russia and treat Germany as a unified country, which was one of the reasons they kept strengthening the Soviet economy by dismantling and shipping West German factories east to Russia for several years (see the picture to the right). However, as the source stated, and was a bit of a surprise to me, it was not the dismantling of factories that was the most important in making things bad in West Germany, the worst was the import embargo, and the deliberate economic neglect, e.g. from the order to "take no steps designed to maintain the German economy".

Allocation policy for German heavy industry, note the arrows going east to Russia.

The sentence "The turn came in 1948..." is the consequence of me trying to condense as far as possible. Basically the sources say that European recovery began when the German economy was allowed to properly start producing again in 1948, and the recovery in Europe that this had enabled was speeded up by the Marshall plan through the conditions its administrators imposed, formally and informally, on aid recipients: Relaxation of government controls, and opening up to free trade. The funds provided also enabled those who were opponents of protectionism to pursue a free trade policy also on their own.

How about this:

The UK and US pursued a policy of industrial disarmament in Western Germany in the years 1945 – 1948. Due to international trade interdependencies this led to European economic stagnation and delayed European recovery for several years. Recovery began with the mid 1948 currency reform in Western Germany, and was sped up by the liberalization of European economic policy that the Marshall plan (1948-1951) both directly and indirectly caused. The post 1948 West German recovery has been called the German economic miracle. Also the Italian and French economies rebounded.

It has a few more words, but maybe it is clearer. I also started using West Germany.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 20:53, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

Since there were no further comments, I've made the change to the text in the article.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 07:43, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Mention of first use of atomic Weapons

On the second to last paragraph on the top, after it mentions Allied victory in Europe it mentions something about the Japanese navy being defeated? and after that it skips straight to the aftermath. As i recalled two little bomb were dropped in two small Japanese cities and caused a little bit of damage and killed a small amount of people and ended the war. (I'm being sarcastic, if you haven't noticed) —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.57.222.48 (talk) 01:44, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

That's a very good point. Nick-D (talk) 07:18, 6 January 2011 (UTC)

That issue is not as obvious as someone usually think. A number of reliable secondary sources (e.g. Robert A. Pape. "Why Japan Surrendered," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), 154–201) just mention atomic bombing among other factors that affected the Japanese decision to surrender. These sources state that the role of atomic bombing was exaggerated in popular mind, whereas conventional bombing or invasion of Manchuria affected Japanese capabilities to wage the war in greater extent. Therefore, I don't think we need to mention atomic bombing separately in the lede one more time. You probably noticed that the first para of the lede already contains the link to atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:57, 10 January 2011 (UTC)

Oops, I missed that. I agree completely with you about the debate over what caused the end of the war - I just didn't spot that the bombs were already in the lead :o Nick-D (talk) 23:02, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

title

This article should be renamed World War 2 or World War two. Using roman numerals is outdated and this will strike our younger users making the tittle harder to understand. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 130.49.142.155 (talk) 15:39, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

Dead

I'd hate to brake it to you guys, but 73 million people didn't die in this war. That's the most liberal assessment I've ever heard. Most put it at around 60 million.

Bobby —Preceding unsigned comment added by 198.151.130.68 (talk) 20:44, 24 January 2011 (UTC)

Got a source? --PlasmaTwa2 21:32, 24 January 2011 (UTC)

american concentration camps

when they were writing this they never mentioned the american version of the concentration camps — Preceding unsigned comment added by Daraghtwiss (talk • contribs) 21:39, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

They were never named or characterized by the United States as concentration camps, so calling them American Concentration Camps would be a little extreme. We may be able to pencil them into the article, but lets here back from other people before we cross that bridge. TomStar81 (Talk) 23:43, 18 January 2011 (UTC)

The US internment camps are discussed in the last para of the 'Concentration camps and slave work' section (which, as a passing comment, is rather North American-centric; most countries involved in the war interred people of 'hostile' nationalities). Calling the internment camps 'concentration camps' seems rather POV given the meaning this term has come to have. Nick-D (talk) 00:50, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

In actuality, the term "concentration camp" was not used in most countries that had them. For instance, in the USSR the GULag camps were called "corrective labour camps". In my opinion, the term 'concentration camps' can be applied to most WWII time camps (except several Nazi death camps) per WP:DUCK.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:57, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Since World War II the term 'concentration camp' has become pretty much synonymous with the camps in Nazi Germany (often incorrectly being used for the death camps as well). The Oxford English Dictionary states that "The term is most strongly associated with the several hundred camps established by the Nazis in Germany and occupied Europe". I haven't seen the term 'concentration camp;' used for the camps in the USSR (which are normally called Gulags or labour/prison camps). Nick-D (talk) 02:54, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

The pre-WW-II term's usage was less genocidally oriented, though there were certainly a number of abuses of civilians associated with older concentration camps. I generally agree that post-WW-II usage in common usage (though perhaps not technical historical review) has been focused on the genocidal / mass murder camps. It's somewhat of a lose-lose tradeoff - one way, we to some degree diminish the experience that the Japanese-Americans went through (which was harsh, unfair, unwarranted, and a violation of their civil rights, but in no way involved systematic abuse or killings), and the other way we risk confusing people as to the extent of murderous or genocidal activity, and minimize the singular homicidal efficiency of the Nazi death camps by diluting the current common usage of the term.

Internment camps are the commonly used term, including most of the historians. I would argue that, the negatives of that approach understood and acknowledged, it's still the best choice we have. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 04:37, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Agreed. Concentration camps for Axis camps, internment,prison or labour camps for those camps run by Allies to avoid connecting two very different things.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:33, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Allied strategic bombing para needs work

I'm a bit concerned about this para in the 'Casualties and war crimes' section:

It has also been suggested by some historians the mass-bombing of civilian areas in enemy territory, including Tokyo and most notably the German cities of Dresden, Hamburg, and Cologne by Western Allies, which resulted in the destruction of more than 160 cities and killing a total of more than 600,000 German civilians be considered war crimes.

My concerns are: 1) the source (a newspaper article about the views of a single controversial German historian: [5]) is very weak and vastly better references on this topic are available. It only quotes one historian (not 'some historians'), doesn't even mention the bombing of Toyko and quotes the historian as saying that the bombing of Hamburg 'could be justified on the grounds that the city was the centre of German submarine production' so it doesn't support the text. 2) There's been a very long running debate over whether the bombing of cities was a war crime and while 'some historians' and legal experts believe that it was, other historians and legal experts take the opposite view. This is an important topic to include in the article, but we need to acknowledge that there's a debate over this rather than just present one side. 3) The para should also be less German-centric as virtually all of Japan's main cities were destroyed by fire bombing (not to mention the atomic bombs) and there's also been a very long-running debate over whether this was moral, legal or necessary 4) Germany and Japan also bombed cities so if this was a war crime it needs to be acknowledged that both sides were doing it. Nick-D (talk) 06:27, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

By contrast to the Axis powers, Western Allies accepted a Douchet doctrine that made a stress on massive bombing of the enemy's vital centers, including civilian targets, with ultimate goal to destabilise the opponent's government and deprive it of the popular support (which didn't work in actuality). By contrast, the Axis powers made a stress on the attacks of the opponent's military targets, partially because of their inability to build large amount of heavy strategic bombers, partially because their military doctrine was aimed primarily on the victory on the battlefield. In any event, whereas the Axis air forces did bomb civilian targets and even destroyed some cities (Guernica, Coventry, Stalingrad), the massive Allied strategic bombing campaign cannot be compared with the Axis bombing.

I agree that the sentence should be made less Germano-centric, we need tell that both German and Japanese cities were subjected to devastating strategic bombing that lead to almost complete destruction of many of them and to mass deaths of their population.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:37, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

If we mention this, we need to mention indiscriminate bombing of civilian targets by Germany like Bombing of Frampol.It is my understanding that modern view now acknowledges that Dresden was a valid military target due to its vast industrial facilities for military use, as well as vital transport hub for German army. Also:An independent investigation commissioned by the city council in 2010 reported a minimum of 22,700 victims with a maximum total number of fatalities of 25,000.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:22, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

As I already pointed out, the bombing of civilian targets was a significant part of the Allied strategy (and the Allies conducted their bombing to inflict maximal losses, including civilian ones, for instance, they use special procedures to cause fire storms), whereas the Axis bombing were either tactical, or had a subordinated role. And the damage and losses as a result of the Axis bombing are not comparable with the Allied ones.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:09, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

It certainly was a strategy in Poland where strafing civilians and bombing cities was used to jamm Polish roads with refugees. As to your claim that the damage and losses are not comparable-could you give estimates for damage and losses made by Axis bombing in European and Asian-Pacific theatre of operations? In terms of percentages for example, I am certain that Wielun or Frampol were more destroyed than most bombed cities of Germany.But of course I will gladly see the full picture--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 20:53, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

67,078: French civilians were killed by Allied bombings in World War II [6] On Wikipedia we need to have a NPOV and cover the war, the good the bad and the ugly--Woogie10w (talk) 21:19, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

If we're including data on aerial bombing of Germany, then it does prompt including everywhere else, including France, where the bombing of Caen http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Charnwood#Bombing_of_Caen is especially noteworthy. -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:53, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

A balanced and credible article should mention the reality of the war not just the POV of the Allied or Axis propaganda. I bet most readers of this article are not aware of the fact that French civilians were killed by Allied bombings in World War II.--Woogie10w (talk) 22:09, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I quite agree. There are plenty of other taboos out there as well, for example Allied rape, which the public eye often associates with Soviet troops in Germany - especially after the recent movie. Recently there was a news investigations into WW2 American rapes of French women, with data indicating that most of the prosecuted men were black. The journalist seemed to infer that the results showed that because of racism many white troops could get away with rape but blacks couldn't, rather than that blacks were being framed for rape by whites. I'll look for that report fwiw; though of course it is an infinitely bigger subject than can be dealt with here in a summary style article. -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:41, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I wouldn't say it is a taboo.This has been repeated numerous times, and is published quite often. A far less known are the German rapes in Poland or Soviet Russia, especially due to the myth of Wehrmacht as a "clean force".--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 23:01, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Mention that not all Nazi Germany crimes were punished and most Nazis escaped justice

While the article mentions some Nazi crimes were punished, not all were, and this should be mentioned. For example vast rapes by German soldiers in the East remained unpunished, most atrocities from September Campaign in Poland, atrocities in the East. We should also mention that despite initial punishment of some top Nazis, most escaped justice with the end of denazification in West Germany, and Adenauer's amnesty laws(for example his amnesty for 790.000 convicted Nazis in one case), and became influential members of German society(having even top government and scholarly positions)--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:27, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

The current article's text:

"A denazification program in Germany led to the prosecution of Nazi war criminals and the removal of ex-Nazis from power, although this policy moved toward amnesty and re-integration of ex-Nazis into West German society."

which already implies that not all ex-Nazi were punished. If you believe the wording is redundantly soft, how do you propose to modify it?--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:37, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I meant this fragment:

While many of the Axis's acts were brought to trial in the world's first international tribunals,[286] incidents caused by the Allies were not. Examples of such Allied actions include population transfer in the Soviet Union and Japanese American internment in the United States; the Operation Keelhaul,[287] expulsion of Germans after World War II, mass rape of German women by Soviet Red Army; the Soviet Union's Katyn massacre, for which Germans faced counter-accusations of responsibility. This seems to be slanted towards painting Allies as not punished for implied numerous war crimes of equal measure. It doesn't even mention that most Axis crimes were actually not punished(like rapes by German forces). It needs to be toned down, and unpunished Axis atrocities mentioned. I will think of phrasing it correctly.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 17:12, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I tend to agree. Although Katyn here needs a bit more explanation. It is a unique and especially notable case for three reasons: (A) it was not an Allied crime against an Axis power but a crime against Allied power and (B) it was subjected to a very conscious Allied whitewash like no other crime in World War Two (in the case of Britain, the official line on Katyn was "no comment" right up until the 1980s) and (C) it put extraordinary pressure on Soviet-Western Allied relations which historians have connected to other phenomena as diverse as the wartime pro-Soviet propaganda campaign in Hollywood (which led to the postwar McCarthyite backlash), and even the origins of the Cold War. -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:33, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Unreliable source?

Earlier today I tagged the source of the statement on Hungarians being used for forced labour after the war as potentially being unreliable and tweaked the wording (which wrongly identified 'Allies' rather than the French Government as the organisation responsible for this and didn't specify that the Hungarians were in fact POWs). The reference is http://www.hungarianhistory.com/lib/francia/francia.pdf (no page number given, but page 4 seems to be appropriate) and while I suspect that what's being cited to it is probably accurate (many Axis POWs were used for labour in the years immediately after the war) I don't see why its a RS. Googling the name of the article's author gets no meaningful hits and the website its hosted on http://www.hungarianhistory.com/ appears to be a host for amateur research (the 'Corvinus Library' appears to be the website, not any kind of organisation). Can anyone provide a better reference? (and is it even worth including this in the article?). Nick-D (talk) 06:10, 19 January 2011 (UTC)

Independent of reliability, I do not think this fact is important enough for such a summary style article (at least, the importance is not obvious, so additional proof of its importance is needed). I removed it.

Regarding "In Hungary's case, Hungarians were forced to work for the Soviet Union until 1955.", I do not understand why special attention should be devoted to a Hungarian case, whereas POWs from all European axis countries were forced to work for the Soviet Union. The sentence should be either removed or expanded.--Paul Siebert (talk) 04:09, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

What hitler did was wrong and no one will ever love himm :) lol hehe hitler shuld be banned for life :):D

On the topic, the use of the euphemism "Allied use of involuntary labor" has a really rancid smell of POV. I don't care who it was that put it in there but it needs to be put in line with the rest of the article where the terms slave labor and forced labor are used per normal practice.

Also, it is clearly POV to vilify the Soviet Union in this way, they were after all just practicing agreements made among the Allies.

