US5790665A - Anonymous information retrieval system (ARS) - Google Patents
Anonymous information retrieval system (ARS) Download PDFInfo
- Publication number
- US5790665A US5790665A US08/785,524 US78552497A US5790665A US 5790665 A US5790665 A US 5790665A US 78552497 A US78552497 A US 78552497A US 5790665 A US5790665 A US 5790665A
- Authority
- US
- United States
- Prior art keywords
- database
- encrypted
- entity
- item
- requesting user
- Prior art date
- Legal status (The legal status is an assumption and is not a legal conclusion. Google has not performed a legal analysis and makes no representation as to the accuracy of the status listed.)
- Expired - Fee Related
Links
Classifications
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/606—Protecting data by securing the transmission between two devices or processes
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F21/00—Security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F21/60—Protecting data
- G06F21/62—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules
- G06F21/6218—Protecting access to data via a platform, e.g. using keys or access control rules to a system of files or objects, e.g. local or distributed file system or database
- G06F21/6245—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes
- G06F21/6254—Protecting personal data, e.g. for financial or medical purposes by anonymising data, e.g. decorrelating personal data from the owner's identification
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06Q—INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY [ICT] SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES; SYSTEMS OR METHODS SPECIALLY ADAPTED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE, COMMERCIAL, FINANCIAL, MANAGERIAL OR SUPERVISORY PURPOSES, NOT OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR
- G06Q20/00—Payment architectures, schemes or protocols
- G06Q20/38—Payment protocols; Details thereof
- G06Q20/383—Anonymous user system
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2211/00—Indexing scheme relating to details of data-processing equipment not covered by groups G06F3/00 - G06F13/00
- G06F2211/007—Encryption, En-/decode, En-/decipher, En-/decypher, Scramble, (De-)compress
-
- G—PHYSICS
- G06—COMPUTING; CALCULATING OR COUNTING
- G06F—ELECTRIC DIGITAL DATA PROCESSING
- G06F2221/00—Indexing scheme relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/21—Indexing scheme relating to G06F21/00 and subgroups addressing additional information or applications relating to security arrangements for protecting computers, components thereof, programs or data against unauthorised activity
- G06F2221/2107—File encryption
Definitions
- This invention relates to information retrieval methods and systems, and more particularly to a technique for anonymous retrieval of data from a database.
- their method requires that the user also asks about "fake items" (i.e., items he is not interested in), thus causing the amount of transmitted bits to increase considerably.
- Their method (1) makes use of a plurality of databases, each containing the same items; (2) identifies the user to each of the databases; but (3) hides from each database the item he really is interested in.
- the present invention presents a different solution to a different problem, although still related to providing privacy to database access.
- the method (1) makes use of a single database, (2) hides the identity of the requesting user from the database, but (3) does not hide the requested item from the database.
- the method generates only a single request and does not cause the amount of transmitted bits to increase by a multiplicative factor (rather there is a small overhead due to special routing information).
- the method preferably comprises sending a query to the database by means of an anonymous message with an anonymous return receipt, (e.g., like in a method of Chaum) except that the return receipt is actually substituted with or includes the item requested.
- an anonymous return receipt e.g., like in a method of Chaum
- the method preferably uses two trusted entities, although more can be added.
- the user sends his item-request to the database as follows.
- the user encrypts with the database's key the following data: the item-request; the user's own address encrypted with the first entity's key (as a return address); and an ordinary key chosen by the user.
- This encrypted triple and the identity of the database (as the addressee information, in case the two entities are not specialized in communications among users and a fixed database) is then encrypted with the key of the second entity.
- the resulting encryption is then sent by the user to the first entity (preferably, after further encrypting it with the first entity's key).
- the first entity takes away its own encryption layer (if any), and causes the resulting data to be received by the second entity.
- the second entity then retrieves the addressee information and sends the database the encrypted "triple" comprising (a) the item-request, (b) the encrypted return address, and (c) the ordinary key. (This triple can be further encrypted with a key of the database if desired).
- the database retrieves the item requested, the encrypted return address, and the key. Then, it fetches the requested item and encrypts it with the received key. It then sends the encrypted item and the received encrypted return address to the second entity (preferably, encrypting this transmission with the second entity's key).
- the encrypted item then reaches the user in a similar (but backward) manner.
