[go: nahoru, domu]
Google Git
Sign in
chromium / chromium / src / cdbedb596cf4480ea8fccd29a4261d2597311422 / . / base / security_unittest.cc
blob: 785bc94b0f81d4fbd39ab0c2ad92993276510626 [file] [log] [blame]
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]1// Copyright (c) 2013 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.
2// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be
3// found in the LICENSE file.
4
jln@chromium.org1b556f82013-01-31 02:23:43[diff] [blame]5#include <fcntl.h>
avi9b6f42932015-12-26 22:15:14[diff] [blame]6#include <stddef.h>
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]7#include <stdio.h>
8#include <stdlib.h>
9#include <string.h>
jln@chromium.org1b556f82013-01-31 02:23:43[diff] [blame]10#include <sys/stat.h>
11#include <sys/types.h>
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]12
13#include <algorithm>
14#include <limits>
dcheng093de9b2016-04-04 21:25:51[diff] [blame]15#include <memory>
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]16
Scott Violet44165792018-02-22 02:08:08[diff] [blame]17#include "base/allocator/buildflags.h"
brettw@chromium.orge3177dd52014-08-13 20:22:14[diff] [blame]18#include "base/files/file_util.h"
dchengdb5935f2016-03-26 00:16:27[diff] [blame]19#include "base/memory/free_deleter.h"
Peter Collingbourne5a35305d2019-02-06 02:51:43[diff] [blame]20#include "base/sanitizer_buildflags.h"
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]21#include "build/build_config.h"
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]22#include "testing/gtest/include/gtest/gtest.h"
23
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]24#if defined(OS_POSIX)
25#include <sys/mman.h>
26#include <unistd.h>
27#endif
28
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]29using std::nothrow;
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]30using std::numeric_limits;
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]31
32namespace {
33
jln@chromium.orgfe394f32013-02-06 03:23:49[diff] [blame]34// This function acts as a compiler optimization barrier. We use it to
35// prevent the compiler from making an expression a compile-time constant.
36// We also use it so that the compiler doesn't discard certain return values
37// as something we don't need (see the comment with calloc below).
38template <typename Type>
thakis189ce1f2015-04-23 02:58:29[diff] [blame]39NOINLINE Type HideValueFromCompiler(volatile Type value) {
jln@chromium.org1cdfdb72013-04-04 12:02:35[diff] [blame]40#if defined(__GNUC__)
41 // In a GCC compatible compiler (GCC or Clang), make this compiler barrier
42 // more robust than merely using "volatile".
43 __asm__ volatile ("" : "+r" (value));
44#endif // __GNUC__
jln@chromium.orgfe394f32013-02-06 03:23:49[diff] [blame]45 return value;
46}
47
primiano3038b2f2017-05-26 15:48:32[diff] [blame]48// TCmalloc, currently supported only by Linux/CrOS, supports malloc limits.
Nico Weberb80b0852019-08-01 22:03:01[diff] [blame]49// - USE_TCMALLOC (should be set if compiled with use_allocator=="tcmalloc")
primiano3038b2f2017-05-26 15:48:32[diff] [blame]50// - ADDRESS_SANITIZER it has its own memory allocator
Sean McAllisteracb45d62020-08-19 17:14:40[diff] [blame]51#if (defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)) && BUILDFLAG(USE_TCMALLOC) && \
52 !defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER)
wfh74a449ca2015-01-13 03:11:40[diff] [blame]53#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) function
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]54#else
wfh74a449ca2015-01-13 03:11:40[diff] [blame]55#define MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(function) DISABLED_##function
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]56#endif
57
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]58// There are platforms where these tests are known to fail. We would like to
59// be able to easily check the status on the bots, but marking tests as
60// FAILS_ is too clunky.
61void OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(bool overflow_detected) {
62 if (!overflow_detected) {
Sean McAllisteracb45d62020-08-19 17:14:40[diff] [blame]63#if defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS) || defined(OS_ANDROID) || \
64 defined(OS_APPLE)
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]65 // Sadly, on Linux, Android, and OSX we don't have a good story yet. Don't
66 // fail the test, but report.
