US9276745B2 - Preserving image privacy when manipulated by cloud services - Google Patents
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Definitions
- Embodiments generally relate to image encryption, and more particularly, to preserving image privacy when the image is hosted or otherwise manipulated by cloud services such as photo-sharing websites.
- Image processing and storage functions are rapidly being integrated into the cloud.
- Image uploading or photo-sharing is pervasive today, and ever expanding.
- Well-known sites such as Facebook®, Twitter®, Google Picasa®, Photobucket®, Flickr®, and the like, store billions of photos.
- privacy concerns have started to surface, with users concerned about the abuse of their personal data and photos, potentially from the sites themselves or from other unknown users.
- Publicly available photos on service provider websites can be used to identify strangers in shopping malls, university campuses, or on public streets, for example, simply by performing facial recognition and matching the photos to names or other identifying information available on the websites of the service providers.
- hackers comprising the databases of photo-sharing websites.
- the hacker or other bad actor may manipulate the content of the original image for nefarious reasons.
- Still other users can download or otherwise hack the photos, save them to external media, or upload them to other websites, with the original owner losing any measure of effective access control, thereby allowing anyone who comes into contact with the copies to have access to the original content.
- FIG. 1 illustrates a conventional system in which hackers or others can gain access to photos.
- User application 105 which may be operated by a person 110 , and can include a computer 115 , a smart phone 120 , a personal digital assistant (PDA) 125 , or a camera 130 , and so forth, may upload images 135 to cloud service 140 .
- the user application 105 or other authorized person may later browse for the images at 165 .
- a hacker 150 which may include a person 155 or a computer 160 , or other unauthorized persons, and so forth, may gain access to the images 135 by accessing the cloud service 140 at 145 .
- JPEG Joint Photographic Experts Group
- FIG. 1 illustrates a conventional system in which hackers or others can gain access to photos through a cloud service.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a system including middleware for preserving the image privacy irrespective of image manipulations by the cloud service, according to an example embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a flow diagram of aspects associated with the middleware of FIG. 2 .
- FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of additional aspects associated with the middleware of FIG. 2 .
- FIGS. 5 and 6 illustrate block diagrams including a database associated with the middleware of FIG. 2 .
- FIG. 7 illustrates a flow diagram demonstrating a technique for encrypting and uploading images to a cloud service.
- FIG. 8 illustrates a flow diagram demonstrating a technique for receiving and decrypting images from a cloud service.
- FIG. 9 illustrates a flow and block diagram related to permutating and encrypting blocks of an image, according to another example embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 illustrates a flow and block diagram related to decrypting the images of FIG. 9 .
- FIG. 11 illustrates a block diagram of a physical object having affixed thereto an encrypted printed image, according to yet another example embodiment of the present invention.
- Embodiments of an apparatus and method for preserving image privacy when hosted or otherwise manipulated by cloud services, associated processes for using such apparatus, and associated systems with which such apparatus and method can be used, are described.
- FIG. 2 illustrates a system 200 including middleware 205 for preserving image privacy irrespective of image manipulations by the cloud services 140 , according to an example embodiment of the present invention.
- the user application 105 may be operated by a person 110 , and can include a computer 115 , a smart phone 120 , a personal digital assistant (PDA) 125 , or a camera 130 , and an forth, which may upload encrypted images 235 to cloud service 140 .
- the user application 105 can include or otherwise be associated with middleware 205 .
- the middleware 205 and its components can be implemented in hardware, software, firmware, or any combination thereof.
- the middleware 205 encrypts images using methods that are resilient to manipulations by the cloud services 140 .
- the cloud services 140 can include, for example, social networks or photo storage sites, which typically resize, filter, crop, or otherwise reformat images, thereby causing conventional encryption techniques to be rendered inoperable.
- Embodiments of the present invention allows users to preserve the privacy of selected photos, upload those photos to any photo-sharing websites or other cloud services, and correctly decrypt the photos back to the original images regardless of the typical backend processing by the photo-sharing sites. Thus, there is no need to change the existing websites or cloud computing models.
- encryption and decryption using embodiments disclosed herein are practical today and can be efficiently accomplished in less than a second for each photo.
