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The United States Response to Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea

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The United States has been actively engaged in addressing the South China Sea dispute, recognizing its implications not only for regional military balances but also for international peace and stability.

China's assertive actions in the South China Sea, including its claim of "indisputable sovereignty" over islands and adjacent waters, have led to growing friction with Vietnam and have affected U.S. strategic and commercial interests.[1][2] According to the Congressional Research Service, China's depiction of its claims using a "nine-dash line" on maps has caused ambiguity and has not been definitively explained.[1] This has raised concerns among the United States and other nations regarding China's intentions.[1]

In response to these challenges, the United States has emphasized its right to freedom of navigation and has taken steps to protect its interests and ensure freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.[1] The U.S. Congress has passed legislation aimed at countering China's coercive and intimidating tactics, including in the South China Sea.[1]Furthermore, the United States has sought to develop a strategic partnership with Vietnam as a response to Chinese actions and to strengthen regional cooperation.[2]

The United States maintains a multifaceted standpoint in the territorial disputes of the South China Sea. While avoiding direct involvement in sovereignty claims, the U.S. seeks to defend its homeland and allies, promote democracy and human rights, protect global trading and financial systems, and preserve its strategic and commercial interests in the region.[3]

The United States' stance and motivations regarding the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have been shaped by various factors, including its longstanding position of non-interference in sovereignty claims, its military interests, economic considerations, and the need to protect its strategic and commercial interests.[3][4]

The US’ Interest in the South China Sea

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Historically, the United States has avoided entangling itself in competing claims of sovereignty in East Asia by refraining from voicing opinions on the merits of such claims.[4] Nonetheless, the US consider the Asia-Pacific region's maritime domain as a realm that has held significant importance and in 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense released an Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, with significant emphasis on the South China Sea.[5]

From a military standpoint, the defense of the homeland and its allies has been the paramount interest of the United States.[3] As the dominant naval power in the world since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. has maintained a high degree of freedom of action in international waters and airspace.[3] However, Chinas claims in the South China Sea have posed challenges to this freedom, prompting concerns in Washington.[3]

Economically, the United States has conducted more trade with Asia than with Europe for decades.[3] Recognizing the importance of the Asia-Pacific region, the U.S. has built a network of free trade agreements and established extensive trade routes across the Pacific Ocean.[3] The South China Sea, being one of the world's busiest waterways, plays a critical role in facilitating trade. Approximately $3.4 trillion in ship-borne commerce, with an estimated $1.2 trillion being US-bound trade including energy supplies to U.S. treaty allies Japan and South Korea, transits the sea each year.[1][6] Additionally, the South China Sea possesses significant reserves of oil and natural gas, as well as abundant undersea resources such as fish stocks and coral reefs.[1]

American Policy and Statements on the South China Sea

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The territorial dispute has been an issue for the US during since the 1990’s and has been addressed by multiple U.S. Administrations, i.e., Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, Barack Obama, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden. While the governments have had slight differentiations in their approach to the South China Sea conflict, the United States’ objectives in and policy regarding the South China Sea (SCS) have undergone minimal alterations. The primary goals of Washington remain consistent, which include maintaining peace, facilitating uninterrupted trade in the region, preventing the emergence of a dominant regional power, and safeguarding its own freedom to operate in the area, predominantly by upholding the principles of Freedom of the Seas.[6][7]

Before the Obama Administration (Clinton & Bush Administration, 1993-2009)

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The United States' involvement in the South China Sea (SCS) dispute began to take shape in 1995, following the People's Republic of China's (PRC) occupation of Mischief Reef the previous year.[6] The Clinton administration, in response to this event, announced a set of principles that have largely guided its approach to the region since then.[6] These principles include advocating for peaceful dispute resolution, maintaining peace and stability, preserving freedom of navigation (FON), remaining neutral on the question of sovereignty, and rejecting acts that violate the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).[6] Although the US acknowledges and abides by most provisions of the UNCLOS, it rejects the EEZ provisions.[6]

During the early months of George W. Bush's presidency in April 2001, the first significant confrontation between the US and the PRC occurred.[8] A Chinese fighter collided with a US intelligence gathering aircraft off the coast of Hainan Island, resulting in the detention of the US aircrew for ten days.[8] The Chinese also seized and examined the aircraft, extracting its surveillance equipment and intelligence.[8]

