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Polarization

Causes

[edit]

Multiple theories claim one or many central causes of political polarization. Included in these causes are political parties, gerrymandering, public ideology, and the media.

Party Polarization

[edit]

One theory claims parties have been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy preferences clash between parties. Evidence for this theory has arisen from data showing prioritization by the majority party in Congress to address policy most aligned with their party platform and ideology. [1]

Change in party voter base is noted as one factor contributing to polarization. In Mann and Ornstein’s “It’s Worse Than It Looks” (2011), the change in United States constituency post- Voting Rights Act correlated with a shift the ideological separation between United States parties in the 1970s. Further analysis showed that, specifically, as the Southern Democrats of the 1970s shifted toward the Republican Party party, the two main parties polarized. [2]

Parties contribute funds to campaigns for individual politicians. This gives a certain control over the political actors to the parties and can drive polarization by forcing the party member to vote along party lines in exchange for campaign contributions. [3] This does not particularly hold true for mass donors of political campaigns. A single donor who is polarized but contributes large sums does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes. [4]

Political actors occasionally and opportunistically benefit from higher polarized environments. [5] During the early 1990s, The Republican Party, according to Mann and Ornstein, used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the House of Representatives. This indicates that polarization can be used to gain power in a representative body. The tactics employed mainly drew distinctions between the majority party for most of the past half century (Democrats) and the to-be majority party from 1992-1994 (the Republicans) [6]. Other theories support the model showing that politicians who cater to more extreme groups of their party tend to see victories while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar extreme. [7] A study by Nicholson found that contentious statements by party leaders tend to affect polarization of the opposing party more than their own voters. This gives power to party leaders and politicians of high status in their party. [8]

In relevance to multiparty systems, Sartori (1976) claimed that the splitting of ideologies in the public constituency causes further divides within the political parties of the country. He theorized that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of a highly polarized multiparty system. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon polarized pluralism and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions over policy issues. [9]

The Public

[edit]

In democratic and other representative governments, the citizens vote for the political actors whom will represent them. The role of public ideology is associated to the preference for candidates and influences the ideological voices heard in the government. [10][11] For example, voters who identify as Republican are mre likely to vote for a strongly evangelical candidate than Democrat voters. [12] A study by Dixit and Weibull (2007) claims that there is a link between public differences in ideology and polarization of representatives. It indicates that this increase in preference differences is usually temporary and will usually meet at a point of compromise. The study also suggests that political polarization is a natural and regular phenomenon. [13]

Fiorina’s hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public but rather is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government. [14] This hypothesis, according to “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America” (2005) and “Is Polarization a Myth?” (2008) by Abramowitz and Saunders, is not supported. Studies indicate that cultural differences focusing on ideological movements and geographical polarization within the United States constituency has correlated with rises in overall political polarization between 1972 to 2004. [15][16]

According to Layman et. al 2005, the ideological split between U.S. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have become, generally, more moderate in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. This correlates with the rise in polarization in the United States. [17] Another theory on this specific phenomenon contends that religion does not contribute to full-group polarization but rather coalition and party activist polarization causing party shifts toward a political extreme within the larger group. [18][19]

Redistricting

[edit]

Redistricting, also known as gerrymandering, has been linked to the rise in polarization. [20] The practice of redistricting could give those who make the districts unequal advantages by placing large like-minded groups in districts whose votes will outweigh the smaller opponent groups, creating partisan polarization. [21] This confers upon a more extreme candidate, according to Carson et. al 2007, more power as the makeup of the voting block shifts in the direction of a polar extreme. However, the effect was modest when analyzed over multiple election cycles and in the United States as a whole. [22] In shorter term analysis, the use of this tactic correlated with the rise in partisanship in the United States House of Representatives between 1992 to 1994. [23] [24] Many theories concur that the redistricting practices have not affected political polarization a great deal. The effect is enough to be measured but over broad areas and time periods the effect of gerrymandering on polarization is minimized. [25][26]

The Media

[edit]