- the middleware 205 transmits encrypted images 235 to the cloud services, so that if a hacker 150 , which may include person 155 or computer 160 , attempts to access the images, all that they would gain access to is the ciphertexts 245 , and therefore would be unable to view the images.
- Authorized users who have the appropriate middleware 205 and appropriate key, can browse the images at 265 and correctly decrypt the images 240 for later viewing, irrespective of the filtering, resizing, cropping, or other manipulations to the images by the cloud services 140 .
- the middleware 205 can receive an original image from the user 105 .
- the middleware 205 includes a splitter 220 , which can split the image into first and second sub-images, as described, in further detail below.
- the middleware 205 includes an encrypt section 210 , which can encrypt the first and second sub-images, and produce first and second encrypted sub-images as also described in further detail below.
- a random number generator (RNG) 215 is used to generate certain encryption keys, such as a master key to be stored, in database 225 , and an image key to be stored in meta data of the image.
- RNG random number generator
- the images can be received and decrypted by the middleware 205 , which may be associated, with the same user application 105 or another authorized user application.
- the middleware 205 includes a decrypt section 230 to decrypt the first and second sub-images, and a combiner 222 to combine the first and second sub-images into substantially the original image.
- FIG. 3 illustrates a flow diagram of aspects associated with the splitter 220 and the encrypt section 210 of FIG. 2 .
- An original image 305 includes pixels 302 . It will be understood that the image 305 can have any suitable number of pixels, and the enlarged pixels shown in the figures are merely for the purpose of illustration.
- Each pixel 302 includes an associated Red/Green/Blue (RGB) pixel value such as RGB pixel_value_A(u,v), where u is the row index and v is the column index for each pixel.
- RGB pixel values are 8 bits, which can represent between 0 and 255 different values or hues. It will be understood that the embodiments and inventive concepts described herein are applicable to 16 bit RGB pixel values, or any other suitable value.
- the splitter 220 can split the original image 305 into sub-image 310 and sub-image 315 .
- Each of the RGB pixel values of the sub-image 310 such as RGB pixel_value_B(u,v), will have a range between 0 and 127 different values or hues.
- each of the RGB pixels values of the sub-image 315 such as RGB pixel_value_C(u,v), will have a range between 0 and 127 different values or hues.
- the encrypt section 210 adds a corresponding keystream value, such as keystream(u,v), which can be a 7 bit random number 320 generated for each RGB pixel value.
- keystream(u,v) can be a 7 bit random number 320 generated for each RGB pixel value.
- the encrypt section 210 adds a corresponding keystream value, such as keystream(u,v), which can be the 7 bit random number 320 generated for each RGB pixel value.
- keystream(u,v) can be the 7 bit random number 320 generated for each RGB pixel value.
- the pixel_cipher_B uses a different keystream from the pixel_cipher_C.
- the splitter 220 can first determine an RGB pixel value for each pixel of the original image, then divide each RGB pixel value of the original image into a first split RGB pixel value (e.g., RGB pixel_value_B(u,v)) and a second split RGB pixel value (e.g., RGB pixel_value_C(u,v)).
- Each split RGB pixel_value_B(u,v) can be associated with a corresponding RGB pixel value of the sub-image 310 .
- each split RGB pixel_value_C(u,v) can be associated with a corresponding RGB pixel value of the sub-image 315 .
- the corresponding keystream(u,v) can then be added.
- the encrypt section 210 can therefore produce a first encrypted sub-image and a second encrypted sub-image, which together can be represented as G(data+keystream) as shown at 335 .
- the middleware 205 can transmit the G(data+keystream), including the first and second encrypted sub-images, to cloud services 140 .
- the cloud services 140 can perform various post-processing functions, represented here as f(.), such as resize, crop, and filter.
- FIG. 4 illustrates a flow diagram of additional aspects associated with the decrypt section 230 and combiner 222 of FIG. 2 .
- the decrypt section 230 of the middleware 205 can receive the f(G(data+keystream)) at 405 from the cloud services 140 .
- the decrypt section 230 can then decrypt the f(G(data+keystream)) to recover the original image.
- the decrypt section 230 subtracts a corresponding reconstructed keystream value (e.g. f(G(keystream))).