During a meeting between President George W. Bush and Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, the United States expressed support for Vietnam's national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, which was interpreted as encompassing the South China Sea.[2] This statement aligned with remarks made by former US Defense Secretary Robert Gates in Singapore, emphasizing the need for actions in Asia that are not perceived as pressure tactics but rather cooperative endeavors.[9]

Before the Obama administration, Southeast Asia, including the South China Sea, was a region that held some importance but was not considered vitally significant.[4] The eight years of the Bush administration saw limited attention to the region, with terrorism being a primary concern.[4] The Obama administration sought to address this neglect through its rebalance strategy, which aimed to prioritize Southeast Asia and the SCS.[4]

The Obama Administration, 2009-2017

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The United States' response to the South China Sea (SCS) dispute during the Obama administration was characterized by a combination of diplomacy and increased military presence.[4] The primary objective of the US was to promote rules-based stability in the region, safeguard freedom of navigation, and ensure peace and security.[10] While the US maintained neutrality on sovereignty claims, it actively opposed assertive behavior and coercion.[4][10]

The US actively engaged in diplomatic efforts to address the SCS dispute. In a notable speech delivered by former Deputy Secretary of State James B. Steinberg in September 2009, the issue of the security dilemma was explicitly highlighted as a key challenge in U.S-China relations, marking the most prominent official acknowledgement of this matter thus far.[3] At the July 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting in Hanoi, Secretary Clinton openly engaged the United States in the matter of the South China Sea issue.[4] Here, in response to the growing tensions in the region during the late 2000s, the Obama administration introduced four additional principles to the US stance in 2011.[11] These principles included resolving disputes without coercion, upholding democratic principles outlined in a 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties between the PRC and ASEAN, supporting the development of a comprehensive Code of Conduct (COC), and emphasizing that sovereignty claims should be based on legitimate land claims.[11] In the speech, Clinton expressed willingness to facilitate multilateral discussions on the disputed territories.[11] She stated that the US oppose any use of threats of force or coercion to resolve the conflict in the south China Sea and clarified that: “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia’s maritime commons and respect for international law in the South China Sea”.[11] This engagement demonstrated the US's commitment to remain a serious strategic player in East Asia and its interest in promoting peace and stability in the region.[11]

The Obama administration recognized the importance of maintaining peace, stability, and respect for international law in the South China Sea.[10] In August 2012, the U.S. Department of State issued a public statement emphasizing freedom of navigation, unimpeded lawful commerce, and the resolution of disputes through collaborative and diplomatic means.[10] The statement expressed concern over escalating tensions and emphasized the need to prevent the use of force or intimidation.[10] The US also underslined it’s active support of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in its efforts to develop a Code of Conduct (COC) for the South China Sea.[10] Consultations and diplomatic solutions were pursued to reinforce regional stability and engagement.[10]

In 2013, the Philippines sought arbitration under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding China's actions in the SCS.[1] In 2016, an UNCLOS arbitral tribunal ruled that China's "nine-dash line" claim had no legal basis and highlighted violations of Philippine sovereign rights.[1] The US urged China and the Philippines to abide by the ruling, emphasizing the binding nature of UNCLOS decisions.[1] However, China declared the ruling "null and void."[1] The United States reaffirmed its commitment to defend its treaty ally, the Philippines, in reference to the Scarborough Shoal incident.[12] Secretary of State Clinton restated the importance of the 1951 treaty, demonstrating support for the Philippines in its altercation with China.[12]

The US's increased interest in the SCS was part of the broader Asia-Pacific rebalancing strategy initiated by the Obama administration.[13] This strategy aimed to strengthen US economic and security ties with Southeast Asia and demonstrate that the US remained a significant power in the region.[12] The US emphasized its vital economic interests, including secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs) and free trade, while upholding international maritime laws and norms.[12]