The mass media has increased as an institution over the past half-century. This, as particularly studied within the past three decades, has affected the viewers as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news media choices. According to Hollander, the mass media’s current, fragmented, high-choice environment has induced a movement of the audience from more even-toned political programming to less-friendly, more one-sided broadcasts and articles. The audiences of these programs also are composed of partisan viewers who watch polarized programming as a self-confirmatory source for their ideologies. [27] [28] Countries with less diversified but emerging media markets, such as China and South Korea have also seen a polarizing impact due to the diversification in political media. [29][30]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Ura, Joseph Daniel, and Christopher R. Ellis. "Partisan Moods: Polarization And The Dynamics Of Mass Party Preferences." Journal Of Politics 74.1 (2012): 277-291. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  2. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  3. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  4. ^ La Raja, Raymond J., and David L. Wiltse. "Don’t Blame Donors For Ideological Polarization Of Political Parties: Ideological Change And Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972-2008." American Politics Research 40.3 (2012): 501-530. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  5. ^ Beniers, K. J., & Dur, R. (2007). Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition. International Tax and Public Finance, 14(1), 29-54. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-006-8878-y
  6. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  7. ^ Hirano, Shigeo, Jr., James M. Snyder, and Michael M. Ting. "Distributive Politics With Primaries." Journal Of Politics 71.4 (2009): 1467-1480. Academic Search Premier. Web. 10 Apr. 2013.
  8. ^ Nicholson, Stephen P. "Polarizing Cues." American Journal Of Political Science 56.1 (2012): 52-66. Academic Search Premier. Web. 10 Apr. 2013
  9. ^ Johnston, R. (2008). Polarized pluralism in the canadian party system: Presidential address to the canadian political science association, june 5, 2008. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 815-834. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423908081110
  10. ^ Garner, A., & Palmer, H. (2011). Polarization and issue consistency over time. Political Behavior, 33(2), 225-246. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9136-7
  11. ^ Mason, Lilliana (01/01/2013). "The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate". The American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills)(0002-7642), 57 (1), p. 140.
  12. ^ Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and Geoffrey C. Layman. "The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, And The Electoral Impact Of Party Identification." American Journal Of Political Science 55.1 (2011): 42-58. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  13. ^ Dixit, Avinash, and Jorgen Weibull. "Political polarization." Political Sciences 104.18 (2007): 7351-56. Web. 5 Apr. 2013. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1863477/>.
  14. ^ Fiorina, Morris, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. "POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISREADINGS." (2008): 1-16. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/cARwUU/Fiorina.pdf>.
  15. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Why Can't We All Just Get Along?" The Berkeley Electronic Press (2005): 1-22. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf>.
  16. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Is Polarization a Myth?" The Journal of Politics 70.2: 542-55. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <doi:10.1017/S0022381608080493>.
  17. ^ Layman, Geoffrey, and John Green. "Wars and Rumours of Wars: The Contexts of Cultural Conflict in American Political Behaviour." British Journal of Political Science 36.1 (2006): 61-89. Web. 3 Apr. 2013. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000044>.
  18. ^ Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. "A GREAT DIVIDE? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972-2000."The Sociological Quarterly 45.3 (2004): 421-50. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf>.
  19. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." The Journal of Politics 60.3 (1998): 634-52. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647642>.
  20. ^ Yoshinaka, A., & Murphy, C. (2011). The paradox of redistricting: How partisan mapmakers foster competition but disrupt representation. Political Research Quarterly, 64(2), 435-447. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/873115158?accountid=10141
  21. ^ Thompson, D. F. (2004). Election time: Normative implications of temporal properties of the electoral process in the united states. The American Political Science Review, 98(1), 51-64. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/214415207?accountid=10141
  22. ^ Carson, J. L., Crespin, M. H., Finocchiaro, C. J., & Rohde, D. W. (2007). Redistricting and party polarization in the U.S. house of representatives. American Politics Research, 35(6), 878-904. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X07304263
  23. ^ McKee, S. C. (2008). The effects of redistricting on voting behavior in incumbent U.S. house elections, 1992-1994. Political Research Quarterly, 61(1), 122-133. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/215329960?accountid=10141
  24. ^ Kousser, J. (1996). Estimating the partisan consequences of redistricting plans - simply. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 21(4), 521-541. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/60821189?accountid=10141
  25. ^ McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" Amer. Journal of Political Science 53.3 (2009): 666-80. Web. 7 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548144>.
  26. ^ Masket, S. E., Winburn, J., & Wright, G. C. (2012). The gerrymanderers are coming! legislative redistricting won't affect competition or polarization much, no matter who does it. PS: Political Science & Politics, 45(1), 39-43. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001703
  27. ^ Hollander, B. A. (2008). Tuning out or tuning elsewhere? partisanship, polarization, and media migration from 1998 to 2006. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 85(1), 23-40. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/216934569?accountid=10141
  28. ^ Hetherington, M. J. (2009). Review article: Putting polarization in perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 413-448. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000501
  29. ^ Yuan, E. J. (2007). The new multi-channel media environment in china: Diversity of exposure in television viewing.Northwestern University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, , 124-124 p. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/304832638?accountid=10141. (304832638).
  30. ^ Kim, S. J. (2011). Emerging patterns of news media use across multiple platforms and their political implications in south korea.Northwestern University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, , 189. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/873972899?accountid=10141. (873972899).