- the decrypt section 230 subtracts a corresponding reconstructed keystream value (e.g., f(G(keystream))) selected from the plurality of modified keystream values.
- a corresponding reconstructed keystream value e.g., f(G(keystream))
- the G(keystream) can be modified by a predefined post-processing function f(.), which can be stored in database 225 and associated with a cloud service identifier (ID) 440 .
- the database 225 can store multiple different post-processing functions associated with any number of different cloud services, each with its own ID. For example, if a photo-storage site is known to resize an image by a certain proportion, such function is stored in database 225 and identified by the associated site ID.
- post-processing functions can be determined based on experimental usage and analysis of the post-processing functions performed on images when subjected to the cloud service sites.
- the ID 440 can also be stored in the meta data of the image, as further described below.
- the decrypt section 230 uses the master_key stored in the database 225 to generate the proper keystream, which together with the applied post-processing function f(.), results in f(G(keystream)).
- the f(G(keystream)) is used to decrypt the image data, as further shown at 410 , 415 , and 420 . Further details regarding the master_key are provided below.
- the recovered image corresponds to decrypted sub-images 310 and 315 .
- the decrypted sub-images can be combined by the combiner 222 into substantially the original image 305 .
- FIGS. 5 and 6 illustrate block diagrams including a database 225 associated with the middleware 205 of FIG. 2 .
- the encrypt section 210 can produce a master_key 505 , which is stored in the database 225 .
- the RNG 215 can produce the master_key 505 , which is preferably a 256-bit cryptographically strong random number.
- the RNG 215 can produce a random number (i.e., Rnumber 510 ), which is used to generate an image_key.
- the Rnumber 510 can be embedded in the metadata 525 of the image 520 , and is preferably a 128-bit random number.
- the metadata 525 can also store the ID 440 , which is described above.
- the keystream can be generated, by either or both of the encrypt section 210 and the decrypt section 230 , using at least the master_key 505 , as shown in both FIGS. 5 and 6 .
- the Encrypt(.) function can be Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher or any other suitable encryption algorithm.
- AES Advanced Encryption Standard
- the pixel_index corresponds to the (u,v) pixel index location of the image.
- the image_key is used to guarantee that each instance of an image will have distinct keystream based upon the image_key that is derived in (7), as further set forth below. In other words, the keystream values discussed above are generated using the image_key and the pixel_index.
- the kdf(.) function can be a standard key derivation function, either cipher or hash-based.
- the Aux can correspond to auxiliary data, such as for security purposes.
- the encrypt section 210 of the middleware 205 can encrypt the image using (6) and/or (7).
- the decrypt section 230 of the middleware 205 can decrypt the image using (6) and/or (7).
- the middleware 205 is the only entity capable of producing the keystream, only the middleware 205 having the master_key 505 can decrypt the images.
- FIG. 7 illustrates a flow diagram 700 of a technique for encrypting and uploading images to a cloud service(s).
- the technique begins at 705 , where the middleware receives an image from a user or user application.
- the image is decompressed to recover RGB pixel values.
- the image is split into two sub-images. The number of bits associated with each RGB pixel value of sub-image 725 and sub-image 720 is less than the number of bits associated with each RGB pixel value of the original image.
- the middleware generates a keystream, which is added to the sub-images at 740 and 735 , as explained in detail above. Image compression can be performed after or during the adding of the keystream.
- the encrypted sub-images at 750 and 745 are uploaded by the middleware to the cloud service(s) at 755 .
- FIG. 8 illustrates a flow diagram 800 of a technique for receiving and decrypting images from a cloud service.
- the cloud service(s) perform post-processing operations on the encrypted sub-images.
- the middleware receives the encrypted sub-images from the cloud service(s).
- the encrypted sub-images are made ready for decryption by the decrypt section of the middleware.
- the sub-images are decompressed using image decompression algorithms such as JPEG.
- the middleware generates the modified keystream, as explained in detail above, and the modified keystream is subtracted from the sub-images at 845 and 840 , either during or after the decompression.
- the flow proceeds to decrypted sub-images at 855 and 850 , which are recombined or otherwise reconstructed into the original image at 860 .
- FIG. 9 illustrates a flow and block diagram 900 related to permutating and encrypting blocks (e.g., (1), (2), . . . , (16)) of an image 905 , according to another example embodiment of the present invention.