The Trump Administration, 2017-2021

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On February 10, 2017, while in Japan, President Trump issued his first statement specifically addressing the South China Sea (SCS).[6] He emphasized the importance of upholding a maritime order founded on international law, which encompasses freedom of navigation, overflight, and lawful utilization of the sea.[6] The President expressed along with Japan that the US would “oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion, or force”.[6] He called upon the relevant countries to refrain from actions that could escalate tensions in the SCS.[6]

Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo stated in a press statement in July 2020, that the administration saw to strengthen the US policy regarding the South China Sea.[14] The Trump administration strongly condemned Beijing's claims to offshore resources across most of the South China Sea as unlawful and its campaign of bullying to control them.[14] They rejected China's "Nine-Dashed Line" claim, emphasizing that it had no coherent legal basis.[14] In a unanimous decision in 2016, an Arbitral Tribunal constituted under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention rejected China's maritime claims as having no basis in international law.[14] The Trump administration aimed to align the U.S. position on China's maritime claims with the Tribunal's decision.[14] It asserted that China had no lawful territorial or maritime claim in areas found to be in the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) or on its continental shelf.[14] The administration opposed China's harassment of Philippine fisheries and offshore energy development in those areas, considering it unlawful.[14] Similarly, the U.S. rejected China's claims to waters beyond a 12-nautical mile territorial sea derived from islands it claims in the Spratly Islands, including Vanguard Bank, Luconia Shoals, waters in Brunei's EEZ, and Natuna Besar. Any Chinese action to harass other states' fishing or hydrocarbon development in these waters was deemed unlawful.[14]

The Trump administration took a firm stance on the inviolability of the principle of freedom of navigation and the protection of the global commons.[3] While emphasizing subsets of "freedom of the seas" such as freedom of navigation and overflight, the U.S. sought to remain neutral on the competing claims of rival states in the South China Sea.[3] However, it insisted on abiding by international law, despite not having ratified the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) itself.[3]

In addition to diplomatic statements, the Trump administration reinforced its approach through doctrine publications.[6] The National Security Strategy (NSS) released in December 2017 accused China of violating its neighbors' sovereignty, restricting free trade, and threatening regional stability.[15] The administration sought sustained U.S. leadership in a collective response to uphold a regional order respectful of sovereignty and independence.[16]

To deter China's activities that might alter the status quo balance of power in the region, the Trump administration imposed penalties on Beijing and expressed concerns about its actions.[17] It publicly criticized Chinese activity in the South China Sea, including the installation of area access denial weapons.[6] The administration rescinded China's invitation to participate in the regional Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) naval exercise and stated that the U.S. Navy would continue to exercise freedom of navigation in the region.[6]

The Biden Administration, 2021-currently

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During the Biden administration the United States have made it clear that it does not have any territorial claims in the South China Sea and takes no position on the sovereignty of the geographic features in the region.[1] However, the US consistently urged that disputes be settled without coercion and in accordance with international law.[1] The Congressional Research Service articulated that the US-China disagreement on the interpretation of international law regarding the rights of foreign militaries to operate in a country's territorial sea or Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) remained a point of contention between the two nations.[1]

During the Biden administration in 2023, the United States and the Philippines introduced new guidelines to a 1951 defense treaty that outlined how the US would respond to an attack on the Philippines in the South China Sea.[18] These guidelines, established after Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos' visit to the White House, affirmed the US commitment to defend Manila and extended that commitment to the maritime region where territorial incursions by Chinese ships had been a concern.[18] Any attack on Philippine public vessels, aircraft, or armed forces, including the coast guard, would invoke mutual defense commitments between the United States and the Philippines.[18] The new guidelines recognized that threats in the South China Sea may manifest in various forms, including asymmetric, hybrid, and irregular warfare, as well as gray-zone tactics, such as employing non-naval vessels like fishing boats as an informal maritime militia.[18] While not specifically naming China, these guidelines addressed concerns over the use of gray-zone tactics to claim sovereignty in the South China Sea.[18]

President Joe Biden reaffirmed the United States' unwavering commitment to defending the Philippines, including its interests in the South China Sea.[18] His clear language during discussions with President Marcos demonstrated a strong alignment between the two leaders and enhanced the concrete nature of the commitments, particularly compared to the previous administration.[18]

US actions in the South China Sea

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The following is a timeline of some of the official US actions in and regarding the territorial dispute in the South China Sea:

Timeline

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In February 2009, secretary of State Hillary Clinton visits the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) secretariat, and the United States accedes to ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, marking a focus on Southeast Asia and strengthening US-ASEAN relations.[4]

In February and March 2009, the US dispatches the USNS Impeccable to conduct military scientific research related to Chinese submarine activity operating from Yulin Naval Base.[19] The mission encounters incidents with Chinese vessels, including crossings, harassment, and attempts to obstruct the US ship.[19]

In July 2010, secretary of State Hillary Clinton articulates US policy toward the South China Sea at the ASEAN Regional Forum Ministerial Meeting in Hanoi, implicitly criticizing Chinese actions.[20] This leads to a diplomatic face-off between the US and China, with China reacting angrily.[20]

In Autumn 2011, secretary Clinton publishes an article titled "America's Pacific Century," outlining the Obama administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, which includes a pivot or rebalance toward Asia.[4] The strategy emphasizes diplomatic, economic, budgetary, and security-related initiatives, with a focus on Southeast Asia and increasing US presence in the region.[21] To support its strategic objectives, the Obama administration increased military presence and security cooperation in the SCS region. This included rotational deployments, more frequent port visits, and improved military-to-military engagements and training exercises with countries such as the Philippines, Vietnam, and Singapore.[21] The US also focused on building stronger security relationships and enhancing partner capacity to ensure regional stability and security.[21]

In November 2012, National Security Advisor Tom Donilon articulates the US strategy, which includes strengthening relationships with ASEAN, supporting the development of a South China Sea code of conduct, and increasing military presence and capability in the region.[22] To ensure regional stability and address security concerns, the United States enhanced its military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Measures included building up Guam as a strategic hub, basing littoral combat ships in Singapore, developing maritime security partnerships, and eventually positioning 60 percent of the US Navy fleet in the Pacific.[22] These actions aimed to strengthen partnerships, reinforce the rules-based order, and maintain security along key sea lanes of communication.[22]

In August 2015 the US Department of Defense issues the Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy, with significant focus on the South China Sea.[5]

In May 2015, the Pentagon begins a program to help partners, specifically Vietnam and the Philippines, increase their capability to perform maritime patrols in disputed waters.[6]

In 2016, under the security assistance program known as the Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative, authorized by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016, the United States aimed to enhance the capabilities of regional countries in terms of maritime domain awareness and patrolling their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).[1] This program has seen modifications and expansions in subsequent NDAAs for FYs 2017, 2019, 2022, and 2023, reflecting the ongoing commitment of the US government to support its regional partners.[1]

In Spring 2018, the United States incorporated economics into its response to the People's Republic of China.[6] The initiation of a trade war focused on increasing US exports to China and revitalizing domestic industries was seen as a strategy to address economic imbalances and restore competitiveness.[16]

In 2020, the US Department of Commerce added several People's Republic of China (PRC) construction, energy, and shipbuilding companies involved in the South China Sea to its Entity List.[1] This addition meant that US companies were barred from exporting to these firms without a government license, emphasizing the US government's intent to restrict certain business activities that could contribute to tensions in the region.[1]

In May 2022, The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, consisting of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India, announced an initiative to improve maritime domain awareness throughout the Indo-Pacific, including the South China Sea.[1] This dialogue highlighted the commitment of the participating countries to address shared security challenges and promote a free and open Indo-Pacific region.[1]

In August 2022, Secretary of State Antony Blinken reassured the incoming Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. of the United States' commitment to the United States-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.[1] Secretary Blinken stated that the United States would assist Philippine forces in the event of a South China Sea contingency, reaffirming the US stance on supporting its allies in the region.[1]

2015-ongoing: The US conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea, challenging excessive maritime claims and demonstrating non-consent.[3][6] These operations involve US Navy ships entering the 12 nautical mile limit around Chinese-held islands, asserting the US denial of Chinese claims on the reefs and islands.[3][6] The US Navy and Air Force maintain an ongoing presence in the South China Sea, conducting FONOPs and bomber missions, respectively, while China conducts military patrols and training in the region.[1]