- the user then uses the chosen ordinary key for decrypting the item requested.
- the database preferably no one except the user and the database knows what the item-request and the item itself are. However, the database preferably does not know who the requesting user is. The database always gets its requests through (e.g.) the second entity.
- Measures can be taken to defeat traffic analysis, or making it less effective. (In particular, further encryption with a party's key, preferably probabilistic, may be quite effective to this end.)
- Public key encryption can be used instead of ordinary one, and vice versa. Some of the encryption layers or a more sparing use of encryption can be made; for instance if complex, indirect, traffic analysis is not as feared as a direct traffic analysis.
- Digital signatures can be used within the method, and so on. The user can pay the entities on a subscription basis, so that his identity is not linked to a given item-request. Alternatively, the user can pay the first entity, who knows how much data was shipped from and to the user, according to his usage of the system.
- the first entity can then pay the second one and/or the database if so wanted.
- the encrypted return address may not be delivered to the addressee but rather left with the second entity.
- the encrypted item requested is forwarded or is caused to be received together with the encrypted return address by the first entity who will then send the encrypted item requested to the requesting user.
- the encrypted return address is not encrypted together with the item-request and the ordinary key. Rather, it is sent to the second entity separately or encrypted together with the addressee information.
- no encrypted return address is used. Rather, when the first entity receives the initial communication from the requesting user this communication is associated with a label and is forwarded to the second entity together with the label.
- the second entity receives from the database the encrypted requested item, it sends it to the first entity together with the label.
- the first entity can, from the label, determine to which user should the encrypted requested item be forwarded.
- this method extends to work with more entities rather than two entities or with auxiliary entities between the first entity and the second entity and/or between the requesting user and the first entity and/or between the second entity and the database.
- each entity could use its own labels for routing backwards the encrypted requested item to the requesting user.
- the requested item may not be encrypted and yet the identity of the requesting user may be hidden from the database.
- the return routing can occur still via the first entity first and then the second entity. In this case, however, the encryption of the return address should be prepared differently.
Landscapes
- Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Theoretical Computer Science (AREA)
- Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Bioethics (AREA)
- General Health & Medical Sciences (AREA)
- Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- General Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Physics & Mathematics (AREA)
- Software Systems (AREA)
- Computer Security & Cryptography (AREA)
- General Engineering & Computer Science (AREA)
- Computer Hardware Design (AREA)
- Accounting & Taxation (AREA)
- Databases & Information Systems (AREA)
- Medical Informatics (AREA)
- Finance (AREA)
- Strategic Management (AREA)
- General Business, Economics & Management (AREA)
- Storage Device Security (AREA)
Abstract
An information retrieval system in which data is retrieved anonymously by a user with the assistance of one or more trusted agents.
Description
The present application is based on provisional application No. 60/010,119 filed Jan. 17, 1996 and entitled "Anonymous Information Retrieval System (ARS)."
This invention relates to information retrieval methods and systems, and more particularly to a technique for anonymous retrieval of data from a database.
It is known in the art to provide a method enabling a user to query two or more databases (containing the same items) so that he could retrieve the item he wanted without letting a single database know which item he actually retrieved.
In sum, their method requires that the user also asks about "fake items" (i.e., items he is not interested in), thus causing the amount of transmitted bits to increase considerably. Their method (1) makes use of a plurality of databases, each containing the same items; (2) identifies the user to each of the databases; but (3) hides from each database the item he really is interested in.
The present invention presents a different solution to a different problem, although still related to providing privacy to database access.
The method (1) makes use of a single database, (2) hides the identity of the requesting user from the database, but (3) does not hide the requested item from the database. The method generates only a single request and does not cause the amount of transmitted bits to increase by a multiplicative factor (rather there is a small overhead due to special routing information).
Briefly described, the method preferably comprises sending a query to the database by means of an anonymous message with an anonymous return receipt, (e.g., like in a method of Chaum) except that the return receipt is actually substituted with or includes the item requested.
The method preferably uses two trusted entities, although more can be added. Preferably the user sends his item-request to the database as follows. The user encrypts with the database's key the following data: the item-request; the user's own address encrypted with the first entity's key (as a return address); and an ordinary key chosen by the user. This encrypted triple and the identity of the database (as the addressee information, in case the two entities are not specialized in communications among users and a fixed database) is then encrypted with the key of the second entity. The resulting encryption is then sent by the user to the first entity (preferably, after further encrypting it with the first entity's key).