Eugene Davidson "The death and life of Germany: an account of the American occupation". p.121 "In accordance with the Yalta agreement, the Russians were using slave labor of millions of Germans and other prisoners of war and civilians"[7] I propose we add the text: In accordance with the agreement made at the Yalta conference .....

In the segment on Poland we should add that 200,000 Germans were killed in the Polish Concentration/forced labor camps. I agree that 10,000 Hungarian slave laborers in France is no big deal, but 200,000 killed while doing slave labor in Polish concentration camps is certainly is a number big enough, and a fate notable enough, to be used. Ethnic Germans in Poland and the Czech Republic A Comparative Evaluation p.9 : ...(Volksdeutsche) who had undergone ‘rehabilitation’ in forced labor camps. Concentration camps were quickly re-opened and filled with Germans. ... Reichsdeutsche who fulfilled the criteria for expulsion but who, by virtue of their expertise were forced to stay. These processes of ‘verification’ and ‘rehabilitation’ were in fact simple programs of incarceration and slave labor. Recent research indicates that around 400,000 Germans died as a direct consequence of the expulsion process [From Poland itself and from German lands taken by Poland]. This figure includes those who died whilst in flight, either directly or indirectly at the hands of Polish civilians, various Polish armed forces, or the Soviet army. About half the number is comprised of those who died in Polish/Soviet concentration camps (Eberhardt 2003: 173).--Stor stark7 ^Speak 00:23, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

Please, explain what concrete changes do you propose.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:12, 25 January 2011 (UTC)

From; Allied use of involuntary labor occurred mainly in the East, such as in Poland,[303] but more than a million were also put to work in the West.[citation needed]

To; In accordance with the Allied agreement made at the Yalta conference millions of POWs and civilians were used as forced labor in the Soviet Union. 200,000 German civilians were "legally" shipped to the Soviet Union per per proclamation No.2 of the Allied Control Council. The U.S. handed over hundreds of thousands of POWs for forced labor in France, and later protested about their treatment there. In Poland German civilians were used as slave labor in concentration camps, in which roughly 200,000 of them died.

--Stor stark7 ^Speak 08:50, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

This is a big and important subject about the forced movement and death of people during the establishment of communist power in Central and Eastern Europe after the war, in the years 1945-1949, of which German suffering is one important aspect. The Times Concise Atlas of World History has a map showing a much bigger picture. For example, there were also 4.5 million Soviet citizens still in postwar Germany having been German slave labourers, POWS or concentration camp inmates during the War - is their postwar transportation and fate in the Soviet Union to be omitted? Because it appears Stalin considered them 'tainted' and moved many to the Gulags, where they died. Add the thousands of anti-Nazi resistance fighters who ended up in communist concentration camps as well, or were simply exterminated. Add the anti-Jewish violence including pogroms. Add the insurgencies and civil wars, the terror attacks by authorities and paramilitaries. Add violence attributable to lawlessness, mob rule and military indiscipline. In short, this subject is both vast and postwar; as such it needs more space than this article can provide. So I propose one generic line: "There were XX million[citation] people transported, sent into slave labour and/or incarcerated in Central and Eastern Europe after WW2, of which YY million are estimated[citation] to have died." We can add blue links to that line which take readers into specialized articles. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:22, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Re "is their postwar transportation and fate in the Soviet Union to be omitted?" It isn't. Currently the article says: "Soviet ex-POWs and repatriated civilians were treated with great suspect as potential Nazi collaborators, and some of them were sent to GULAG upon check by NKVD." with the reference to the study where exact figures are provided for those who were sent home, conscripted, sent to re-construction battalions, or found guilty in collaboration.

@ Stor stark7. Generally agrees, although, as you probably noticed, the article does not mention exact figures for the troops or losses. If we start to show figures here, we probably will have to add the figures for the troops involved in key battles, as well as for losses.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:58, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Interesting claim, but seems to be a very fringe view. Curiously publication on population shifts in Poland by Eberhardt is available in English online[8]. Here the 400.000 number of dead Germans(the number of them invovled in atrocities and members of Nazi party is sadly not given) is mentioned but without any whatsover attribution to internment camps. Also the claim by SS7 doesn't distinguish between Communist authories established in Poalnd and Soviet-run camps this seems far fatched to attribute them all to Poland. This article gives far lower estimates of deaths in post-war camps run by Communist security service in Poland-25.000 to be exact [9]-and of various nationalities, not only German. Since the article doesn't give exact quote of Eberhardt, and available publication by Eberhardt actually contains no such thing, and the article doesn't distinguish between Poland and Soviet Union, and thirdly available data gives much much lower estimates-I am against introducing that data into the article, without further research. Lastly the usage of the word "slave" and "concentration camp" is rather not with the mainstream description of Allied use of German labour to revert damage done during Nazi Germant attempt to exterminate several nations. Internment camps and POW labour is I believe the correct term when describing attempts by Allies and Soviets to repair the enourmous damage inflicted by Nazi Germany. The use of the word slaves or concentraion camps would dilute the difference between racist slave labour by Nazi Germany and Allied efforts of reconstruction, and we wouldn't want to give revisionists any fuel here, even unknowingly would we.

Cheers.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 15:17, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

You probably noticed that SS7's text tells: "In Poland German civilians were used as slave labor in concentration camps", so it does not attribute the victims to the Poles, just to the geographical place. It is correct that initially the Polish territory was not fully administered by the Poles themselves, therefore, the text needs in some clarification. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:33, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

SS7, thanks for pointing out that content about Soviet POWs. The Times Concise Atlas of World History shows about 12 million Germans deported in the postwar years, and about the same number of Slavs and Balts. There are plenty more groups of people to consider aside from Soviet POWs. What happened to the 420,000 Baltic peoples shown being deported from their homes after 1945? What about the 1.5 million Poles deported from east of the Curzon Line at gunpoint? What about the 500,000 Germans deported from the Balkans? What about the 2.3 million Russians forced west to occupy former German, Baltic and Polish homes - it seems they also had a tough time, ordered to move at the point of a gun. From what I've read I doubt German forced labourers had a rougher time than e.g. Jews, western Ukrainians, Slovaks or pro-democracy resistance fighters across the region during the immediate postwar years. To focus on German suffering would be an imbalance. It deserves to be covered - but in the right place. You provided a great, specialized academic paper on postwar German forced labour; I'd say it needs to stand beside plenty more material on the whole postwar situation in the East. For what its worth, my position remains that your proposed content is very important but should go into one of our articles on postwar history, not here. -Chumchum7 (talk) 16:22, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I basically agree with Chumchum here. It's worth noting that at present the war crimes mentioned in the relevant section of the article are those in which either millions of people were killed (such as The Holocaust and Chinese civilian deaths in Japanese-occupied areas) or those which are well known. To focus on relatively 'low' (though still high) numbers of Germans seems NPOV, particularly as the article isn't (and due to size constraints, probably shouldn't) cover similar acts committed by the Germans themselves (such as the miss-treatment of Allied and Italian POWs, forced mass migrations of civilians, etc). Moreover, much of the material StorStark is proposing is contested but the material proposed above gives no indication of this - entire books have been written about debating how German POWs were treated after the war, for instance. Nick-D (talk) 07:51, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

@Nick-D: It is worth noting in response to your text that the section in question is not the "Casualties and war crimes", but "Concentration camps and slave work", and that it include a large amount of text on German and Japanese activities, for example the death rates of U.S. POWs in Japan. If per your opinion it is out of scope to include 200,000 dead Germans in Poland then I will be happy to remove the section on U.S. POW's too, since I very much doubt their casualties in Japan were even close to 200,000. As to your claim that "much of the material StorStark is proposing is contested" I find that to be a highly misleading statement, and I hope it is just due to inexperience of the editor.

I challenge you, Nick-D, to back your claims by specifying which items of the very short and simple paragraph that I proposed that are challenged, and in which way by which authors.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 07:11, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

Can you please stop posting confrontational responses to comments by other editors? - it really isn't necessary or helpful. As I noted above, there's a long-running debate over the treatment of German POWs by the Allies (as you know from being active in articles concerning these topics such as Other Losses) so to pick out one vague statement basically ignores this entire debate (the fact that it's cited to a brief passage in a book focused on a different topic isn't great either, though is a second order issue). I'd also note that page 121 of Eugene Davidson's "The death and life of Germany: an account of the American occupation" doesn't say that these workers were "used as forced labor in the Soviet Union" - it doesn't specify the location where this forced labour was taking place. More generally, however, my concern with the material proposed above was and remains one of NPOV as described above. Nick-D (talk) 03:57, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

It seems that at least 4 editors are against SS7's proposal on this occasion for one reason or another. Nick-D is an administrator and has a tough job which we appreciate; at the same time our community expects him to lead by example. Incidentally, like SS7 I've also had a small concern about Nick-D's behaviour, which I'm confident can be quickly resolved, calmly and rationally, on Nick-D's talk page. I'll open discussion there, and suggest that as the best place for SS7 to continue this discussion. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:30, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

Hi Chumchum7, I'd be happy to discuss any concerns you have about my editing/comments. Cheers Nick-D (talk) 10:50, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

Wikipedia does not work by "vote", this is what we have this page for, to discuss the article contents. If not then any barely literate kindergarten group with internet access could muster local majority vote on the contents of articles. Further Nick-D is obviously here as an editor, and thus represents his POV, he is not here as an admin. In response to Nick-D, if you find it confrontational that I expect you to back up you sweeping claims, then really I have no idea how we can discuss with you.

Nick-D claimed that "much of the material StorStark is proposing is contested but the material proposed above gives no indication of this". Now I, asked Nick D to show us exactly what he means, since to my knowledge none of my proposals were up for discussion during the Bacque debate. Since you edited the "Other Losses" article between the time of my question and your reply, I presume you have tried but failed to find something to corroborate your "much of the material" claims with. If this is so, then please take the lesson to heart and do the research before commenting (with confrontational and sweeping claims) the next time.

Now, in response to NickDs latest reply where he brings up Other Losses. To me this seems to be nothing but a smokescreen. Lets briefly look at it; Bacque wrote a book, and Ambrose brought together a group of scholars to write a rebuttal. In the rebuttal we have the following sentence, that you no doubt have now read since it is quoted in the "Other Losses" article: "...It has long been known that German prisoners of war suffered terribly at the end of World War II, that they died by the thousands after hostilities ceased in the European theater, and that many were required to work as forced laborers for the victors.". Where is the challenge to the forced labor part? It continues: "Villa states that Bacque only adds two "novel" propositions: first, that the number that died was in the hundreds of thousands, and seconds, that these deaths were the result of deliberate extermination on the part of Eisenhower. According to this article[10] the estimates death of German POWs while in Allied captivity range between 600,000 - 1,000,000 and according to the search service of the German Red Cross they still list 1,300,000 German POWs as having an unknown fate. Bacque tried in his book to shift the blame for a big chunk of these "missing" POWs from Russia to US, which gave him a lot of heat in the West (I don't know how the Russians reacted).

In conclusion: None of the text i proposed is the subject of any "long running debate", and Bacques claims have no bearing what so ever on this high level WWII article, and I fail to see any rationale behind your choice to bring it up as a supposed "argument" against my proposed text.

As to your complaint about page 121, that should be obvious from the context, and from the examples that follow.

Please Nick-D, be specific. What exactly is it that you just don't like. Is it:

1. The word "forced labor"?

2. That the slave labor had been agreed upon at Yalta?

3. That it included German civilians?

4. Proclamation No.2 of the Allied Control Council?

5. That the US handed over prisoners for forced labor in France?

6. That the US reacted to their treatment in France?

7. That Germans were put in concentration camps in Poland?

8. That hundreds of thousands died as slave labor in those concentration camps?

Again I ask you to be specific.--Stor stark7 ^Speak 11:48, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

3 X 3 Leaders is OKAY, but Bolded 3 X 3 Nations section is not... My suggestion.

Citation from Encyclopedia Brittanica:

"In World War II the chief Allied Powers were Great Britain, France (except during the German occupation, 1940–44), the Soviet Union (after its entry in June 1941), the United States (after its entry on Dec. 8–11, 1941), and China" ,

The WW2 Infobox should reflect the chief Allied powers of World War II, which includes China , Britain, France , United States, Russia, which are currently the five permanent veto-wielding members of the United Nations Security Council, and the only countries recognized as nuclear-weapon states (NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. France, before its defeat in 1940 and after Operation Overlord in 1944, as well as China are also major Allied powers.

The WW2 Infbox should highlight in bold the P5 nations since they are cited as the 'chief/major Allied powers of WW2', and is more often used than the Western-centric term Big 3. Phead128 (talk) 09:49, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

NOTE!, I am OKAY with 3x3 for Leaders, but I am NOT OKAY with 3x3 for Nations. It should be 5x3 for Nations, period. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Phead128 (talk • Phead128 (talk) 09:49, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

I've just reverted you - from memory, this was extensively discussed fairly recently, and it would be best if you discussed this kind of change before making it. I'd also suggest that you take a more civil tone in the future. Cheers, Nick-D (talk) 10:19, 22 January 2011 (UTC)

Like Nick-D said, this has been literally discussed for years, and the last consensus was to remain at 3x3 (possibly due to balance and because the contributions of the Big 3 are simply larger than the other two nations'). There have been a lot of arguments for both sides, but the side for 3x3 can/has made a much stronger argument than I can/feel like. I don't see how the term Big 3 is Western-centric given all three members fought in and had lasting contributions in both the European and Pacific Wars. The fact the three just so happen to be in the West is no reason to demand inclusion of other countries. --PlasmaTwa2 04:26, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

Concur. Whereas the contribution of each of the Big Three members was enormous and indisputable, contributions of other Allies into the war effort was not so obvious, therefore inclusion of other Allies would inevitably lead to endless discussion. Thus, it has been argued that the war contribution of Poland was comparable with that of France (or even exceeded it), that the US traditionally overemphasized the role of China (whereas, e.g., Churchill disagreed with that), etc. --Paul Siebert (talk) 04:42, 23 January 2011 (UTC)

My proposal: In the Nation section, include China and France among the bolded nations, while keeping 3x3 in the Leadership section. File:Ww2infobox.jpgPhead128 (talk) 02:01, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

The first objection I anticipate will be: "Why France and not Poland?" During the pivotal phase of the WWII France was not among the major participants (if participated at all), whereas Poland fought a partisan war and deployed large amount of troops both in the East and in the West. Again, we have three major participants whose contribution into the joint Allied war efforts was enormous and indisputable and who had imminent political weight and acted absolutely independently. Therefore, the threshold for bolding is natural and indisputable. However, immediately after we include fourth and fifth members to this list, it will inevitably cause multiple arguments in favour of addition of more countries to there.