Causes

[edit]

Multiple theories claim one or many central causes of political polarization. Included in these causes are political parties, gerrymandering, public ideology, and the media.

Party Polarization

[edit]

One theory claims parties have been one of the major driving forces of polarization as policy preferences clash between parties. Evidence for this theory has arisen from data showing prioritization by the majority party in Congress to address policy most aligned with their party platform and ideology. [1]

Change in party voter base is noted as one factor contributing to polarization. In Mann and Ornstein’s “It’s Worse Than It Looks” (2011), the change in United States constituency post- Voting Rights Act correlated with a shift the ideological separation between United States parties in the 1970s. Further analysis showed that, specifically, as the Southern Democrats of the 1970s shifted toward the Republican Party party, the two main parties polarized. [2]</ref>[3] Parties contribute funds to campaigns for individual politicians. This gives a certain control over the political actors to the parties and can drive polarization by forcing the party member to vote along party lines in exchange for campaign contributions [4].This does not particularly hold true for mass donors of political campaigns. A single donor who is polarized but contributes large sums does not seem to usually drive a politician toward political extremes. [5] Political actors occasionally and opportunistically benefit from higher polarized environments. [6] During the early 1990s, The Republican Party, according to Mann and Ornstein, used polarizing tactics to become the majority party in the House of Representatives. This indicates that polarization can be used to gain power in a representative body. The tactics employed mainly drew distinctions between the majority party for most of the past half century (Democrats) and the to-be majority party from 1992-1994 (the Republicans) [7]. Other theories support the model showing that politicians who cater to more extreme groups of their party tend to see victories while simultaneously pulling their constituency toward a polar extreme. [8] A study by Nicholson found that contentious statements by party leaders tend to affect polarization of the opposing party more than their own voters. This gives power to party leaders and politicians of high status in their party. [9] In relevance to multiparty systems, Sartori (1976) claimed that the splitting of ideologies in the public constituency causes further divides within the political parties of the country. He theorized that the extremism of public ideological movement is the basis for the creation of a highly polarized multiparty system. Sartori named this polarizing phenomenon polarized pluralism and claimed it would lead to further polarization in many opposing directions over policy issues. [10]

The Public

[edit]

In democratic and other representative governments, the citizens vote for the political actors whom will represent them. The role of public ideology is associated to the preference for candidates and influences the ideological voices heard in the government. [11][12] For example, voters who identify as Republican are mre likely to vote for a strongly evangelical candidate than Democrat voters. [13] A study by Dixit and Weibull (2007) claims that there is a link between public differences in ideology and polarization of representatives. It indicates that this increase in preference differences is usually temporary and will usually meet at a point of compromise. The study also suggests that political polarization is a natural and regular phenomenon. [14] Fiorina’s hypothesis that polarization is a phenomenon which does not hold for the public but rather is formulated by commentators to draw further division in government. [15] This hypothesis, according to “Why Can’t We All Just Get Along? The Reality of a Polarized America” (2005) and “Is Polarization a Myth?” (2008) by Abramowitz and Saunders, is not supported. Studies indicate that cultural differences focusing on ideological movements and geographical polarization within the United States constituency has correlated with rises in overall political polarization between 1972 to 2004. [16][17] According to Layman et. al 2005, the ideological split between U.S. Republicans and Democrats also crosses into the religious cultural divide. They claim that Democrats have become, generally, more moderate in religious views whereas Republicans have become more traditionalist. This correlates with the rise in polarization in the United States. [18] Another theory on this specific phenomenon contends that religion does not contribute to full-group polarization but rather coalition and party activist polarization causing party shifts toward a political extreme within the larger group. [19][20]