The first entity takes away its own encryption layer (if any), and causes the resulting data to be received by the second entity.
The second entity then retrieves the addressee information and sends the database the encrypted "triple" comprising (a) the item-request, (b) the encrypted return address, and (c) the ordinary key. (This triple can be further encrypted with a key of the database if desired).
The database retrieves the item requested, the encrypted return address, and the key. Then, it fetches the requested item and encrypts it with the received key. It then sends the encrypted item and the received encrypted return address to the second entity (preferably, encrypting this transmission with the second entity's key).
The encrypted item then reaches the user in a similar (but backward) manner. The user then uses the chosen ordinary key for decrypting the item requested.
Thus, preferably no one except the user and the database knows what the item-request and the item itself are. However, the database preferably does not know who the requesting user is. The database always gets its requests through (e.g.) the second entity.
Measures can be taken to defeat traffic analysis, or making it less effective. (In particular, further encryption with a party's key, preferably probabilistic, may be quite effective to this end.) Public key encryption can be used instead of ordinary one, and vice versa. Some of the encryption layers or a more sparing use of encryption can be made; for instance if complex, indirect, traffic analysis is not as feared as a direct traffic analysis. Digital signatures can be used within the method, and so on. The user can pay the entities on a subscription basis, so that his identity is not linked to a given item-request. Alternatively, the user can pay the first entity, who knows how much data was shipped from and to the user, according to his usage of the system. The first entity can then pay the second one and/or the database if so wanted. The encrypted return address may not be delivered to the addressee but rather left with the second entity. When the second entity receives the item requested from the database, then, the encrypted item requested is forwarded or is caused to be received together with the encrypted return address by the first entity who will then send the encrypted item requested to the requesting user. In such a case, the encrypted return address is not encrypted together with the item-request and the ordinary key. Rather, it is sent to the second entity separately or encrypted together with the addressee information. Alternatively, no encrypted return address is used. Rather, when the first entity receives the initial communication from the requesting user this communication is associated with a label and is forwarded to the second entity together with the label. When the second entity receives from the database the encrypted requested item, it sends it to the first entity together with the label. Thus, the first entity can, from the label, determine to which user should the encrypted requested item be forwarded.
Of course, this method extends to work with more entities rather than two entities or with auxiliary entities between the first entity and the second entity and/or between the requesting user and the first entity and/or between the second entity and the database. Also, each entity could use its own labels for routing backwards the encrypted requested item to the requesting user. Alternatively, the requested item may not be encrypted and yet the identity of the requesting user may be hidden from the database. Also, the return routing can occur still via the first entity first and then the second entity. In this case, however, the encryption of the return address should be prepared differently.
While the invention has been disclosed in connection with the preferred embodiments shown and described in detail, various modifications and improvements thereon will become readily apparent to those skilled in the art. Accordingly, the spirit and scope of the present invention is to be limited only by the following claims.
Claims (1)
1. A method of retrieving information from a database with the assistance of at least one trusted entity, wherein the database does not know the identity of the requesting user, comprising the steps of:
having the requesting user send to a database a message identifying the item requested, providing the requesting user's address, and including an ordinary key, said message being encrypted with an encryption key of the database and said identification of the requesting user's address being encrypted with an encryption key of the trusted entity;
having the database remove its own encryption layer, retrieve the item requested, encrypt it with the ordinary key, and send the encrypted item requested to the trusted entity along with the encrypted requesting user's address; and
having the trusted entity take away its own encryption layer and send the encrypted item requested to the requesting user.