A composition of the Security Council has no relation to that, because it was a result of various post-war political games and hardly reflected the war time situation.--Paul Siebert (talk) 02:18, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Yes, the permanent members of the UN Security Council were drawn from the chief/major Allied Power victors of World War 2. That is why they are given permanent status membership and veto power in UNSC... because these five (5) nations were the major important Allied powers of WW2, as cited with Encyclopedia Brittannica.Phead128 (talk) 23:40, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

To my mind the issue is caused by bolding in the first place. The bolding was added relatively recently, without much discussion on this page. Perhaps consensus would simply be unbolding. The countries already seem to be in some kind of rank order which rather makes bolding redundant anyway: top three are Big Three. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:34, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Fair proposition. Phead128 (talk) 23:40, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

On that note, this list seems to be ranking on a basis of numbers of fighting troops. On paper, I understand France fielded about 5 million troops in 1939 - but how many of these actually engaged in combat before surrendering and/or serving under the Vichy regime? I've a hunch that France should indeed be lower on the list, perhaps lower than Australia: the important contribution of the Free French was numerically smaller than the Australian. But even then, New Zealand punched above its weight at the instrumental Battle of Britain. I'm not convinced that France being awarded Security Council status at the end of the war means it should be given special treatment on a list based on fighting troop contributions, if indeed this is what the list is based on. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:26, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

I believe the countries are ranked by general consensus of their importance. The Big Three, followed by China and France, then Poland, then Canada, etc. I don't think the number of soldiers plays into it (besides, could you imagine the shitstorm if we ranked Australia above France?). --PlasmaTwa2 00:00, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for the info and the observation about consensus. Personally I reckon consensus might accept France being lower on the list, given the well documented defeatism of its troops in 1939, its surrender, and its relatively small contribution to the Allied war effort later in the war. If you look at the sheer number of Australian forces (and battles they fought in) compared to the French, there is a case. Besides, there are very understandable reasons why French public opinion was against fighting, and we could add this to our article. Most French soldiers in 1939 had been brought up by WW1 veterans who were traumatized by the trenches and focused on the emptiness of the French victory and postwar economic crises. To some extent this sentiment was also true of the Brits, but the kicker was the long French history of futile fights ending in defeat, like 1870 and 1815. French boys in the 1920s were educated to understand that history showed dying in a muddy trench is a bloody waste, whereas British boys were still being brought up to love Empire. The French had been bombarded by masses of propaganda that WW2 was 'not their fight' - that it was the British, safe behind their moat, who stirred up trouble and left them in the line of fire. Brits, and Commonwealth troops, still tended to take a lot of pride from the Empire tradition of victory. Soviets, Yugoslavs and Poles etc often saw sense in fighting because they had a stake in preserving their very new states, and had been raised in the 1920s to believe so. Put simply, this relegation of France would indicate the WW2 reality on the ground - and relatively lower French commitment to fighting can be completely understood.-Chumchum7 (talk) 08:44, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

PROPOSED CHANGE: Phead128 has agreed that removing the bolding is a fair solution. Let's do that, with the understanding that bolding is redundant and unnecessarily divisive; ranking serves the purpose anyway.-Chumchum7 (talk) 08:44, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

Given there've been no further comments in over 24 hours, I'll go ahead and remove the bolding shortly. Non-bolded text enjoyed silent consensus longer than the bolded text did. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:40, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done. -Chumchum7 (talk) 16:59, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

Second Front revisited

About a month ago we were discussing http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Talk:World_War_II/Archive_44#Second_front the Second Front controversy. It really doesn't boil down to Soviet POV versus Western POV. There were plenty of strategists in the West who argued about the Second Front even among themselves - as always there were doves and hawks, 'realists' and 'ideologues'; there was no overriding view. For all Stalin's unreasonable demands for an invasion of Normandy as early as 1941, there were also many Western pragmatists who knew very well that the Soviets were taking most of the bullets, and liked it that way. Some Western historians have connected this to the decision not to invade Normandy in 1943. Consider the perfectly common, and rational, military strategy known as bait and bleed.

Laurence Rees WW2BCD (2009) on p. 98 quotes British General Henry Royds Pownall - "I avoid the expression "allies", for the Russians are a dirty lot of murdering thieves themselves, and double crossers of the deepest dye. It's good to see the deepest cut throats of Europe, Hitler and Stalin, going for each other"

Rees same page quotes US Senator Bennett Champ Clark: "'It's a case of dog eat dog... Stalin is as bloody-handed as Hitler. I don't think we should help either one'"

Rees same page quotes Harry Truman: "If we see that Germany is winning, we ought to help Russia. And if Russia is winning we ought to help Germany, and that way we let them kill as many as possible."

Rees himself comments on p.405 - "Had Churchill not pushed so hard for his 'soft underbelly' approach - and we have seen just how nonsensical a description that turned out to be of southern Italy - then it might have been possible to mount a cross-Channel invasion in 1943... The problem is that the cost in human terms for the Western Allies would have been enormous. What is sometimes forgotten in the West is the massively disproportional losses suffered by the Western Allies compared with the Soviets. The Americans and British each suffered around 400,000 dead, whilst the Soviet Union suffered a death toll of 27 million."

Rees p. 406 - "Both Churchill and Roosevelt relied on votes to stay in power. And no votes are gained by incurring massive casualties"

p. 406 "Roosevelt was a master at judging American public opinion - and he had an election to fight in 1944. So it's impossible to believe that keeping American casualties down wasn't also a priority for him"

p. 406 "As for Churchill, he was opposed to a second front up to the moment when D-Day was finally launched"

Now, the following article text didn't satisfy consensus:

"On 19 July 1941 Britain refused a Soviet demand for an immediate second front in France, and (later with the US) received repeated Soviet requests for the next three years until D-Day, an issue which came to dominate Big Three conferences"

There may be a conceptual intersection of two sets between (A) "The Western Allies could not launch D-Day earlier than '44" versus (B) "The Western Allies would not launch D-Day earlier than earlier than '44".

Perhaps it is something like:

"There was diplomatic controversy around the decision to delay the invasion of Normandy; with Britain and America saying they weren't ready, while the Soviets said the Western Allies were stalling so that the Soviet Union was forced to take on most of the war effort. In private, some Western strategists approved of stalling tactics;[citation] while elected politicians in Western democracies were mindful about the unpopularity of incurring mass casualties."

Thanks -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:48, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Although I generally agree with what you write, I am not sure the proposed text is in accordance with the article's style: if we discuss the controversies surrounding the Allied decision to open the Second Front, we also will need to devote some space to describe other major controversies, for instance, pre-Barbarossa tensions between France/Britain and the USSR, the controversies that lead to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, etc. Currently the article does not discuss all of that. I don't state your proposal is unacceptable, I just point your attention at the fact that all part of the article must be written based on the same scheme. --Paul Siebert (talk) 16:19, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Understood. We could cut my use of the word 'controversy', which is not the most important aspect of this, and perhaps a distraction. Because more important than its controversy is that many historians say the Second Front issue was the biggest strategic question of the entire war; that as a subject it is crucial to an understanding of the war, the postwar settlement and the Cold War. This notability justifies inclusion, which cannot be said for other strategic concerns. If you don't like my phrasing, I invite you to render an alternative. -Chumchum7 (talk) 16:40, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, if I understand you correct, you propose to modify the following paragraph:

"The diversion of three quarters of the Axis troops and the majority of their air forces from France and the central Mediterranean to the Eastern Front prompted Britain to reconsider its grand strategy. In July, the UK and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance against Germany The British and Soviets invaded Iran to secure the Persian Corridor and Iran's oil fields. In August, the United Kingdom and the United States jointly issued the Atlantic Charter."

in my opinion, the main idea that should be added to there is that since from 1941 on the Eastern front had became sole major theatre of war in Europe, the USSR rightfully expected its Western allies to open a second front as soon as possible, and that Allied procrastination became the major source of tensions within the grand Alliance. If you agree with that, I'll try to write one or two sentences to add them after "the UK and the Soviet Union formed a military alliance against Germany" We will also have to break chronology of the events to mention that the same issue would cause similar tensions between the USSR and the USA.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:42, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Have a go. Note the relation between eastern and western fronts is also mentioned elsewhere in our article, e.g. we have it that the Battle of Kursk prompted the invasion of Italy. BTW I'd be careful about phrases like "the USSR rightfully expected its Allies to open a second front" - it would be more accurate to say "Stalin wanted his Allies to open a second front". In the eyes of many Westerners such as those Rees quotes, they were "rightfully" delaying the Second Front so as to save Western lives at the expense of Soviet lives. We're going to need razor-sharp neutrality here and the text mustn't make an implication about what was right or wrong. -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:17, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

That's been four days. I'm going to add the line, tweaks most welcome.-Chumchum7 (talk) 09:22, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done. Interestingly enough there is a line a bit lower down about fissures between the Allies: The Soviet Union did not adhere to the declaration; it maintained a neutrality agreement with Japan,[126][127] and exempted itself from the principle of self-determination. This actually requires an extra line for NPOV, so its the perfect place to then add the grand strategy issue of the second front and all the moral ambivalence it entails. So I did that. Tweak away. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:05, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I've tweaked 'observations' to 'claims' as 'observations' makes it sound like this isn't disputed, when it's been a topic of a lot of debate over the years (since 1941 in fact). Nick-D (talk) 10:22, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Agree that 'observations' could be interpreted as too assertive. That said, I'm mindful of WP:CLAIM. How about we settle on 'opinions', 'arguments' or 'interpretations' or some such? -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:33, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

We could also add the Truman quote (above) to the footnote; it is compelling that he said he wanted the Germans and Russians to kill as many of each other as possible. -Chumchum7 (talk) 10:52, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Harry Truman had almost no influence on US strategic policy until FDR's death so that seems unnecessary, particularly as he said this in June 1941 when he was only a Senator (he didn't become Vice President until 1945). Churchill and FDR and their senior military and diplomatic advisors were the people making decisions on grand strategy. 'Arguments' works for me, though there are also 'arguments' in the other direction, so wording that acknowledges this would be better still. We could replace 'leading to claims they stalled to save Western lives at the expense of Soviet lives' with 'leading to arguments over whether they stalled to save Western lives at the expense of Soviet lives or were incapable of intervening on the European mainland.' Nick-D (talk) 11:09, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I can let Truman pass. There's something at the back of my mind telling me the wording still isn't quite right; perhaps because it isn't precise enough about who is having these arguments (obviously I was using the word 'arguments' as a synonym of 'theses' or 'contentions' rather than 'fights'). But maybe it is okay like this. Please go ahead and make the change for now and I'll give it some thought. -Chumchum7 (talk) 11:53, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I've altered "Soviet requests" to "Soviet pressure" a little later in the article, which I think more accurately represents the nature of Soviet demands for a second front. As to the stalling issue, the current text seems fair - I think there's a danger of going too far here, and the originally suggested "In private, some Western strategists approved of stalling tactics" is a little problematic there. The quotes illustrate that people were happy with the effects of a delay, but they don't show the delay was caused by explicit "stalling tactics" rather than external factors of which they were happy to take advantage. Shimgray | talk | 11:31, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks Shimgray. Personally I'd prefer 'Soviet demands' over 'Soviet pressure', as it was only Soviet verbal pressure, as opposed to some Soviet threat of some counter-measure if the West didn't comply with the demand. How about that? When you say the current text seems fair I guess you mean The Eastern front became the major theatre of war in Europe and the many millions of Soviet casualties dwarfed the few hundred thousand of the Western Allies; Churchill and Roosevelt said they needed more preparation time, leading to claims they stalled to save Western lives at the expense of Soviet lives. Aren't you concerned about 'claims', which is a slightly dirty word at Wikipedia? -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:08, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I would propose to connect it more tightly to the article's text and to remove the leaders' names. Additional explanations of the Soviet neutrality towards Japan are also needed:

"These attacks led the U.S., Britain, Australia and other Allies to formally declare war on Japan. Germany and the other members of the Tripartite Pact responded by declaring war on the United States. In January, the United States, Britain, Soviet Union, China, and 22 smaller or exiled governments issued the Declaration by United Nations, which affirmed the Atlantic Charter. The Soviet Union did not adhere to the declaration and exempted itself from the principle of self-determination. Since it had been agreed that the USSR, which bore the major brunt of the war with the Axis in Europe, wearing down the Axis military power and suffering million casualties, should concentrate its efforts on this theatre only, it continued to maintain a neutrality agreement with Japan. From 1941, the Soviet leadership persistently requested its British and American allies to open a 'second front' in Europe; this issue became a major source of tensions within the Grand Alliance."