- FIG. 10 illustrates a flow and block diagram related to decrypting the image 905 of FIG. 9 . Reference is now made to FIGS. 9 and 10 .
- Blocks of the image 905 can be defined to have a particular size, or otherwise divided into N blocks, each block including some number of pixels. For example, an image with 2048 by 1024 pixels can have the block size defined as 64 by 64 pixels. In such case, the total number of blocks will be 512.
- the encrypt section 210 can select a permutation from a factorial of N permutations. In other words, the encrypt section 210 can permutate the blocks in 512! (factorial of 512) number of different ways, which is even larger than 2 512 . Put differently, the encrypt section 210 can then permutate the N blocks of the image based on the selected permutation.
- the middleware 205 can choose only one out of all possible 512! (factorial of 512) possibilities, which is practically infeasible for any third party, without the secret key 925 , to guess correctly. This is quite different from, for example, a jigsaw puzzle where there is only one final pattern and pieces include various shapes to help with the orientation.
- the permutation causes the file content 910 of image 905 to be scrambled into the file content 920 of the permutated image 930 . There is no clue that is available to human users on how to reconstruct the orientations.
- the middleware 205 can then upload the permutated image 930 to the cloud service(s) 140 , which can perform post-processing functions (e.g., f(.)) on the permutated image.
- post-processing functions e.g., f(.)
- the permutated image is then received, from the cloud service(s) 140 and decrypted using the decrypt section 230 .
- the decrypt section 230 can use the secret key 925 to decrypt the permutation and return the file contents 920 of the permutated image 930 back to substantially the file contents 910 of the original image 905 .
- the secure permutation can be performed by generating a keystream and by using the secret key 925 and a stream cipher F(.).
- the encrypt section 210 can receive an image having a size (e.g., height ⁇ width). A predefined block size M can be used.
- the encrypt section 210 can also receive and/or generate the secret key 825 , the stream cipher F(.), and a key derivation function (e.g., kdf(.)).
- the encrypt section 210 can output instance_randomH and a permutated image.
- instance_randomH For every instantiation of middleware to encrypt a photo by permutation, generate a random number H (e.g., 128-bit), referred to herein as instance_randomH.
- instance_key Kdf(K, H), where K is the secret key 925 .
- K is the secret key 925 .
- Each instance_key can be a distinct key to augment the security.
- keystream is a bit stream (e.g., 1000111111110).
- the encrypt section 210 can permute the blocks of the image.
- the decrypt section 230 can gain access to the secret key K (e.g., 925 ) and the private hint H (i.e., instance_randomH) to generate the permutation sequence.
- the permutation can then be reversed and the original image reconstructed.
- the stream cipher F(.) and the derivation function kdf(.) can be public, and H is a random number used as the instance identifier.
- methods disclosed herein include selecting a permutation from a factorial of N permutations.
- a keystream can be generated.
- the N blocks can be permutated based on the keystream and the selected permutation.
- Each of the N blocks can be swapped with another of the N blocks based on the keystream.
- N swap positions can be determined. For example, the swap position can be based on keystream[j] modulo N, where j is an index into the keystream. The index j can be decremented from N down to 2.
- Each of the N blocks can be swapped with another of the N blocks located at the swap position.
- FIG. 11 illustrates a block diagram 1100 of a physical object 1105 having affixed thereto an encrypted printed image 1110 , according to yet another example embodiment of the present invention.
- the middleware 205 can encrypt an image using one or more of the techniques described. In detail above.
- the image can then be physically transformed, as shown at 1120 .
- the physical transformations can include resizing, scaling, compressing, cropping, and so forth, and can be performed on the encrypted image electronically and/or on physical printed media.
- the image can be printed on physical media, thereby resulting in a printed image 1110 .
- the printed image 1110 is scrambled or otherwise undecipherable without the appropriate decryption algorithm and keys.
- hackers or other adversaries are therefore prevented from interpreting the printed image 1110 .
- the encrypted image allows information to be securely transmitted in the physical non-electronic world.
- the printed image can be affixed to a physical object 1105 .
- the physical object can be, for example, a package, a sign, paper, a display, a magazine, a newspaper, and the like.