67 printf("Platform has overflow: %s\n",
68 !overflow_detected ? "yes." : "no.");
69#else
70 // Otherwise, fail the test. (Note: EXPECT are ok in subfunctions, ASSERT
71 // aren't).
72 EXPECT_TRUE(overflow_detected);
73#endif
74 }
75}
76
Avi Drissman5b286372020-07-28 21:59:38[diff] [blame]77#if defined(OS_FUCHSIA) || defined(OS_APPLE) || defined(ADDRESS_SANITIZER) || \
78 defined(THREAD_SANITIZER) || defined(MEMORY_SANITIZER) || \
Yuki Shiinocdbedb52020-08-25 09:23:03[diff] [blame^]79 BUILDFLAG(IS_HWASAN) || BUILDFLAG(USE_PARTITION_ALLOC_AS_MALLOC)
John Abd-El-Malek17727ff2014-10-02 22:55:15[diff] [blame]80#define MAYBE_NewOverflow DISABLED_NewOverflow
81#else
82#define MAYBE_NewOverflow NewOverflow
83#endif
Yuki Shiinocdbedb52020-08-25 09:23:03[diff] [blame^]84// Test that array[TooBig][X] and array[X][TooBig] allocations fail and not
85// succeed with the wrong size allocation in case of size_t overflow. This
86// test is disabled on environments that operator new (nothrow) crashes in
87// case of size_t overflow.
88//
89// - iOS doesn't honor nothrow.
90// - XSan aborts when operator new returns nullptr.
91// - PartitionAlloc crashes by design when size_t overflows.
92//
Thomas Anderson4a6a13b2019-02-21 01:52:05[diff] [blame]93// TODO(https://crbug.com/828229): Fuchsia SDK exports an incorrect
94// new[] that gets picked up in Debug/component builds, breaking this
Yuki Shiinocdbedb52020-08-25 09:23:03[diff] [blame^]95// test. Disabled on Mac for the same reason.
John Abd-El-Malek17727ff2014-10-02 22:55:15[diff] [blame]96TEST(SecurityTest, MAYBE_NewOverflow) {
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]97 const size_t kArraySize = 4096;
98 // We want something "dynamic" here, so that the compiler doesn't
99 // immediately reject crazy arrays.
100 const size_t kDynamicArraySize = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize);
thakis4d7b56b2017-02-14 16:21:35[diff] [blame]101 const size_t kMaxSizeT = std::numeric_limits<size_t>::max();
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]102 const size_t kArraySize2 = kMaxSizeT / kArraySize + 10;
103 const size_t kDynamicArraySize2 = HideValueFromCompiler(kArraySize2);
104 {
dcheng093de9b2016-04-04 21:25:51[diff] [blame]105 std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize]> array_pointer(
106 new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize2][kArraySize]);
thakis4d7b56b2017-02-14 16:21:35[diff] [blame]107 // Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
108 char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
109 OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!p);
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]110 }
jln@chromium.org1cdfdb72013-04-04 12:02:35[diff] [blame]111 // On windows, the compiler prevents static array sizes of more than
112 // 0x7fffffff (error C2148).
Peter Kastingbe940e92014-11-20 23:14:08[diff] [blame]113#if defined(OS_WIN) && defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
114 ALLOW_UNUSED_LOCAL(kDynamicArraySize);
115#else
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]116 {
dcheng093de9b2016-04-04 21:25:51[diff] [blame]117 std::unique_ptr<char[][kArraySize2]> array_pointer(
118 new (nothrow) char[kDynamicArraySize][kArraySize2]);
thakis4d7b56b2017-02-14 16:21:35[diff] [blame]119 // Prevent clang from optimizing away the whole test.
120 char* volatile p = reinterpret_cast<char*>(array_pointer.get());
121 OverflowTestsSoftExpectTrue(!p);
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]122 }
jln@chromium.org1cdfdb72013-04-04 12:02:35[diff] [blame]123#endif // !defined(OS_WIN) || !defined(ARCH_CPU_64_BITS)
jln@chromium.org9c4729b2013-01-26 04:41:15[diff] [blame]124}
125
Sean McAllisteracb45d62020-08-19 17:14:40[diff] [blame]126#if (defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)) && defined(__x86_64__)
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]127// Check if ptr1 and ptr2 are separated by less than size chars.