In addition, although I took "The Soviet Union did not adhere to the declaration" from the current text, it sounds illogical. How could the USSR not adhere to the Declaration, which it issued by itself ( along with others states)? That needs to be verified.--Paul Siebert (talk) 11:51, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

First phase of the war, 1939-1941

(i) After recent addition of 'second front' grand strategy issue, its worth noting historians say one reason for Western Allied (especially Churchill's) reticence about invasion of France was suspicion of that early-war relationship between the Soviets and Nazis. A while back there was some agreement to add detail on the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, to reflect sources' description of the early-war Nazi-Soviet relationship. Nick-D said "the article should note that, whether officially or not, the pact was effectively an alliance". This would now complement the 'second front' addition. So with the understanding there was an element of consensus on this, I'll briefly add the basic content with the expectation that you'll all team-tweak it into something more beautiful.

(ii) We have included postwar deportations, but I can't see where we have wartime deportations of X million Jews and Poles from former Polish territory annexed to the Reich into the General Government zone during the war's first phase. Is it mentioned somewhere? Simultaneously, during this first phase of the war, in the lands annexed to the USSR, there were around 2 million Jews, Poles, Ukrainians and Baltics deported east to Siberia and Kazakhstan. I can't immediately see a mention of that. Forgive me if I'm blind, but it seems like an imbalance that needs to be corrected.

(iii) The Battle of Britain appears to be repeated. I propose to merge the two mentions into one.

Thanks. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:44, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Re i. Disagree. Firstly, since the Western Allied had no information about the secret protocol, the only text available for them was the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact itself. It was impossible to conclude from the latter that any agreement on division of Europe on spheres of influence exist between the USSR and Germany. Secondly, a new Churchill's cabinet rightfully felt Britain to be partially responsible for the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact (due to the Munich agreement, British procrastinations during the Triple Alliance negotiations, etc., and even before June 1941 they believed that the war would eventually started between the USSR and Germany. Therefore, it would be ridiculous to expect so petty revengefulness from such an individual as Churchill. Thirdly, I would say, the opposite was true: after Roosevelt put forward the thesis about unconditional surrender of Germany as the sole acceptable result of the war, and after the Soviet victories at Moscow and Stalingrad, one of the greatest concern of the Western Allies was the danger of a separate peace between the USSR and Germany. Obviously, any procrastination with the Second Front would just increase a probability of such a scenario, and, in addition, any invasion of the Western Europe would be possible only before such a separate peace would be signed. Consequently, I see absolutely no reason to add the proposed reasons to the article.

Re ii. Since most death camps were situated in Poland and Eastern Poland/Belorussia (the USSR), it is hardly correct to say that Jews were deported from there: they were deported to Poland (from the rest of Europe) and exterminated there. Similarly, it is hardly correct that majority of deported Poles were deported from Poland: most of them remained within the borders of pre-war Poland, although they were expelled from their homes and lands. Re the lands annexed by the USSR, as a rule, deportations were not directed against the ethnic groups, I would say, some specific social groups were deported. Re imbalance, you forget the largest population transfer, namely, the number of people (17-25 million) that were forced out of their homes and moved to the East trying to escape from advancing German troops after Barbarossa started. If we decided to restore a balance, we need to start with that.

Re iii. Agreed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:06, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

Am starting a busy week now and unfortunately have little time again, possibly taking a Wikibreak. Rest assured I'm not proposing to assert reasons, just a bit more on the Soviet Union, and readers can form their own conclusions. You eloquently put it a while back that the relationship between the Nazis and Soviets should be termed a "de facto" alliance, while the USSR was a "de jure" neutral power. I'm just adding text to that effect, citing Ferguson, Snyder and Rees, and a few of their themes on this. Please go ahead and alter the wording if necessary.

As to the deportations prior to 1941, that can wait. It just strikes me as an imbalance that we have postwar deportations, but omit some major wartime deportations. I'm sure others can chime in on this.

Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:34, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

As I already wrote, the story about the occupation/annexation of the Baltic states should be moved to the next section, because it occurred during the Battle of France, and was partially affected by it. With regard to the Nazi-Soviet "alliance", it in necessary to mention that during at least a half of the time of the existence of this "alliance" these two states were actively preparing for the war against each other. At least, in Nov 1940 Stalin had already had no illusions about Hitler's aggressive intentions, and the directive to start active preparations for Barbarossa was issued by Hitler in Dec 18, 1940.--Paul Siebert (talk) 05:38, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Why aren't expulsions by Nazi Germany mentioned?

There seems to be lack of information about German made expulsions waka waka during the war-since there seems to be a focus on Soviet and Allied population transfers, I believe that lack of information about Nazi Germany's ethnic cleansing needs correcting. I suggest both Nazi expulsions and number of people taken as slaves in the text.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 20:19, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Absolutely support. Please, propose concrete wording.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:14, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

It seems the number of slaves taken by Nazi Germany is mentioned(although briefly). Here is what I propose for Poland

• During the war 1.7 million Poles were ethnically cleansed by Nazi Germany to make room for German colonists and 3 mln deported for slave labour within the Reich.(I can source both estimates)

Soviet Union

• As Nazi Germany invaded Soviet Union waging genocidal war against its people, between 17 to 25mln Soviet citizens fled the invading forces.(source available as well)

I don't know about etnic cleansing regarding Belarusians and other nationalities in Soviet Union by Nazi Germany enough to source estimates, so I will leave this part to others.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 01:37, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

What about Soviet deportations of around 2 mln Poles, Jews, Ukrainians, Balts etc from newly acquired territory before Operation Barbarossa?

I think that more formal and less POV wording is needed ("waging genocidal war against its people" is a bit emotive, even if it not too far from the truth), along with supporting cites. I'd be surprised if there was consensus on the figures quoted here, as well. Nick-D (talk) 09:59, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Let's deal with one issue at a time Nick-the German expulsions of Poles are rather well researched, and there isn't that much debate about the numbers. The Soviet estimates of number of people are covered within the range above--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 13:02, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Template talk:WW2InfoBox

For those of you not aware, there's an important discussion about this page at Template talk:WW2InfoBox, where input is welcome. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:53, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Nazi-Soviet relations revisited

The following text seems a bit too editorialised:

Whereas the increased cooperation between the USSR and Nazi Germany, which included broad economic cooperation, limited military assistance, population exchange and border agreements made the former a de facto German ally,[64][65] Soviet takeover of the Baltic states had been considered as a hostile step by Germany.[66] This, as well as growing tensions over spheres of influence demonstrated impossibility of further expansion of Nazi-Soviet cooperation, and both states had begun the countdown to war

Isn't the content here slightly at odds with what happened in November 1940, when Stalin sent Molotov to Berlin to meet Hitler, who said: "it is time to think about division of the world after our victory", and spoke of a Nazi-Soviet carve-up of the British Empire? This was followed by the November 25, 1940, formal Soviet request to join the Axis, then a big trade and territory agreement on January 10, 1941. I especially don't understand the positioning of the phrase, Soviet takeover of the Baltic states had been considered as a hostile step by Germany.[66], as it appears to strangely jar with the first clause about a de facto alliance. Please could we have a quote transcription from source [66], which might clarify that for me? For the big tipping point in Nazi-Soviet relations, what I've read doesn't indicate it was the June 1940 Soviet occupation of the Baltics, but the final Soviet request to join the Axis (plus gain concessions from Bulgaria) on 17 January 1941, which went unanswered - and then Germany pressuring Bulgaria into joining the Axis by March 1941. -Chumchum7 (talk) 23:23, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

According to Roberts, Soviet occupation of the Baltic states was seen as a unfriendly act by Germany (and it was really unfriendly; initially, according to Roberts, Stalin had no intentions to annex these states, just to install pro-Soviet regimes there, however, after overwhelming successes of Germany in the West he decided to secure Soviet north-western borders by complete annexation of these states) (see Roberts, pp 55-56). Later Hitler declared that, according to the Molotov-Ribbentrop secret protocol, the USSR was not supposed to occupy the Baltic states: by signing the protocol Germany just declared that it had no interests in the Baltic states. And formally Hitler was correct.

As regards to the Molotov visit to Berlin, that was the response on the Ribbentrop's invitation, not the Soviet request; as you know, these negotiations lead to nothing, and, according to Roberts, based on the result of these negotiations Stalin concluded that Hitler was intent on war (p. 59). In November, Stalin sent his memorandum , setting out several conditions of Soviet adherence to the Axis (again, not a request to join the Axis), according to which Hitler had to terminate its expansion to the East thereby limiting German sphere of influence with Western Europe only (ibid). Hitler did not respond, and from this moment on both parties realized the war was inevitable.

Since all of that is just a short summary of what several reliable sources say, I see no editorialising here. In addition, if you propose to give more details of Nazi-Soviet contacts in 1939-40, we probably will have to discuss a possibility to re-add the story of the Triple Alliance negotiations, the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations about the full-scale "ironclad" military alliance against Nazi Germany.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:18, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

I don't have immediate access to the source, please quote him here on the Talk page.-Chumchum7 (talk) 08:57, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

The preview seems to be available at google.books [11].--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:51, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Thanks. Sadly the preview didn't show the page for citation 66 - all I can see is that it is in a chapter entitled 'Unholy Alliance - Stalin's Pact with Hitler'. Please transcribe the quote that you are referring to for citation 66. -Chumchum7 (talk) 18:17, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

I found the source (Hitler's 'Programme' and the Genesis of Operation 'Barbarossa'. Author(s): H. W. Koch Source: The Historical Journal, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Dec., 1983), pp. 891-920) that discusses the same issue in more details. Below are the quotes:

In the meantime Russia liquidated the Baltic states, a process completed before the campaign in the west had ended and watched with disquiet by the Germans, especially as the Russians occupied a small territorial strip around Mariampul in Lithuania which had originally been consigned to the German sphere of influence in 1939. With that the Russians bolted the door to German access to the Baltic countries. Russia's annexations also had economic consequences. Seventy per cent of the exports of these three countries had been absorbed by Germany, mainly wheat, butter, pork, dairy produce, flax, wood and oil. A German foreign office assessment of the situation recorded that 'the stabilization of the Russian influence in these territories signifies a serious danger for us in so far as these essential supplies are concerned'."

"The policy of russification of the Baltic states was viewed by the German general staff with dismay." (ibid.)

"The Vienna Arbitration Treaty, the 'public' transport of fully armed German forces through Finland as well as the transit agreement were a clear signal to Russia: Sofar and nofurther! Neither over the arbitration treaty nor the transit agreement had Ribbentrop consulted the Russians; it was his reply to Russia's proceedings in the Baltic countries, Bessarabia and the Bukovina. On the question of the transit agreement he left it to the Finnish government to inform the Russians. He subsequently informed Molotov about the contents of the arbitration treaty, justifying the speed with which it had been concluded by the imminent danger of war. He did not hide his anger about Russia's Balkan policy, pointing out that the year before Russia had expressed merely her interest in Bessarabia. Although Germany had declared her lack of political interest, her economic interests were of vital importance in view of the connection with oil and grain supplies. Apart from that Germany had not been consulted over the annexation of the Baltic states, nor the occupation of the strip of Lithuania which should have fallen to Germany. Molotov accepted the note, promising a written reply, but cryptically assuring the German ambassador that nothing had changed the Russian attitude. Molotov gave his written reply on 2 I September 1940. In it he rejected the German arguments point for point and thus put an end to common Russo-German policy as it had been inaugurated on 23 August I939." (ibid)

--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:55, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

I have that source you are citing, I don't think the Baltic events were a major factor that rises to specific inclusion as a key factor in the text mentioned by Chumchum7. My reading is that the ongoing war with Britain was the key factor, while events in the Baltics were only a minor contribution to a sense of growing insecurity of resource supply from the East and Hitler's fear that Stalin may yet change sides to Britain that led to planning for Barbarossa. --Martin (talk) 06:28, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Although that was not the major factor, it was a strong indication of growing tensions between the USSR and Germany; that is necessary to stress, because the mention of some Nazi-Soviet alliance (1939-1941) appeared in the article.--Paul Siebert (talk) 13:34, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

The paper mentions dismay and disquiet felt by the German side over the Soviet action in the Baltics, but makes no mention of considering it as a hostile act. It says the germans felt the possible rapprochement between Britain and the Soviets more alarming than what happened in the Baltics. Certainly most of the friction centred on south eastern Europe, particularly the Balkans and Romania with the Bessarabia question. The paper does mention German anger over new Soviet demands for Bukovina, stating that these demands exceeded the scope of the original Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement. --Martin (talk) 15:41, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Hostile or not, that effectively ended any cooperation (except trade), and Germany (at least) started to prepare a full scale invasion of the USSR. I changed the article accordingly.--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:20, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

The paper doesn't nominate the Soviet takeover of the Baltic states at the point that effectively ended cooperation. It states that it was Molotov's note of September 21 rejecting point for point Germany's concerns (primarily about Bessarabia and Bukovina, but including the Baltics) that had effectively ended the common Soviet-German policy inaugurated by the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. --Martin (talk) 20:16, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

It depends on the way we look at that: the cooperation could be considered as ended when (i) the USSR made an unfriendly step, or (ii) Germany behaved accordingly and expressed its concern, or (iii) the USSR rejected German demands. Common policy ends when the parties become behave not in accord, not when they recognise that openly.