References

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  1. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w Congressional Research Service. (2022). China Primer: South China Sea disputes. Congressional Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42784
  2. ^ a b c Thayer, C. A. (2010). The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea. Security Challenges, 6(2): 69-84. The United States and Chinese Assertiveness in the South China Sea on JSTOR
  3. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m Scobell, A. (2016). “The South China Sea and U.S.-China rivalry”. Political Science Quarterly, 131(3): pp. 497-523.
  4. ^ a b c d e f g h i j McDevitt, M. (2013). The South China Sea and U.S. policy options. The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy, 35(4), pp. 175-187. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10803920.2013.817923
  5. ^ a b U.S. Department of Defense. (2015). The Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/NDAA%20A-P_Maritime_SecuritY_Strategy-08142015-1300-FINALFORMAT.PDF
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q Callahan, John. (2021). “The United States and the South China Sea Question”. In Security, Strategy, and Military Dynamics in South China Sea, edited by Gordon Houlden, Scott N. Romaniuk & Nong Hong. Bristol University Press. 235-249.
  7. ^ Congressional Research Service. (2017) South China Sea Disputes: Background and US Policy. Washington DC. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10607/4
  8. ^ a b c Allison, Graham. (2017). “Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?” New York, Mariner Books.
  9. ^ Gray, Andrew. (2008). “Pentagon chief says U.S. will remain Asian power”. Reuters. Accessed 28th of May 2023. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-defence-asia-gates-idUSSP27470420080531
  10. ^ a b c d e f g Crook, J. R. (2012). “Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law”. American Journal of International Law. 106(4), pp. 843-884.
  11. ^ a b c d e Clinton, Hillary. (2010).  “Remarks at Press Availability.” July 23, 2010, Hanoi, Vietnam. https://2009 2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/07/145095.htm
  12. ^ a b c d Steffens, A. W. (2013). Scramble in the South China Sea: Regional Conflict and US Strategy. Strategic Studies Quarterly, 7(3), pp. 88-107. Scramble in the South China Sea Regional Conflict and US Strategy on JSTOR
  13. ^ Manvin, Mark E. et al. (2012). ”Pivot to the Pacific? The Obama Administration’s “Rebalancing” Toward Asia.” CRS Report for Congress R42448. Washington: CRS, 28 March 2012. https://sgp.fas.org/crs/natsec/R42448.pdf
  14. ^ a b c d e f g h Pompeo, M. R. (2020). “U.S. Position on Maritime Claims in the South China Sea.” Press statement, 13th of July. U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/u-s-position-on-maritime-claims-in-the-south-china-sea/
  15. ^ The White House. (2017). “National Security Strategy of the United States of America”. Washington. https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf
  16. ^ a b Swanson, Ana. (2018). “Trumps Trade War with China is Officially Underway”. The New York Times. Accessed on 28th of May 223.  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/05/business/china-us-trade-war-trump-tariffs.html
  17. ^ Sevastopulo, Demetri & Hill, Kathrin. “US Warns China on Aggressive Acts by Fishing Boats and Coast Guard.” The Financial Times. Accessed on 285h of May 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/ab4b1602-696a-11e9-80c7-60ee53e6681d
  18. ^ a b c d e f g Zhang, Adrianna. (2023). “US, Philippines Issue New South China Sea Defense Guidelines.” VOA News. Acessed 28th of May 2023. https://www.voanews.com/a/us-philippines-issue-new-south-china-sea-defense-guidelines/7079809.html
  19. ^ a b Valencia, Mark. (2009). “The Impeccable Incident: Truth and Consequences.” China Security, vol. 5(2): 22-8. https://www.yumpu.com/en/document/view/11777537/the-impeccable-incident-truth-and-consequences-china-security
  20. ^ a b Pomfret, John. (2010). “U.S. Takes a Tougher Tone with China,” Washington Post, 30 July 2010.
  21. ^ a b c Clinton, Hilary. (2011). “America’s Pacific Century.” Foreign Policy. Accessed on 28th of May 2023. https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/
  22. ^ a b c The White House. (2012). “Remarks by National Security Advisor Tom Donilon—As Prepared for Delivery.” Office of the Press Secretary, 15 November 2012, www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/11/15/remarks-national-security-advisor-tom-donilon-prepared-delivery.
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