Redistricting

[edit]

Redistricting, also known as gerrymandering, has been linked to the rise in polarization. [21] The practice of redistricting could give those who make the districts unequal advantages by placing large like-minded groups in districts whose votes will outweigh the smaller opponent groups, creating partisan polarization. [22] This confers upon a more extreme candidate, according to Carson et. al 2007, more power as the makeup of the voting block shifts in the direction of a polar extreme. However, the effect was modest when analyzed over multiple election cycles and in the United States as a whole. [23] In shorter term analysis, the use of this tactic correlated with the rise in partisanship in the United States House of Representatives between 1992 to 1994. [24] [25] Many theories concur that the redistricting practices have not affected political polarization a great deal. The effect is enough to be measured but over broad areas and time periods the effect of gerrymandering on polarization is minimized. [26][27]

The Media

[edit]

The mass media has increased as an institution over the past half-century. This, as particularly studied within the past three decades, has affected the viewers as previously less partisan viewers are given more polarized news media choices. According to Hollander, the mass media’s current, fragmented, high-choice environment has induced a movement of the audience from more even-toned political programming to less-friendly, more one-sided broadcasts and articles. The audiences of these programs also are composed of partisan viewers who watch polarized programming as a self-confirmatory source for their ideologies. [28] [29] Countries with less diversified but emerging media markets, such as China and South Korea have also seen a polarizing impact due to the diversification in political media. [30][31]