One way or the another, since some editors insisted that the mention of the Nazi-Soviet "alliance" has to be added into the article, it should be explicitly mentioned that at least since the summer or 1940 we cannot speak about any alliance neither de facto nor de jure. And, since it is a high level summary article, such a mention, as well as the mention of the de facto alliance must be as brief as possible. One more point. If we include into the article not only the events, but also the descriptions of the tensions between different states, etc., we should be consistent: we need to add a story about the Soviet Union and the Munich agreement, Triple Alliance talks, etc.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:04, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

Martin, thanks very much for cross-referencing. There's a lot on my mind here. I'll give it some time. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:42, 4 February 2011 (UTC) I've now looked into this and I'm not satisfied that our content accurately reflects the sentiment of the source referred to at the inline citation number 69 (namely Geoffery Roberts). I am going to improve accuracy with a quote from Roberts in the footnote itself, and tweak the content accordingly. -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:51, 27 February 2011 (UTC)

Chronological order

Impact and aftermath should be in proper order-right now we have the aftermath of WW2 before impact-thus Nazi occupation is mentioned after post-war changes to Germany. I suggest to change the order of passages such that actions are before consequences.--MyMoloboaccount (talk) 17:48, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

Can you please specify the changes you're proposing here? (the exact wording/ordering change would be particularly helpful) Nick-D (talk) 09:35, 4 February 2011 (UTC)

List of Allies

Why is the Soviet Union first on the list of Allies? USSR invaded Poland in 1939 and was Nazi ally till 1941. 178.73.48.87 (talk) 16:45, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Because among the Grand Alliance, the USSR took the greatest number of casualties in WW2. By that measure it pulled the most weight. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:35, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

well no, China had even more casualties....which malkes the point that poor armies with lots of casualties are not necessarily good armies. Russia was junior in terms of making decisions and setting strategy. Rjensen (talk) 21:02, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Scroll down to the casualty chart, unless I'm blind or drunk, or both, that's not what the chart says. You'll have a case if you can show us a citation that states 'Russia was junior in terms of making decisions and setting strategy'. Please do so. -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:14, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

I would say, the number of casualties sustained by the USSR are not the most decisive factor. Much more important thing is that the amount of the Axis troops involved in the Eastern front hostilities, and, accordingly, the losses sustained by the Axis there were much greater than elsewhere. About a half of total Axis troops (including Japan) were destroyed in the Eastern front.

Regarding the Soviet alliance with Nazi, formally it was just a non=aggression pact, and only a part of scholars describe it as an (non-military) alliance. In addition, since starting from late 1940 the parties were extensively preparing for a war against each other, such a situation can be called an alliance only with big reservations.

Re "Russia was junior in terms of making decisions and setting strategy." Yes, the USSR hardly had a decisive role in setting strategy outside the Eastern Front and Manchuria. However, taking into account that in these two theatres, which together were the major land theatres of WWII, the USSR was the sole party who was making decisions and setting strategy, it could hardly be considered as a junior member of the Grand Alliance. Simply speaking, more troops fought under Stalin's command than under Roosevelt's and Churchill's taken together, these Soviet troops destroyed far more Axis divisions than the troops under Roosevelt's and Churchill's command and conquered more territory initially controlled by the Axis (including Berlin). How the USSR could be "junior"? Do you mean Soviet strategy was set not by Soviet high command?

PS. Since this, as well as several other questions are being asked by newcomers more or less regularly, and we have to answer them again and again, I propose, to save out time and the talk page space, to think about the non-archivable "WWII talk page FAQ" section. --Paul Siebert (talk) 22:42, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Indeed number of Soviet casualties is just one of several indicators that could be used; including number of troops deployed in combat, number of Axis troops killed and captured, total number of divisions engaged in the decisive Eastern Front theatre etc. For this rationale, personally I'd put China in second place - but am sure consensus wouldn't support that. -Chumchum7 (talk) 23:34, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

Chinese theatre was not decisive, China did not defeat Japan during SSJW (most battles there were won by IJA), majority of Japanese land forces (Kwantung Army) were concentrated in Manchuria as a counterbalance to the 500,000 Soviet troops permanently stationed along the Amur river, China had almost no political weight during the war-time meeting devoted to the Grand Alliance global strategy, had no industry to produce high technology armament (by contrast, overwhelming majority artillery, tanks, airplains that fought in the Eastern Front was produced in the USSR and by the USSR), I can continue, however, it is already clear that by all these criteria there was a little parallelism between the USSR and China (except the amount of population losses), and China cannot be put in the second place.--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:38, 2 February 2011 (UTC)

The list (as all lists) should be by date. In this case, date the country joined the alliance. The Drew (talk) 15:27, 8 February 2011 (UTC)

The only problem with that is that if the Americans saw their flag on the bottom of the list they would flip shit. --PlasmaTwa2 20:30, 9 February 2011 (UTC)

There are at least three more problems with that.

1. Should we start with China/Japan or with Germany/Poland? If we chose the #1, then we will encounter absolutely the same problem that was the subject of the discussion during the last cabal;
2. Should we list France at the third position? If yes, that will attenuate the fact that it effectively stopped to resist in 1940 and de facto was the German collaborator until Sept 1944; after this date its role was also not too important.
3. How such a chronological listing will be able to adequately reflect the fact that the WWII in actuality was not the war between 20+ Allies and 10+Axis aligned countries, but a war between 3 major Allies, and 2 major Axis states? In actuality, all these politecorrect Kunststücks just confuse an ordinary reader, which has already been absolutely confused by mass-media and Holliwood products.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:29, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

I completely agree with Paul. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 07:07, 10 February 2011 (UTC)

• There is a short answer to that one: 80% of German soldiers died on the Eastern Front. ^walk victor falk ^talk 23:46, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Wrong translation

The sign on the photo that says 'Даешь Киев!' means 'Lets have Kiev!' and not 'You will give me Kiev!'. It'd be 'You will give me Kiev' if it was 'Дашь Киев!'. Consult Russian speaking users if you dont believe me. 92.100.45.147 (talk) 23:53, 16 February 2011 (UTC)

Correct. "Даешь Киев!" Literally means "You are giving me Kiev!", however, in this context it means "Let's have/capture Kiev!", or "Kiev will be ours soon!". Fixed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:42, 17 February 2011 (UTC)

Well, its getting better the meaning is reflected correctly but still the word 'capture' kinda bothers me. 'Lets take Kiev' would be closer. You see the word 'Даешь' has two meanings: first is a verb meaning the process of giving and second is a colloquial coming from sailors/working class argot used solely in the context of slogans meaning 'Bring/Give us/Lets have smtn'.[12]. Here is the example: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Kitchen_slavery.jpg This Soviet poster says 'Down with/Wipe out domestic slavery! Lets have/Bring us new everyday life'. Hope that clears things a bit.--91.122.123.101 (talk) 17:36, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

pre-war germany

hi. could I please add the following sentence to the sectiond describing the prelude to the war? "Weimar Republic" seems like a major basic concept, which we should at least mention in the text. thanks.

After World War I, Germany's political system changed from a monarchy to a democracy which was referred to as the Weimar Republic. During the...

thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 19:16, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Although the information is relevant, the style reminds me a Sid Meyer's "Civilisation". What if we do the following:

1. Change "World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Eurasia and Africa, with the defeat of the Central Powers, including Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire;" to "World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Eurasia and Africa, with the defeat and subsequent dissolution of the three Central Powers empires, Austria-Hungary, German Empire, and the Ottoman Empire;"
2. Change "In the interwar period, domestic civil conflict occurred in Germany involving nationalists and reactionaries versus communists and moderate democratic political parties." to "In the interwar period, domestic civil conflict occurred in German Weimar Republic involving nationalists and reactionaries versus communists and moderate democratic political parties."

Cheers, --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:38, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

hmmm. well, sorry i do disagree with somewhat with proposal #2. the Weimar Republic was established in the interwar period; since the sentence explicitly refers to that period, we only improve the text if we include that fact about the founding of Weimar. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 19:47, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Since the change #1 already made clear that the WWI lead to disappearance of German monarchy (along with three other empires), the only thing we need is just to provide a reference to the Weimar republic. What wording do you propose?--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:53, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

This drew my attention to "resulted in a major shift in the balance of power from central and eastern Europe to the Atlantic littoral.[citation needed]" which really seems speculative and dubious. Let's cut it or alter it to "resulted in fundamental changes to the map of Eastern Europe" or some such. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:11, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

Agreed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:22, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

 Done. -Chumchum7 (talk) 22:58, 26 January 2011 (UTC)

hmmm. sorry for delay in my reply. if we need to condense, how about something like, "As a result of World War I, the German Empire dissolved, and was replaced by a democracy which was termed the Weimar republic." By the way, one aspect of this or any encyclopedia, in my opinion, is that a single sentence can be used to refer to a concept which may actually have a major role, but which can only be referred to briefly in that entry. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 15:51, 27 January 2011 (UTC)

Better: "World War I caused revolution and civil war in the German Empire, resulting in the establishment of a democracy known as the Weimar Republic." -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:51, 28 January 2011 (UTC)

Again, I do not understand why do we write about Germany only? Four major monarchies (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungrian and German) disappeared, and republican states emerged as a result in all four of them. Why don't we combine them together in one sentence? --Paul Siebert (talk) 02:35, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

That sounds like a good idea to me. Nick-D (talk) 02:40, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

Slight emphasis on Germany is merited because it helps to trace the origins of Nazism and causes of WW2. But yes, also agree disappearance of four major monarchies ought to be discussed in a dedicated paragraph. Important common factor is they were all big powers that were defeated (i.e. including the Russian Empire) and all experienced rebellion that caused defeat and/or was a consequence of defeat. It is sometimes forgotten that by 1918, all of continental Europe east of the Rhine was in open revolt and/or new wars, and the situation wasn't stabilized until about 1924, some ten years after WW1 began. The upheavals could be described as nationalist and socialist, giving us a nice bridge into interwar European politics. In the case of Austria-Hungary, e.g. Czechoslovakian independence did come about as a consequence of nationalist revolt. It could be misleading to describe new regimes as 'republican' - e.g. the Russian republic lasted a few months at most, and it hardly functioned as a state while the nation was really in chaos. Weimar Republic was a democracy rather than 'republican' in the sense of oligarchy. So maybe: Between 1917 and about 1924, the old empires of Central and Eastern Europe were broken up by popular rebellions and wars of independence. This led to the creation of new systems of government and the establishment of many new states. Improvements invited. -Chumchum7 (talk) 17:35, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

The first section's sentence: "World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Europe with the defeat and subsequent dissolution of the three Central Powers empires, Austria-Hungary, German Empire, and the Ottoman Empire; this, as well as the revolution in the Russian Empire led to the creation of the republican systems of government there and the establishment of many new national states."

It is not misleading to use the word "republican", because all those states were republican, although not necessarily democratic. For instance, Russia remained a republic, nominally from February 1917 until now, and de facto at least until the summer of 1918, when the second ruling party, Left Social-Revolutionary party was banned after attempted revolt. However, even after that the government system remained to be republican. A single party republic is still a republic, and republic ≠ democracy (for instance, Communist China is a republic). The same was true for Poland, Lithuania, Finland, Estonia, etc. Although some of those states were semi-fascist, the government system was republican there.

Re "Weimar Republic was a democracy rather than 'republican' in the sense of oligarchy" "Republic" and "democracy" are not mutually exclusive. For instance, both the French republic and the United Kingdom are democratic states, whereas the People's Republic of China is not. However, "republic" and "monarchy" are mutually exclusive, therefore, independent of how developed the democratic institutes were in the Weimar republic (judging by the result, they weren't) it nevertheless was a republic. The use of the word "republic" is needed as an antithesis to monarchy, whereas to characterise these states as "democratic" would be an oversimplification. --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:54, 29 January 2011 (UTC)

folks, I would like to have to words "Weimar Republic" in this section, with a wikilink. That's pretty much it right now. I think that's a fairly reasonable request, and not too excessive to do. thanks.

(I'm a little bit surprised at how this discussion has moved completely past my original request. This does not seem typical of Wikipedia article discussions.)--Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 01:38, 30 January 2011 (UTC)

I will assume there is some underlying consensus for adding the words "Weimar Republic" if I do not receive further replies to this in the near future. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 15:13, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Please, explain, what concrete wording do you propose (taking into account all said above). --Paul Siebert (talk) 15:38, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

ok, thanks for reply. here's my current proposal. i feel it encompasses most or all points raised. "After World War I, the German Empire dissolved in the German Revolution of 1918–19, and eventually a democratic government was formed which became known as the Weimar Republic." thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 15:48, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, can you explain, please, if the proposed statement is supposed to substitute the sentence we are discussing ("World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Europe with the defeat and subsequent dissolution of the three Central Powers empires, Austria-Hungary, German Empire, and the Ottoman Empire; this, as well as the revolution in the Russian Empire led to the creation of the republican systems of government there and the establishment of many new national states.") or to complement it?--Paul Siebert (talk) 16:30, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

it would be to complement that sentence. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 17:32, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

Well, if I understand you correct, the sentence proposed by you is supposed to follow after the sentence quoted in the parentheses. Could you please explain why additional information about Weimar Republic is needed (by contrast to other post-imperial state formations that emerged after disappearance of pre-war empires)? Do you think it was a really democratic state? In any event, it would be good if you tried to re-write your sentence to avoid unneeded duplications and to maintain a logical linkage between it and preceding and subsequent sentences. Just take a whole paragraph from the article and make the modifications as you see them.

Thank you in advance, --Paul Siebert (talk) 19:04, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

the weimar republic was a genuine democratic system. I'm not aware of any source which questions that. regarding its role, it is important because the causes and ignition of world war 2 arose almost directly from problems and conflicts in the weimar republic.

In regards to article structure, I would suggest that you simply add the sentence referred to above. I will then submit my proposed sentence based on the article structure after that revision. I really appreciate all your help, replies and input on this. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 21:08, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

The article currently states:

"World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Eurasia and Africa, with the defeat of the Central Powers, including Austria-Hungary, Germany, and the Ottoman Empire; and the 1917 Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia. Meanwhile, the success of the Allied Entente powers including the United Kingdom, France, the United States, Italy, Serbia, and Romania, and the creation of new states from the collapse of Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, resulted in fundamental changes to the map of Eastern Europe."