128bool ArePointersToSameArea(void* ptr1, void* ptr2, size_t size) {
129 ptrdiff_t ptr_diff = reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::max(ptr1, ptr2)) -
130 reinterpret_cast<char*>(std::min(ptr1, ptr2));
131 return static_cast<size_t>(ptr_diff) <= size;
132}
133
jln@chromium.org1b556f82013-01-31 02:23:43[diff] [blame]134// Check if TCMalloc uses an underlying random memory allocator.
wfh74a449ca2015-01-13 03:11:40[diff] [blame]135TEST(SecurityTest, MALLOC_OVERFLOW_TEST(RandomMemoryAllocations)) {
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]136 size_t kPageSize = 4096; // We support x86_64 only.
137 // Check that malloc() returns an address that is neither the kernel's
138 // un-hinted mmap area, nor the current brk() area. The first malloc() may
139 // not be at a random address because TCMalloc will first exhaust any memory
140 // that it has allocated early on, before starting the sophisticated
141 // allocators.
142 void* default_mmap_heap_address =
Ivan Kotenkova16212a52017-11-08 12:37:33[diff] [blame]143 mmap(nullptr, kPageSize, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE,
144 MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0);
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]145 ASSERT_NE(default_mmap_heap_address,
146 static_cast<void*>(MAP_FAILED));
147 ASSERT_EQ(munmap(default_mmap_heap_address, kPageSize), 0);
148 void* brk_heap_address = sbrk(0);
149 ASSERT_NE(brk_heap_address, reinterpret_cast<void*>(-1));
Ivan Kotenkova16212a52017-11-08 12:37:33[diff] [blame]150 ASSERT_TRUE(brk_heap_address != nullptr);
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]151 // 1 MB should get us past what TCMalloc pre-allocated before initializing
152 // the sophisticated allocators.
153 size_t kAllocSize = 1<<20;
dcheng093de9b2016-04-04 21:25:51[diff] [blame]154 std::unique_ptr<char, base::FreeDeleter> ptr(
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]155 static_cast<char*>(malloc(kAllocSize)));
Ivan Kotenkova16212a52017-11-08 12:37:33[diff] [blame]156 ASSERT_TRUE(ptr != nullptr);
jln@chromium.org547683f2013-02-04 23:39:48[diff] [blame]157 // If two pointers are separated by less than 512MB, they are considered
158 // to be in the same area.
159 // Our random pointer could be anywhere within 0x3fffffffffff (46bits),
160 // and we are checking that it's not withing 1GB (30 bits) from two
161 // addresses (brk and mmap heap). We have roughly one chance out of
162 // 2^15 to flake.
163 const size_t kAreaRadius = 1<<29;
164 bool in_default_mmap_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
165 ptr.get(), default_mmap_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
166 EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_mmap_heap);
167
168 bool in_default_brk_heap = ArePointersToSameArea(
169 ptr.get(), brk_heap_address, kAreaRadius);
170 EXPECT_FALSE(in_default_brk_heap);
171
172 // In the implementation, we always mask our random addresses with
173 // kRandomMask, so we use it as an additional detection mechanism.
174 const uintptr_t kRandomMask = 0x3fffffffffffULL;
175 bool impossible_random_address =
176 reinterpret_cast<uintptr_t>(ptr.get()) & ~kRandomMask;
177 EXPECT_FALSE(impossible_random_address);
jln@chromium.org1b556f82013-01-31 02:23:43[diff] [blame]178}
179
Sean McAllisteracb45d62020-08-19 17:14:40[diff] [blame]180#endif // (defined(OS_LINUX) || defined(OS_CHROMEOS)) && defined(__x86_64__)
jln@chromium.org1b556f82013-01-31 02:23:43[diff] [blame]181
jln@chromium.orgb5bf9a132013-01-15 20:16:33[diff] [blame]182} // namespace