- the physical object can also be a screen or a display, such as a move screen, a TV screen, a computer display, a phone display, or the like.
- the printed image 1110 can be photographed or scanned using, for example, a camera and/or scanner 1115 .
- a digital image can be captured of the printed image 1110 .
- the middleware 205 can decrypt the digital image, using one or more of the techniques described in detail above.
- the decryption algorithm can reconstruct the original image, or at least an approximate of the original image, because the middleware 205 has access to the master key and the other components and algorithms for decrypting the photographed or scanned image, notwithstanding the physical transformations 1120 of the encrypted image.
- images can be covertly transmitted, using a form of visual cryptography, which can be used for advertising, subscription services, audience selection, games, secure social networking, among other possibilities.
- images can be privately or covertly transmitted from middleware, to a physical object, then to an endpoint such as the same or different middleware.
- the image can remain confidential or private, even when exposed to external physical world scenarios.
- Embodiments include middleware for uploading encrypted image data to websites (e.g., social media and/or cloud services) using the lossy data formats already accepted by the backend services using a new loss-resilient encryption algorithm.
- the resilient encrypted image cipher text can be manipulated by the back end cloud services (e.g., compressed, cropped, transformed, filtered, etc.), yet the approximate original image can still be restored given the ciphertext and a secret decryption key used by authorized parties.
- the encrypted image can be downloaded, copied, moved, manipulated and uploaded to other websites while remaining secure (i.e., encrypted) so only parties with the correct key can decrypt the image and restore the approximate original using one or more of the resilient encryption algorithms disclosed herein.
- Specialized hardware or hardware accelerators can be used to accelerate the resilient cryptographic algorithms.
- the middleware can be included within general purpose computers, tablets, smart phones, ultrabooks, servers, or the like. Embodiments disclosed herein enhance image and media privacy, allowing manipulation of ciphertext, while providing the ability to recover the original plaintext content.
- an article drawn from the set of media including floppy disks, optical disks, fixed disks, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, random access memory, read-only memory, or flash memory, comprising a machine-accessible medium having associated non-transitory instructions that, when executed in a test and measurement device, results in a machine performing the steps of the various embodiments of the invention as disclosed herein.
- floppy disks, optical disks, fixed disks, volatile memory, non-volatile memory, random access memory, read-only memory, or flash memory comprising a machine-accessible medium having associated non-transitory instructions that, when executed in a test and measurement device, results in a machine performing the steps of the various embodiments of the invention as disclosed herein.
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Abstract
Description
pixel_cipher— B(u,v)=pixel_value— B(u,v)+keystream(u,v,“0”) (1)
pixel_cipher— C(u,v)=pixel_value— C(u,v)+keystream(u,v,“1”) (2)
recover_image=f(G(data+keystream))−f(G(keystream)) (3)
recover_image=f(G(data))+f(G(keystream))−f(G(keystream)) (4)
recover_image=f(G(data)) (5)
keystream=Encrypt(image_key,pixel_index) (6)
image_key=kdf(master_key,Rnumber∥Aux) (7)
-
- a. dj=keystream[j] modulo N. (e.g., swap position is determined by stream cipher)
- b. swap a[dj] and a[j−1]
Claims (18)
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PCT/US2011/065284 WO2013089758A1 (en) | 2011-12-15 | 2011-12-15 | Preserving image privacy when manipulated by cloud services |
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US9276745B2 true US9276745B2 (en) | 2016-03-01 |
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US13/976,298 Expired - Fee Related US9276745B2 (en) | 2011-12-15 | 2011-12-15 | Preserving image privacy when manipulated by cloud services |
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US (1) | US9276745B2 (en) |
EP (1) | EP2791855B1 (en) |
CN (1) | CN104040934B (en) |
WO (1) | WO2013089758A1 (en) |
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US20130279690A1 (en) | 2013-10-24 |
CN104040934A (en) | 2014-09-10 |
EP2791855A1 (en) | 2014-10-22 |
WO2013089758A1 (en) | 2013-06-20 |
CN104040934B (en) | 2018-04-24 |
EP2791855B1 (en) | 2019-01-23 |
EP2791855A4 (en) | 2015-08-12 |
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