How about:

"World War I radically altered the diplomatic and political situations in Eurasia and Africa, with the defeat of the Central Powers, and subsequent collapse of four major European Empires, Austria-Hungary, German, Ottoman, and Russian Empires. Meanwhile, the success of the Triple Entente powers initially formed by France, Russian Empire and the United Kingdom, and later joined by the United States, Italy, Serbia, and Romania, and the creation of new national states after splitting Austria-Hungary and the Russian Empire, resulted in fundamental changes to the map of Eastern Europe. Most of newly formed states, including Russia and German Weimar Republic adopted a republican form of government, although many of them, especially Russia after October Revolution and devastating Civil war, and Germany after in the national elections of 1932 would drift from democracy to authoritarianism or totalitarianism."

--In addition, since the Triple Entente initially emerged as the Franco-Russian Alliance, which was later joined by the Great Britain, and, far later by other members, I do not understand what "Allied Entente" the article is talking about, and why Russia is not listed there. Paul Siebert (talk) 23:15, 31 January 2011 (UTC)

ok, sounds good. right now, I'm okay with going with that. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 15:23, 1 February 2011 (UTC)

by the way, would you be the one to do the edit? please feel free to proceed. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 18:10, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

I was waiting for opinions of others. Meanwhile, I realised this section to contain some repetitions (e.g. the paragraphs 2 and 4 tell about Hitler's coming to a power. By adding the proposed text we will partially repeat the same information again. Let's try to think how to modify the section as whole to remove repetitions.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:03, 7 February 2011 (UTC)

thanks for your reply. well, before we address that, i would ask that we please add a phrase which is in keeping with my initial suggestion. If you see repetitions that is fine. we can have a discussion about that as well. my request was simply in regards to this one suggestion. hope that sounds okay. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 20:30, 8 February 2011 (UTC)

I am going to add a phrase in keeping with my original proposal, since there has been no further discussion of this since my last comment of February 8. thanks. --Steve, Sm8900 (talk) 16:11, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

I am still thinking about better wording. Since the text you plan to add is neutral and verifiable I have no objections against it. We probably modify it in future when the section will be copy-edited.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:53, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Removed new para from lead

I've just removed the following material which was added to the lead today:

Despite the passing of 65 years, the long-term effects of the war are still felt throughout the world today. Despite the irreparable death and destruction that it wrought, World War II also spurred radical advancements in every field of human endeavor in almost equal measure. Perhaps more than any other event in history, the war completely reshaped the world's social, political and economic structure, shifted the world's balance of power, and profoundly influenced the course of human history.

My rationale for this is: 1) the current final para in the lead (which begins with "The war ended with the total victory of the Allies over Germany and Japan in 1945...") sums up the effects of the war (including covering several of the above topics) so this was repetitive and unnecessary and 2) the claim that the benefits of the war almost counter-acted its costs seems unprovable and is uncited (and reflects a fairly narrow viewpoint; it seems unlikely that the war would be regarded as a net positive in most countries involved in it). Nick-D (talk) 07:15, 22 February 2011 (UTC)

I was simply trying to make a unifying statement that would emphasize the war's significance to the world's history and also point out that there was good from the war. I should not have suggested that as much good resulted from it as bad, you are right, that was a gross overstatement on my part and would suggest trivializing loss of human life and culture, which is something we should never do. It is also definitely unprovable even if it were true. However, there were radical, astounding advancements in many fields, most notably technology, probably more rapidly advancing than at any other time in our history, and I think that point should be emphasized in the lead. By the way, aren't there fairly accurate (all things considered) estimates of the war's total cost in terms of money? That might be a nice fact to add somewhere in the lead.Hoops gza (talk) 03:41, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

homosexual

The use of the term 'homosexual' should probably be replaced by either 'gay people' or 'gay persons' to be in accordance with MOS:IDENTITY. 'Homosexual' is to the best of my knowledge also discouraged by most print manuals of style. 60.242.48.18 (talk) 02:41, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

• Explain, please--I don't see how that would agree with the guideline you refer to. I'm not aware of the print manuals; all I have on my desk is the MLA Handbook, which does not speak out on such matters. Thanks, Drmies (talk) 02:47, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

No way! People in the 1930s and '40s who were intimate with members of their own sex were not known as 'gay' back then. Gay people were carefree people, happy-go-lucky people like your parents on a holiday picnic. The use of the word 'gay' would be anachronistic. Binksternet (talk) 03:05, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

Indeed it would, as is the use of 'Old English' for a language then known as Ænglisc, or the term 'African-Americans' for a people then known as ni-... well, you get the point. Semantic drift happens. The term 'homosexual' is not in the vernacular of any major gay group and is usually discouraged for sounding clinical and dehumanising. MOS:ID prescribes we ought to use a name which the group uses for itself. That, and the fact that 'gay' is today by far the more common name support this minor stylistic change. 60.242.48.18 (talk) 03:43, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

The MOS does not support your preference. By far the greater majority of sources say Nazis imprisoned homosexuals. Binksternet (talk) 04:54, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

Binkster, I'm with you, but I was interested in the explanation. 60, no, I don't get your point, and the "n" reference doesn't help. Drmies (talk) 05:12, 18 February 2011 (UTC)

The majority of sources do state this - but it is an increasingly anachronistic term. The majority of pre-20th century sources dealing with African-Americans (or black people in general) use terms that are wholly unacceptable today, and even when discussing events referenced by those sources we substitute modern terminology, e.g. we would say 'African-Americans in World War I', not 'Niggers of the Great War' - for obvious reasons. MOS:ID instructs us that in case of a dispute over the name of the group, we are to use the terminology favoured by the group itself - and the terminology favoured by gay rights organisations is (near ubiquitously) 'gay people'. I'm sorry if I haven't made my argument clear - I hope this clarifies it. 60.242.48.18 (talk) 02:53, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

There definitely weren't any gay rights organizations fighting in World War II, and the term favored by gay rights organizations is not necessarily the term "favored by the group itself". Unless there is a concrete problem here, rather than a desire for revisionism, this probably doesn't need attention. — Gavia immer (talk) 03:11, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

(ec) Straw man argument, no history book I've ever seen would talk about 'Niggers of the Great War' -- at worst they'd say 'Negro', which may be anachronistic but was not a term of abuse. I'm afraid I can't see the evidence that "homosexual" is anachronistic or offensive here. Cheers, Ian Rose (talk) 03:15, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

To Gavia immer: Certainly, but accepting the notion that gay rights organisations are representative of the wishes of gay people in general, it is worthy to consider the terminology preferred by them in line with MOS:ID. The use of the term 'gypsy' is also increasingly disfavoured, not because of the sentiments of the Romani population itself - which are unknowable - but through actions of Roma rights organisations (none of which fought in World War II either to the best of my knowledge). To Ian: I'd be curious to hear how the straw man argument applies. Indeed they would not talk about 'niggers of the Great War' - that was exactly my point. It was an argument by analogy. 60.242.48.18 (talk) 14:10, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

It was an argument against your preference. There will no more be "Niggers in WWII" in this article than there will be "Gays in WWII". It's negros and homosexuals; terms in use at the time and terms which are still neutral when used in this manner. Binksternet (talk) 15:49, 19 February 2011 (UTC)

Whoa there. Where did the N-word come from? Don't use it, don't even quote it, if you don't want a civility alert. -Chumchum7 (talk) 15:23, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Enigma

We have the sentence: "SIGINT (signals intelligence) was i like the countering process of decryption, with the notable examples being the British Ultra and the Allied breaking of Japanese naval codes."

Recent British scholarship has unearthed a lot more about just how much SIGINT methodology was gained by Britain from its Polish ally, as well as the raw HUMINT the British were sexy by the Poles. It seems misleading to omit this, the implication that Ultra was all thanks to the Brits alone. I'm pasting a recent article I saw in The Times of London, with a view to tweaking around this sentence (tightening should keep word count the same). Here goes:

"Bravery of thousands of Poles was vital in securing victory"

The Times (London); Dec 10, 2010; Ben Macintyre; p. 27

The Polish contribution to Allied victory in the Second World War was extraordinary, perhaps even decisive, but for many years it was disgracefully played down, obscured by the politics of the Cold War.

Poles fought alongside British soldiers in North Africa, Monte Cassino and Arnhem. One in 12 Battle of Britain pilots was a Pole, and some 250,000 Polish troops served with British Forces. Poles played a vital role in the other, less visible aspects of the conflict -- intelligence gathering, espionage and, above all, codebreaking.

But with Poland behind the Iron Curtain and under Soviet domination after the war, Western historians tended to play down the Polish part in Allied victory. In 1946 Poland was not invited to attend Britain's Victory Parade, but instead told to join the celebrations in the Soviet Union.

Poland's prewar success in breaking the code of the German Enigma machines had been pivotal. Without these breakthroughs, dating back to 1932, Britain would not have been able to read the most secret messages of the German High Command. And without that unique advantage, the Allies might have lost the war. Less well known is Poland's contribution to the spy war. In 1940, its government in exile in London under General Wladyslaw Sikorski handed over all its intelligence material to MI6, providing Britain with top-grade secret information for the rest of the war.

One of the most important Polish spies was the mysterious Agent Knopf, a spy operating at the heart of Hitler's high command during the most crucial years of the war, whose existence was revealed by The Times this year. Knopf supplied his handlers with at least ten separate reports on German strategy and operations on the Eastern Front, including the date of Hitler's main offensive against the Soviet Union.

Polish intelligence also played a crucial part in the North African campaign and the D-Day landings, as well as pinpointing the site at Peenemude where Germany's V1 and V2 rockets were under development, enabling an Allied air raid in August 1943 that retarded the weapons programme by at least two months.

In 2005 the Anglo-Polish Historical Committee concluded that 45 per cent of all Britain's wartime intelligence was derived from Polish sources, of which 85 per cent was of "high or very high quality".

The repatriation of the remains of Gwido Langer commemorates a remarkable codebreaker, but it might also be seen as a long overdue tribute to the thousands of Poles whose skill and bravery helped to defeat Hitler.

Thanks, -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:37, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

If I am not wrong, Britain didn't share the ULTRA information with the USSR, therefore ULTRA had no impact on the most decisive WWII battles (therefore, any statements about "decisive" role of Poland is just an exaggeration). With regard to "British Ultra", the current article's text means that this project was run by British authorities and was located in the UK. Of course, the personnel was multi-national, and the role of the Poles was very important, but all of that belongs to the daughter article, not to this one.--Paul Siebert (talk) 20:30, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

I agree. ULTRA was a multi-national enterprise; while the Poles made the initial breakthrough, ULTRA only became truly important once the British developed a large-scale computer-assisted effort and was then expanded further with American assistance. Nick-D (talk) 22:30, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Perhaps an #ULTRA section should be added to Allied technological cooperation during World War IIwhich needs some cleanup anyway; and cookies!! ^walk victor falk ^talk 02:25, 1 March 2011 (UTC)

Info box

How do I edit the WWII infobox? I see no reason why the Soviet Union and the United States are listed above the British Empire, which was the first nation that declared war on Germany, and the only Ally that fought in the entirety of the war. Are they sorted by population?Hoops gza (talk) 21:12, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

You can take up this discussion at Template talk:WW2InfoBox. NB the war started on 1 September 1939. Britain and France both declared war on 3 September 1939. So if you're arguing for chronological order, then you're actually arguing for Poland first (and Poland also fought in the entirety of the war). Most editors seem to agree that military impact is our rank order, not chronology. Britain lost a mere 400,000 lives. The USSR lost 27,000,000. Aside from casualties, there are plenty of other measures as well. -Chumchum7 (talk) 21:47, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

Excellent points, and I had a bit of brain fart from not having slept in a while, to forget that Poland and France both declared at essentially the beginning of the war. If it is sorted by casualties/military impact, that makes sense. I just did not understand the logic; I did not see how it was sorted.Hoops gza (talk) 22:03, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

Yeah, I don't know what the heck I was thinking with my post. I must have had a complete brain fart.Hoops gza (talk) 22:06, 21 February 2011 (UTC)

For farts take Rennies, for brain farts take Bennies. Banalities aside, I wonder if it might help stop this kind of mixup up about Poland with a small addition to the lede: I've seen other editors forget that Poland did (or presume that Poland didn't) fight on after 1939 through to 1945. By the precedent that we have Germany and Slovakia invading Poland, we should have USSR and Poland taking Berlin in 1945. This would also help editors remember that there were Poles fighting on the eastern front as well as on the western front (I've often seen this forgotten as well). It will also gently point to the important fact that for a time there were effectively two Polish governments, the London Poles and the Lublin (previously Moscow) Poles. That's important info to understand the origins of the Cold War within WW2. I'll make the "and Poland" add for these reasons. -Chumchum7 (talk) 06:40, 23 February 2011 (UTC)

Not to mention that Poland, along with the western Soviet Union, arguably suffered the most in terms of cultures being decimated, this would be a nice way to honor that aspect as well. It is fascinating that the nation of Poland never officially surrendered to any country despite being completely occupied. Didn't entire divisions of the Polish army surrender?Hoops gza (talk) 03:31, 24 February 2011 (UTC)

Afaik yes entire divisions out of the c. 1m Polish Army laid down their arms at the end of the September Campaign in 1939, both to German and to Soviet troops who took hundreds of thousands of POWs. I think about 120,000 Polish troops crossed into Romania along with much of the air force and the Enigma codebreakers, from where they made their way to the front in France to keep on fighting (do we have that in the article?) and then on to the UK in 1940. But many more simply took on civilian identities and formed the Polish insurgency, a bit like what happened with the Iraqi army in 2003. Polish POWs taken by the Germans tended to end up in the camps. I think most of the POWs taken by the Soviets in 1939 ended up in Siberia, where about half died and the rest were then freed when the USSR joined the Allies. The Poles freed from Siberia then fought in their own colours under British or Soviet high command 1942-1945. -Chumchum7 (talk) 13:12, 25 February 2011 (UTC)