Priority Applications (1)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US08/785,524 US5790665A (en) | 1996-01-17 | 1997-01-17 | Anonymous information retrieval system (ARS) |
Applications Claiming Priority (2)
Application Number | Priority Date | Filing Date | Title |
---|---|---|---|
US1011996P | 1996-01-17 | 1996-01-17 | |
US08/785,524 US5790665A (en) | 1996-01-17 | 1997-01-17 | Anonymous information retrieval system (ARS) |
Publications (1)
Publication Number | Publication Date |
---|---|
US5790665A true US5790665A (en) | 1998-08-04 |
Family
ID=26680811
Family Applications (1)
Application Number | Title | Priority Date | Filing Date |
---|---|---|---|
US08/785,524 Expired - Fee Related US5790665A (en) | 1996-01-17 | 1997-01-17 | Anonymous information retrieval system (ARS) |
Country Status (1)
Country | Link |
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US (1) | US5790665A (en) |
Cited By (34)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US5956717A (en) * | 1996-10-07 | 1999-09-21 | Kraay; Thomas A. | Database origami |
US6145079A (en) * | 1998-03-06 | 2000-11-07 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary to perform electronic services |
US6161181A (en) * | 1998-03-06 | 2000-12-12 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary |
WO2000077701A1 (en) * | 1999-06-12 | 2000-12-21 | Tara Chand Singhal | Method and apparatus for facilitating anonymous transactions |
US6199052B1 (en) | 1998-03-06 | 2001-03-06 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary with archive and verification request services |
WO2001039428A2 (en) * | 1999-11-24 | 2001-05-31 | Geopartners Research, Inc. | Method and system for protecting of user privacy |
US20010014911A1 (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2001-08-16 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Service providing method and system |
US20020091928A1 (en) * | 2000-10-03 | 2002-07-11 | Thaddeus Bouchard | Electronically verified digital signature and document delivery system and method |
US20020165824A1 (en) * | 1995-10-02 | 2002-11-07 | Silvio Micali | Scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI management |
US20030009665A1 (en) * | 2001-07-03 | 2003-01-09 | Lee Elizabeth L. | System, apparatus, and method for performing cryptographic validity services |
US20040158733A1 (en) * | 2003-02-11 | 2004-08-12 | Thaddeus Bouchard | Method and system for secure facsimile delivery and registration |
US20050010783A1 (en) * | 1995-10-24 | 2005-01-13 | Phil Libin | Access control |
US20050014485A1 (en) * | 2001-11-21 | 2005-01-20 | Petri Kokkonen | Telecommunications system and method for controlling privacy |
US20050055548A1 (en) * | 1995-10-24 | 2005-03-10 | Silvio Micali | Certificate revocation system |
US6910020B2 (en) * | 1996-10-16 | 2005-06-21 | Fujitsu Limited | Apparatus and method for granting access to network-based services based upon existing bank account information |
US20050138361A1 (en) * | 2003-12-22 | 2005-06-23 | Mart Saarepera | System and method for generating a digital certificate |
US20050154879A1 (en) * | 2004-01-09 | 2005-07-14 | David Engberg | Batch OCSP and batch distributed OCSP |
US20050154918A1 (en) * | 2003-11-19 | 2005-07-14 | David Engberg | Distributed delegated path discovery and validation |
US20060097843A1 (en) * | 2004-11-10 | 2006-05-11 | Phil Libin | Actuating a security system using a wireless device |
US7337315B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-02-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient certificate revocation |
US7353396B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-04-01 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Physical access control |
US20080126513A1 (en) * | 2006-11-29 | 2008-05-29 | Omtool Ltd. | Methods and apparatus for enterprise document distribution |
US20090106276A1 (en) * | 2006-11-29 | 2009-04-23 | Omtool Ltd. | Methods and apparatus for digital content handling |
US20090164781A1 (en) * | 2001-10-29 | 2009-06-25 | Thaddeus Bouchard | Methods and Apparatus for Secure Content Routing |
US7600129B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2009-10-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access using additional data |
US7657751B2 (en) | 2003-05-13 | 2010-02-02 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient and secure data currentness systems |
US7716486B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-05-11 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling group access to doors |
US20100169294A1 (en) * | 2008-12-30 | 2010-07-01 | International Business Machines Corporation | Search engine service utilizing the addition of noise |
US7822989B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-10-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access to an area |
US8015597B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2011-09-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Disseminating additional data used for controlling access |
US8261319B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2012-09-04 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Logging access attempts to an area |
US8904181B1 (en) | 2001-03-23 | 2014-12-02 | David P. Felsher | System and method for secure three-party communications |