  1. ^ Ura, Joseph Daniel, and Christopher R. Ellis. "Partisan Moods: Polarization And The Dynamics Of Mass Party Preferences." Journal Of Politics 74.1 (2012): 277-291. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  2. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  3. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." The Journal of Politics 60.3 (1998): 634-52. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647642>.
  4. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  5. ^ La Raja, Raymond J., and David L. Wiltse. "Don’t Blame Donors For Ideological Polarization Of Political Parties: Ideological Change And Stability Among Political Contributors, 1972-2008." American Politics Research 40.3 (2012): 501-530. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  6. ^ Beniers, K. J., & Dur, R. (2007). Politicians' motivation, political culture, and electoral competition. International Tax and Public Finance, 14(1), 29-54. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10797-006-8878-y
  7. ^ Mann, Thomas E., and Norman J. Ornstein. It's Even Worse Than It Looks. New York: Basic Books, 2012. Print.
  8. ^ Hirano, Shigeo, Jr., James M. Snyder, and Michael M. Ting. "Distributive Politics With Primaries." Journal Of Politics 71.4 (2009): 1467-1480. Academic Search Premier. Web. 10 Apr. 2013.
  9. ^ Nicholson, Stephen P. "Polarizing Cues." American Journal Of Political Science 56.1 (2012): 52-66. Academic Search Premier. Web. 10 Apr. 2013
  10. ^ Johnston, R. (2008). Polarized pluralism in the canadian party system: Presidential address to the canadian political science association, june 5, 2008. Canadian Journal of Political Science, 41(4), 815-834. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423908081110
  11. ^ Garner, A., & Palmer, H. (2011). Polarization and issue consistency over time. Political Behavior, 33(2), 225-246. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11109-010-9136-7
  12. ^ Mason, Lilliana (01/01/2013). "The Rise of Uncivil Agreement: Issue Versus Behavioral Polarization in the American Electorate". The American behavioral scientist (Beverly Hills)(0002-7642), 57 (1), p. 140.
  13. ^ Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and Geoffrey C. Layman. "The Party Faithful: Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, And The Electoral Impact Of Party Identification." American Journal Of Political Science 55.1 (2011): 42-58. Academic Search Premier. Web. 11 Apr. 2013.
  14. ^ Dixit, Avinash, and Jorgen Weibull. "Political polarization." Political Sciences 104.18 (2007): 7351-56. Web. 5 Apr. 2013. <http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1863477/>.
  15. ^ Fiorina, Morris, Samuel Abrams, and Jeremy Pope. "POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC: MISCONCEPTIONS AND MISREADINGS." (2008): 1-16. Web. 11 Apr. 2013. <http://sitemason.vanderbilt.edu/files/cARwUU/Fiorina.pdf>.
  16. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Why Can't We All Just Get Along?" The Berkeley Electronic Press (2005): 1-22. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~govt/docs/Abramowitz.pdf>.
  17. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Is Polarization a Myth?" The Journal of Politics 70.2: 542-55. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <doi:10.1017/S0022381608080493>.
  18. ^ Layman, Geoffrey, and John Green. "Wars and Rumours of Wars: The Contexts of Cultural Conflict in American Political Behaviour." British Journal of Political Science 36.1 (2006): 61-89. Web. 3 Apr. 2013. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123406000044>.
  19. ^ Brooks, Clem, and Jeff Manza. "A GREAT DIVIDE? Religion and Political Change in U.S. National Elections, 1972-2000."The Sociological Quarterly 45.3 (2004): 421-50. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://sociology.fas.nyu.edu/docs/IO/3858/A_Great_Divide.pdf>.
  20. ^ Abramowitz, Alan, and Kyle Saunders. "Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate." The Journal of Politics 60.3 (1998): 634-52. Web. 4 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2647642>.
  21. ^ Yoshinaka, A., & Murphy, C. (2011). The paradox of redistricting: How partisan mapmakers foster competition but disrupt representation. Political Research Quarterly, 64(2), 435-447. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/873115158?accountid=10141
  22. ^ Thompson, D. F. (2004). Election time: Normative implications of temporal properties of the electoral process in the united states. The American Political Science Review, 98(1), 51-64. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/214415207?accountid=10141
  23. ^ Carson, J. L., Crespin, M. H., Finocchiaro, C. J., & Rohde, D. W. (2007). Redistricting and party polarization in the U.S. house of representatives. American Politics Research, 35(6), 878-904. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1532673X07304263
  24. ^ McKee, S. C. (2008). The effects of redistricting on voting behavior in incumbent U.S. house elections, 1992-1994. Political Research Quarterly, 61(1), 122-133. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/215329960?accountid=10141
  25. ^ Kousser, J. (1996). Estimating the partisan consequences of redistricting plans - simply. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 21(4), 521-541. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/60821189?accountid=10141
  26. ^ McCarty, Nolan, Keith Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. "Does Gerrymandering Cause Polarization?" Amer. Journal of Political Science 53.3 (2009): 666-80. Web. 7 Apr. 2013. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25548144>.
  27. ^ Masket, S. E., Winburn, J., & Wright, G. C. (2012). The gerrymanderers are coming! legislative redistricting won't affect competition or polarization much, no matter who does it. PS: Political Science & Politics, 45(1), 39-43. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1049096511001703
  28. ^ Hollander, B. A. (2008). Tuning out or tuning elsewhere? partisanship, polarization, and media migration from 1998 to 2006. Journalism and Mass Communication Quarterly, 85(1), 23-40. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/216934569?accountid=10141
  29. ^ Hetherington, M. J. (2009). Review article: Putting polarization in perspective. British Journal of Political Science, 39(2), 413-448. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0007123408000501
  30. ^ Yuan, E. J. (2007). The new multi-channel media environment in china: Diversity of exposure in television viewing.Northwestern University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, , 124-124 p. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/304832638?accountid=10141. (304832638).
  31. ^ Kim, S. J. (2011). Emerging patterns of news media use across multiple platforms and their political implications in south korea.Northwestern University). ProQuest Dissertations and Theses, , 189. Retrieved from http://search.proquest.com/docview/873972899?accountid=10141. (873972899).
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