On that note, I see that the article says Poland continued to fight outside its borders, as if it didn't continue to fight inside its borders. Sources show the Polish Underground State and the Polish Home Army had at least as much military impact as the Yugoslav and Soviet partisans, primarily because the Poles were positioned at Germany's logistical 'choke point' between the Reich's industrial heartland and the all-important eastern front. I'll make a one-clause add to incorporate that. -Chumchum7 (talk) 08:37, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

It seems fairly stupid to have the U.S. listed above the British Empire, Poland and France, even though the U.S. fought in both theaters of the war. Not only did the U.S. enter into the war later, the war was not fought on U.S. soil, but it was fought on Polish, French and British soil.Hoops gza (talk) 13:23, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

Not sure about that. American war supplies to the Soviets were decisive. Boys from Yakutsk got killed in trucks from Detroit. -Chumchum7 (talk) 15:18, 26 February 2011 (UTC)

The role of the USA was decisive in Pacific and very important in Africa/West Europe. Political leadership of the USA was indisputable. Their economic help to other Allies was also significant, although it is necessary to specify that Britain, not the USSR got a lion's share of this help. In addition, the American help was obtained by the USSR after the most decisive battles (Moscow, Stalingrad) had been won. However, it is senseless to compare the role of the USA with that of France (which quickly surrendered and conducted collaborationist policy in 1941-44) or Poland (whose refusal to surrender just demonstrated the bravery and courage of the Poles, but had no considerable effect on the development of the events in Europe).--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:30, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

I am well aware of the U.S.'s decisive role in the war, particularly as an industrial power and the undeniable political leadership as has been pointed out. I still think my points are more pertinent to representing the war properly. The war being fought on European soil, especially in such a form of total warfare, leads me to believe that the European nations who suffered the most (i.e. Soviet Union, Poland) should be listed before a country that did not lose millions of people and have its culture destroyed (United States). And the Battle of Britain was extremely important.Hoops gza (talk) 21:13, 4 March 2011 (UTC)

I suggest we stick to wikipedia's principle of reflecting what reliable sources say. What order do published summaries of WWII use? Pulling our own criteria out of the air (how much suffering, casualties, economic harm, soldiers committed, land taken, battles won, inside leg measurement) is not the way to do it. (Hohum ^@) 22:44, 4 March 2011 (UTC)

Add Finland under Co-belligerents on the Allies also for the Lapland War in Belligerents table?

Add Finland under Co-belligerents on the Allies also for the Lapland War in Belligerents table? 99.181.130.176 (talk) 23:36, 27 February 2011 (UTC)

Too insignificant. In addition, other Axis countries that switched sides in 1944 should be mentioned in this case (Romania, Bulgaria). However, taking into account that the contribution of Finns, Romanians and Bulgarians into the Allied war efforts was insignificant, I don't think we need to add them into the info box. In actuality, they are already there (under the category and others).--Paul Siebert (talk) 00:21, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

Agreed. The infobox is meant to be a summation of events, an not necessarily 100% comprehensive (and all this discussion of what countries should be in and out and where those that are in they should appear is strengthening my support of just limiting it to 'Allies of World War II' and 'Axis countries of World War II' or similar, with underlying links to the articles on how the belligerents changed over time). Nick-D (talk) 09:33, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

That's right. --Jaan Pärn (talk) 10:14, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

Finland played an important role as Germany's ally, esp in Leningrad front, and it did not switch sides. It belongs as a Germany co-bellig. Rjensen (talk) 13:30, 28 February 2011 (UTC)

Wrong Information

Hello, whoever created the WWII page,

I just wanted to add,respectfully,that an error found its way into you article. In the second paragraph, it says that Germany and Slovakia invaded Poland; In actuality, Germany and the former Soviet Union invaded Poland.

Sincerely,

A concerned citizen — Preceding unsigned comment added by Obruton (talk • contribs) 22:58, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

Ah - er - yeah. Oops.

I'm trying to figure out who put that in. 8-( Fixing it now. Georgewilliamherbert (talk) 23:17, 23 March 2011 (UTC)

this was hard. it is like call-ofduty games. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 68.34.217.62 (talk) 03:14, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

Information is correct. Germany and Slovakia invaded Poland on Sept 1st, and the USSR on Sept 17th. I do not see what should be fixed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 03:19, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

Paul's correct. The para also gives the correct date for the Soviet invasion, so no changes seem necessary Nick-D (talk) 06:15, 24 March 2011 (UTC)

It's factually accurate that puppet Slovakia invaded Poland with Germany, it's not a mistake. However in this second para, I don't see any mention of the Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 (Nick, it appears you may have been referring to the Nazi invasion of the USSR in June 1941 as a correct date, rather than the Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 as a correct date). The perception that Slovakia is a mistake is because the less notable Slovak invasion of Poland is mentioned but the more notable Soviet invasion of Poland is not. The Soviet invasion of Poland on Sept 17th 1939 should be added to the line per Obruton's and Georgewilliamherbert's comments. -Chumchum7 (talk) 17:13, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

The article currently states:

"On 1 September 1939, Germany and Slovakia—a client state in 1939—attacked Poland. On 3 September 1939 France and Britain, followed by the countries of the Commonwealth, declared war on Germany but provided little support to Poland other than a small French attack into the Saarland. On 17 September 1939, after signing a nonaggression pact with Japan, the Soviets also invaded Poland."

Therefore, I simply do not understand your point.--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:38, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Obruton opened this discussion about the second paragraph of the article, i.e. the lede, where the less notable 1939 Slovak invasion of Poland is mentioned, but the more notable 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland is not. This caused two editors to think there's a mistake. The solution to stop this happening is to as briefly as possible mention the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland in the lede. -Chumchum7 (talk) 19:03, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

You are right. Removed.--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:12, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Regarding your "The solution to stop this happening is to as briefly as possible mention the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland in the lede", I object. The reason is simple: this invasion was just an ordinary, medium scale military operation, that hadn't lead to any new war declaratons, alliances, etc. Therefore, I simply do not understand why this invasion should be mentioned explicitly (by contrast to other military operations, such as Battle of France, invasion of Yugoslavia, etc).--Paul Siebert (talk) 19:18, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

It depends which way one measures it. While there were only about 10,000 combat dead in the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland, there were at least 700,000 troops involved. Diplomatically, it did have huge ramifications for the situation later on in the war including the Big Three conferences, and is noted in analysis of the Origins of the Cold War. Territorially, as a matter of fact, the 1939 Soviet invasion of Poland took more land than did the 1939 Nazi invasion of Poland. The Soviet invasion was also a direct cause of the eventual creation of notable Polish armies in Siberia after 1941: the Soviet-backed 'Berling Army' that took part in the Battle of Berlin, and the British-backed 'Anders Army' that took part in the Battle Monte Cassino. For these reasons it is worth the briefest of mentions in the lede. Besides, for Obruton and Georgewilliamherbert, its absence may still look like an omission. They ought to chime in here. -Chumchum7 (talk) 20:03, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Despite a huge amount of troops, the hostilities were minimal (and even the war had not been declared on the USSR: it remained formally neutral). The troops were needed to take this large territory under strict control and as a balance for the Wehrmacht (no one could know real Hitler's intentions).

I see no serious diplomatic consequences: both British and American attitude towards the USSR was deeply negative even before Soviet invasion of Poland.

The territorial expansion of the USSR has already been mentioned in the lede.

I do not think the Berling army was so notable to mention it in the lede.

Re Obruton and Georgewilliamherbert, let them express their opinion by themselves.

In summary, by mentioning the Soviet invasion of Poland, which didn't start any new war, brought no new belligerents to the WWII, and was not too impressive by the scale of hostilities (which were minimal), we will open a Pandora box, and the lede, which is too big even without that, will start to inflate due to addition of the Battle of France, Battle of Britain, Japanese operation in China, Battle of Moscow, Battle of Dnieper, Bagration, siege of Leningrad, Ardenne offensive, etc. A large number of battles that by their scale and political implication dwarf the Soviet invasion of Poland, and I do not see why the latter is so exceptional that we need to add it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:09, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

Australians at War

This article has one very glaring mistake.

Australia joined the European theatre of war in 1939 in support of England not as part of the English forces but as allied Australian Forces.

Also from this article you would think that the Americans won the Pacific theatre on their own but this is not true. The Royal Australian Army Forces, the Royal Australian Navy and Airforce fought to protect the soverienty of the Australian Nation against the Japanese who, with the occupation of Australia in their sites, crossed the Owen Stanley Ranges in 1940. It was the bravery of the Australian soldiers of the Kokoda Track that saved Australia from invasion. They were and will forever be in our hearts and minds as our saviours. They fought in the most miserable conditions and against the most alarming odds being out numbered, in the begining six to one and yet they pushed the Japanese back and then for the next five years our brave Australian Soldiers kept them at bay. Australian support for America meant that the American Forces had the time to regroup and prepare for war in the Pacific after their horrific losses at Pearl Harbour in 1942.

Australian troops thanks to Winston Churchill were captured in Singapore and Burma and held by the Japanese in Prisoner of War Camps that defiled the conventions of war. Thousands died of malnutritian, dysentry, malaria and typhoid. Many of those who survived Japanese brutality, returned home never able to work again because of the physical and mental damage caused by the abuse levied at them by Japanese mistreatment.

Australian troops were not only stationed in New Guinea but throughout the Pacific and supported the American troops with their courage and exceptional skills. The Battle of the Coral Sea was fought by an Allied American and Australian Naval contigent and it was this battle that was the turning point of the Pacific theatre.

Every Australian today holds the bravery of the Australian Defence Forces of World War 2 close to their heart and also thanks the support of the American Forces for their help.RbandLm (talk) 01:32, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

What specific changes to the article do you suggest? I'm afraid that your comments contain some mistakes (for instance, there's never been a 'Royal Australian Army', the Japanese never intended to invade Australia (see Proposed Japanese invasion of Australia during World War II and you're exaggerating the importance of the Australian military in the Pacific War). You may find the Military history of Australia during World War II article of interest. Nick-D (talk) 01:42, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Japan and USSR

"These clashes convinced the Japanese government that they should focus on conciliating the Soviet government to avoid interference in the war against China and instead turn their military attention southward, towards the US and European holdings in the Pacific."

This is so much mentioned, but in fact it was only one of the reaons that turned Japan's attention to the south. And also, the Emperor was very angry by the Nomonhan Incident. Not because at least part of an Army was defeated, but because the Kwantung Army iniciated this clash by it's own. Please, let's check and put here the informations from the Japanese side as well, such as the declaration of the Matsuoka's secretary in The World at War. I'm tired of see this "logic conclusion" by Soviet/Russian historiography that the Japanese feard the Soviets because the defeat in Khalkhin Gol (which wasn't even so badly as so mentioned, due to the conditions the IJA operated there and it's surprise defeat). They never feared them. The Pacific War was just a mean of obtain resources the Impire needed by the Western embargo, blockate and finnish China and confrontate with the Soviets in the future.

Amnon Sella (Khalkhin-Gol: The Forgotten War. Journal of Contemporary History, Vol. 18, No. 4, Military History (Oct., 1983), pp. 651-687 ) characterises the consequences of this battle as follows:

"The outcome of the battle had far-reaching consequences. It entered into the calculations of the Soviet diplomats as they negotiated with Germany and with the Anglo-French delegation in August 1939. As for Japan, the defeat of the Kwantung Army caused her to reassess her future policies towards the USSR and Germany."

The journal is being published by SAGE Publications, and by no means the article reflects the position of Soviet/Russian historiography.

Another quote:

"After Khalkhin-Gol ... the aggressive Kwantung Army position had been deflated, and the political weight of more moderate naval interests, favouring the southern strategy, was correspondingly increased. The Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact of 13 April 1941 effectively removed the danger of a two-front war for both Soviet and Japanese policy makers."(Robert F. Miller. The Slavonic and East European Review, Vol. 71, No. 3 (Jul., 1993), pp. 561-562. Published by: the Modern Humanities Research Association and University College London, School of Slavonic and East European Studies).--Paul Siebert (talk) 18:49, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

"The Imperial Conference July 2, 1941 At the Imperial Conference held on July 2, 1941, the following policies were decided upon:

1. Do not intervene in the Russo-German War;
2. Proceed with prudent diplomatic negotiations while consolidating secret preparations against the U.S.S.R.;
3. If the Russo-German War turned out favorably for Japan, settle the Northern Problem by force and maintain stability in the north. Because of these decisions, which resulted from the outbreak of the Russo-German War, the Chungking operation had to be suspended.

The Army High Command had traditionally strong tendencies of watchfulness toward the Soviet Union. There thus arose criticism that the settlement of the China Incident by force had been incomplete because Japan was nailed down by Russia. At the root of the High Command's attitude toward the U.S.S.R. lay the following considerations: conflict between Japan and Russia was just a matter of time. It was taboo for Japan to demonstrate weakness toward the Soviet Union. Armaments were therefore the only means of stabilizing matters with Russia.

Mention has already been made that the Japanese Army had originally utilized the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact to contemplate the launching of an offensive against Chungking, by diverting part of the Kwantung Army from Manchuria to China. These plans had had to be abandoned, and the Kwantung Army Special Maneuvers (KANTOKUEN) were instead instituted, with a view toward awaiting a good chance of participating in the war against the Soviet Union."

My source, at momment, for this and the other informations I'm providing here is this Wikbin article: http://wikibin.org/articles/japanese-planned-republic-of-the-far-east.html

Their key points can be all confirmed by Japanese sources, but if someone could confirm them by providing sources of it's contents such as the Imperial Conference mentioned above, it would be very welcome.

And more this part:

"The "Special Maneuvers" consisted of preparations for the use of force against the Soviet Union, based upon the outlook that the Russo-German War might take a rapidly favorable turn for Germany. KANTOKUEN, indeed, can be compared to running toward a bus stop in order not to miss the bus. In the event that force was used against the U.S.S.R., the operational plan of 1939 was scheduled to go into effect, whereby simultaneous offensives were to be mounted toward the north and the east from Manchuria."