US10943273B2 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2021-03-09 | The Hoffberg Family Trust 2004-1 | System and method for determining contingent relevance |
USRE49334E1 (en) | 2005-10-04 | 2022-12-13 | Hoffberg Family Trust 2 | Multifactorial optimization system and method |
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Cited By (61)
Publication number | Priority date | Publication date | Assignee | Title |
---|---|---|---|---|
US7716486B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-05-11 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling group access to doors |
US7337315B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-02-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Efficient certificate revocation |
US7353396B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2008-04-01 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Physical access control |
US8732457B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2014-05-20 | Assa Abloy Ab | Scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI management |
US8015597B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2011-09-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Disseminating additional data used for controlling access |
US7600129B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2009-10-06 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access using additional data |
US7822989B2 (en) | 1995-10-02 | 2010-10-26 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Controlling access to an area |
US20020165824A1 (en) * | 1995-10-02 | 2002-11-07 | Silvio Micali | Scalable certificate validation and simplified PKI management |
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US20050010783A1 (en) * | 1995-10-24 | 2005-01-13 | Phil Libin | Access control |
US8261319B2 (en) | 1995-10-24 | 2012-09-04 | Corestreet, Ltd. | Logging access attempts to an area |
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US20050055548A1 (en) * | 1995-10-24 | 2005-03-10 | Silvio Micali | Certificate revocation system |
US5956717A (en) * | 1996-10-07 | 1999-09-21 | Kraay; Thomas A. | Database origami |
US6910020B2 (en) * | 1996-10-16 | 2005-06-21 | Fujitsu Limited | Apparatus and method for granting access to network-based services based upon existing bank account information |
US6199052B1 (en) | 1998-03-06 | 2001-03-06 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary with archive and verification request services |
US6161181A (en) * | 1998-03-06 | 2000-12-12 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary |
US6145079A (en) * | 1998-03-06 | 2000-11-07 | Deloitte & Touche Usa Llp | Secure electronic transactions using a trusted intermediary to perform electronic services |
WO2000077701A1 (en) * | 1999-06-12 | 2000-12-21 | Tara Chand Singhal | Method and apparatus for facilitating anonymous transactions |
WO2001039428A2 (en) * | 1999-11-24 | 2001-05-31 | Geopartners Research, Inc. | Method and system for protecting of user privacy |
WO2001039428A3 (en) * | 1999-11-24 | 2002-02-07 | Geopartners Res Inc | Method and system for protecting of user privacy |
US20010014911A1 (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2001-08-16 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Service providing method and system |
EP1126732A2 (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2001-08-22 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Location dependent service providing method and system |
US20080263151A1 (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2008-10-23 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Service providing method and system |
EP1126732A3 (en) * | 2000-02-14 | 2002-08-21 | Kabushiki Kaisha Toshiba | Location dependent service providing method and system |
US20020091928A1 (en) * | 2000-10-03 | 2002-07-11 | Thaddeus Bouchard | Electronically verified digital signature and document delivery system and method |
US7082538B2 (en) | 2000-10-03 | 2006-07-25 | Omtool, Ltd. | Electronically verified digital signature and document delivery system and method |
US8904181B1 (en) | 2001-03-23 | 2014-12-02 | David P. Felsher | System and method for secure three-party communications |
US9419951B1 (en) | 2001-03-23 | 2016-08-16 | St. Luke Technologies, Llc | System and method for secure three-party communications |
US6973571B2 (en) | 2001-07-03 | 2005-12-06 | Bank Of America Corporation | System, apparatus, and method for performing cryptographic validity services |
US20030009665A1 (en) * | 2001-07-03 | 2003-01-09 | Lee Elizabeth L. | System, apparatus, and method for performing cryptographic validity services |
US8726015B2 (en) | 2001-10-29 | 2014-05-13 | Omtool, Ltd. | Methods and apparatus for secure content routing |
US20090164781A1 (en) * | 2001-10-29 | 2009-06-25 | Thaddeus Bouchard | Methods and Apparatus for Secure Content Routing |
US7242946B2 (en) * | 2001-11-21 | 2007-07-10 | Nokia Corporation | Telecommunications system and method for controlling privacy |
US20050014485A1 (en) * | 2001-11-21 | 2005-01-20 | Petri Kokkonen | Telecommunications system and method for controlling privacy |
US10943273B2 (en) | 2003-02-05 | 2021-03-09 | The Hoffberg Family Trust 2004-1 | System and method for determining contingent relevance |
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