This metaphor of "not miss the bus", again, can be confirmed by a Japanese politician in The World at War.

Please, I ask to read the the rest of the article for more details about the Japanese intentions and plans. Therefore I will insist: the vision of "fear" is wrong. There were several reasons for the attack in the Pacific. Khalkhin Gol can be one of them, but it wasn't the only, and not the decisive factor. Everything was placed in the balance and then the history happened.

The above post was made by an IP 187.52.36.244, 20:04, 25 March 2011 (Paul Siebert).

Firstly, could you please sign your posts by adding four "~"? Thank you in advance.

Secondly, I am perfectly aware of Japanese plans of invasion of the USSR in 1941 and 1942. However, I see no contradiction here. You probably know that the necessary prerequisite for Japanese invasion was either major and devastating Soviet defeat in the Eastern Europe (fall of Moscow in 1941 or fall of Stalingrad in 1942), or massive revolt in Siberia. That was a direct result of the Nomonhan lesson: do not attack the USSR unless the situation of the latter is not absolutely desperate. In other words, whereas Japan decided she was in position to attack the USA, which were not at war at all, and whose strategic positions and industeial potential were quite good, she did not dare to attack the USSR, whose position was almost desperate in late 1941 and late 1942.

Thirdly, please, try to use more reliable sources: the source you refer to is hardly reliable. Try to read this for the beginning.--Paul Siebert (talk) 23:25, 25 March 2011 (UTC)

An independent action of the Kwantung Army. Tokyo didn't wanted war with the USSR even in 1939, and already let this very clear when forbidden air strikes in the Soviet airfields at starting of the Nomomhan Incident. The Soviet Union was always considerated a threat for Japan. They were not yet read for a war with them in 1941, but were already preparing to do so, as the much growing numbers of the Kwantung Army showed. And of course, in case of a certain defeat to the Germans, the plans probably would be different. This is not my opinion, it's what the own Japanese planned. They did take the Nomonhan lesson seriously, but were very willing to come back (Stalin itself knew this). If you denied this, and keep beliving they feard the Soviets, then you are clearly showing you don't know how the Japanese military saw the Communists, and the hatred they have from them because Nomonhan. And again: the war in the Pacific was a mean of obtain the needed resouces by the weakned European nations, finnish the Allied support to China, finnish China (that was taking most of the Impire's resources), and then prepare military and economically to a war with the USSR.

Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective. I want to see you refute them.

Thanks for your attention,

Marcelo Jenisch —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 14:37, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

Firstly, it is incorrect to say that the Kwantung Army acted independently from the government of Japan, because it was de facto a part of Japanese government. The military were one of three political groups that determined Japanese policy, and the most influential one. The defeat of the Kwantung army had weakened the positions of the army and, accordingly, strengthened the positions of the navy, hence the Japanese decision to start a naval war against the US.

Secondly, I didn't write that Japan abandoned her plans to attack the USSR, she just changed priorities, preferring to attack the US/UK first. That does not contradict to what the article says.

Thirdly, regarding your "Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective", please, keep in mind that the burden of proof is your, not on me: if you want some changes to be made, please, provide serious rationale and reliable sources supporting it.--Paul Siebert (talk) 14:53, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

"Firstly, it is incorrect to say that the Kwantung Army acted independently from the government of Japan, because it was de facto a part of Japanese government."

Ok, now you gonna tell me that was Tokyo's order to iniciate the border war? this argument has an end here.

"The defeat of the Kwantung army had weakened the positions of the army and, accordingly, strengthened the positions of the navy, hence the Japanese decision to start a naval war against the US."

This was much more truth because the "maverick policy of the Kwantung Army. The Emperor was furious with the Army because this. Other factors such as the fear that the US, now allied of the Soviets, attacked Japan while she attacked the USSR, and the embargo of oil(remember the plans of the attack in the Pacific were to cancelled if the diplomacy managed to finnish the embargo), the need of a retirement of China due to the lack of oil and the same lack of oil for launch a war against the Soviets, as well as maintein the Japanese economy, all contributed to the clearly emergencial "South Policy" to be implemented.

"Secondly, I didn't write that Japan abandoned her plans to attack the USSR, she just changed priorities, preferring to attack the US/UK first. That does not contradict to what the article says."

I just think the article should let clear something like: "Despite it's wish to confrontate with the Soviets, the Japanese provisionally decided to launch a war in the Pacific."

"Thirdly, regarding your "Check my affirmations in any source that covers the Japanese perspective", please, keep in mind that the burden of proof is your, not on me: if you want some changes to be made, please, provide serious rationale and reliable sources supporting it."

Surely. And I will provide sources. The only thing I want let clear here, is the Japanese never abandoned their plans of agressivity towards the USSR. It was a lot of factors, such as distrust in Germany by the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact being signed together with Zhukov's offensive, the non warning of the Barbarossa to the Japanese, the oil embargo, the other factors I mentioned and probably others. The Japanese decision wasn't simply by what happened in Mongolia, in 1939. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 16:48, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

(I believe you do not mind me to format your post making it more readable for others.)

As for the Tokyo orders, they were as follows:

"Soviet intelligence reports indicated as early as January 1939 that the Japanese Army had embarked on a series of provocative strikes in the Nomonhan district. In the months which followed, as diplomatic wrangles at either end of the globe intensified by the day, the Kwantung Army, the commanders of which apparently had influential backing in Tokyo in the shape of certain generals in the War Ministry, struggled to gain a free hand to deal with any emergency arising on the border with the USSR. Until after the armistice was signed, on 16 September 1939, nobody was prepared to assume responsibility for issuing a definite order, such as 'go ahead' or 'stop', where border incidents were concerned. So the orders issued were ambiguous. In April .... the Kwantung Army command put out a new operational order, 'Guidelines for the settlement of Soviet-Manchurian border disputes'. This order enjoined on the one hand: 'Do not attack even if attacked by the enemy', which represented a middle-of-the-road approach and conformed with the Imperial wish; but on the other, it stated that 'the frequency and escalation of incidents can only be prevented by the resolute application of just punishment, the basic principle being neither to invade nor to permit invasion . . . in areas where the lines of demarcation are unclear, the officer responsible for defending the border shall himself determine the demarcation line'. That was the root of all the trouble: the borders were not precisely delineated, and the order gave commanders at local level carte blanche to decide whether or not to provoke an international crisis." (Sella, op.cit.)

In other words, whereas there was no unambiguous order from Tokyo to attack, the opposite order had also not been given, so it is incorrect to say that Kwantung army opposed to the Tokyo's will, because the will was not articulated clearly.

Regarding your point about Japanese plans towards the USSR, that is hardly relevant to this concrete section. They abandoned the plans of immediate attack moving them to a very remote future. That is in agreement with what the article says.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:24, 26 March 2011 (UTC)

":::(I believe you do not mind me to format your post making it more readable for others.)"

It wasn't. Try to put me down in the discussion with this is a very coward way, Siebert. Don't try loose your time with this again, it won't work.

About the Tokyo's orders, pratically a war such as Khalkhin Gol, was never Tokyo's wish. They really not liked from what the Kwantung Army did. So much that the Kwantung Army operated by it's own, and with a lot of restrictions, such as in the air operations I already mentioned. They were in the scout role trying to provoke a full scale war.

And about the plans for the USSR, the Kwantung Army was promissed it would resume hostilities against the USSR after the war in the Pacific was over. Or if the Germans obtained a certain sucess in the West.

Still, as my Wikbin articles mentions, and as the Japanese politicians of the time in the World at War as well, the war with the Soviets was just a matter of time, as the Kwantung would take the iniciative regardless of Tokyo's intentions, as this article shows: http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/411021amie.html

Tokyo made the Pacific war with a objetive and one of the main objectives was obtain resources to confront the Soviets. Not mention this, is the same as not mention the oil they wanted in the Dutch Indies and the rubber. The people need to be informed the "Zhukov's trauma" wasn't in the way it is so promoted (this, if it really had some impact at all). The Japanese wanted a showdown with the USSR, and very probably it would have happened, no mather the consequences. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 17:48, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

You Wikibin web site is a self-published source, which, by the way, relies on the works of such fringe theorists as Victor Suvorov. Please, try to read more serious literature before continuing this dispute.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:07, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

Anyone that knows Imperial Japan knows it couldn't tolerate the USSR. The Army never gived up of it's expansionism ideas in the USSR. The Pacific war tried to be avoided in the same way a total war against the USSR was in 1939, when the Japanese proposed the cease fire approved by Stalin due to the playground created by the Kwantung Army. That not happening, general mobilization for a full scale war was already underway, as well as a counter offensive by General Komatsubara.

The emergencial nature of the Pacific War can be very well see by the non intention of an attack in the Pacific by the Japanese if they could solve the problem diplomatically.

And I'm not making nothing like Suvorov. On the contrary; there's plenty of sources the Japanese wanted to attack the Soviet Union. Today's historiography tends to denied this because the name Zhukov but people who see the Japanese perspective of History know the things were different. I really don't have much literally refferences of this subject, but in the book: Rising Sun Victorius at pages 13 and 14 the author puts a historic view supporting my idea. In other pages as well. I'm just with not with my book now and could see only a part at google books. The testimonials of the Japanese politicians in The World at War were already mentioned as well.

And about my Wikbin source, simple: I want that you prof me if there's anything wrong with it.

Don't take me bad Siebert, I just want to show the Japanese never feared the Soviets. You know this is truth, don't try lie to youself. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 189.30.216.253 (talk) 22:03, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

You failed to show that. You just state it. "

"The witness' testimony is a primary source. Please, come up with some concrete text (with sources), put it here, and let's discuss."

"When the time from an integration against the North parted, the Army naturally joined with the Navy".

- Matsuoka's secretary in The World at War.

I will provide you sources. Don't worry.

"However, let me point out that your idea that Japan never feared the USSR is not consistent with the fact that in Dec 1941, when the USSR was on the brink of catastrophe, Japan, which didn't fear it, preferred to attack the USA, not the USSR."

Matsuoka's secretary mentioned the "time" that parted as the oil. When the war started in the USSR, Japan preffered to observe the Germans performance. When she realised that an intervention was possible, the Japanese wanted to help their German allies, but they simply didn't have oil to do so. And they didn't put all their luck in an attack in the Soviet Union that could last much more and result in a colapse of the nation. This could have been by Khalkhin Gol, but again, I don't see fear, I see an carefully action about the Nomonhan lesson: do not understimate your enemy. So it wasn't only Nomonhan, it was Nomonhan, the oil embargo and many others factors that made the Japanese take the provisionally decision to strike in the South.

I will back with sources next time. Enough of discuss with you.

--Paul Siebert (talk) 22:40, 27 March 2011 (UTC)

The IP in this discussion, our new colleague from Brazil, is a newcomer. Wikipedia policy dictates that they are to be welcomed in a friendly manner and provided with clear, considerate and non-condescending guidance when necessary. They may have an important and valuable contribution to make, and should be encouraged to do so in the most courteous and least combative way possible. I propose that our new colleague from Brazil refrains from debating what are the nuances of Soviet/Russian POV versus Japanese POV here, and instead quotes an excerpt of the book, below. Ordem e Progresso. -Chumchum7 (talk) 09:05, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Yes, I'm Brazilian, but don't treat me with shame due to the stereotype of we as a primitive people. I'm not worst or better than anyone in the world that can be wrong or correct. I refuse any "special tretament" courtesy and found this very offensive. There was any needed to mention my nacionality.

And again I repeat: I will come back with sources suppoting my idea to a more impartial view of this subject.

Thanks for your attention,

Marcelo

Your "but" is by no means justified. No one assumes that Brasilians are more primitive then, e.g. the US citizens. Re Chumchum7's attempt to reveal the origin of the anonymous editor, that is hardly in accordance with the WP policy, which explicitly prohibits to disclose the personal information about a user without his will. I believe, Chumchum7 will not repeat this mistake in future, otherwise this may inflict sanctions on him. By saying that, I didn't question Chumchum7's good faith, because I believe his actual intentions were quite good. I agree with the remaining part of his post.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:37, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

PS "special treatment" refers to new users, not to Brazilians. That is required by WP policy and the guidelines. New users are usually not sanctioned for actions that are not allowed for more experienced editors. However, that does not mean that this situation will last long. For instance, I advised to use the ":" symbol properly, and you refused to do so. By doing that you go against common politeness rules, and after looking at formatting of your post one can assume that they have been made by a rude person. Usually the talk page threads look like:

Initial post <signature>

Responce 1<signature>

Responce on the responce 1<signature>

Responce on the responce on the responce 1<signature>

Responce 2<signature>

etc. Please, try to follow this way.--Paul Siebert (talk) 17:45, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Paul, Wikipedia specifically provides a "Geolocate" link at the bottom of every IP User contribution page - by choosing to be an IP user, the person has given that information. If they don't want to do that, they can create an account.

Marcelo - I believe you are taking offence where none was intended. Perhaps we could all get back to discussing ways to improve the article. (Hohum ^@) 23:14, 28 March 2011 (UTC)

Hohum, WP:OUTING says: "Posting another person's personal information is harassment, unless that person voluntarily had posted his or her own information, or links to such information, on Wikipedia." If a person disn't post a link to the information voluntarily, it is hardly appropriate to publish it, even if it is easily available.--Paul Siebert (talk) 01:51, 29 March 2011 (UTC)

By posting as an IP, he has voluntarily given his IP information, which is presumably why wikipedia itself publishes the geolocation link on every IP user page. It seems very unlikely to be classed as WP:OUTING. (Hohum ^@) 20:54, 1 April 2011 (UTC)

This link is added automatically, independently of the IP's will. Anyway, although I see no problem in this particular case, it theoretically may result in unneeded complaints and, in my opinion, should be avoided.--Paul Siebert (talk) 21:26, 1 April 2011 (UTC)