Posted by Stephan Somogyi, Product Manager, Security and Privacy

[Cross-posted on the Google Analytics Blog]

If you run a web site, you may already be familiar with Google Webmaster Tools and how it lets you know if Safe Browsing finds something problematic on your site. For example, we’ll notify you if your site is delivering malware, which is usually a sign that it’s been hacked. We’re extending our Safe Browsing protections to automatically display notifications to all Google Analytics users via familiar Google Analytics Notifications.

Google Safe Browsing has been protecting people across the Internet for over eight years and we're always looking for ways to extend that protection even further. Notifications like these help webmasters like you act quickly to respond to any issues. Fast response helps keep your site—and your visitors—safe.

Posted by Tim Willis, Hacker Philanthropist, Chrome Security Team

[Cross-posted from the Chromium Blog]

Around this time each year we announce the rules, details and maximum cash amounts we’re putting up for our Pwnium competition. For the last few years we put a huge pile of cash on the table (last year it was e million) and gave researchers one day during CanSecWest to present their exploits. We’ve received some great entries over the years, but it’s time for something bigger.

Starting today, Pwnium will change its scope significantly, from a single-day competition held once a year at a security conference to a year round, worldwide opportunity for security researchers.

For those who are interested in what this means for the Pwnium rewards pool, we crunched the numbers and the results are in: it now goes all the way up to $∞ million*.

We’re making this change for a few reasons:

• Removing barriers to entry: At Pwnium competitions, a security researcher would need to have a bug chain in March, pre-register, have a physical presence at the competition location and hopefully get a good timeslot. Under the new scheme, security researchers can submit their bugs year-round through the Chrome Vulnerability Reward Program (VRP) whenever they find them. 
• Removing the incentive for bug hoarding: If a security researcher was to discover a Pwnium-quality bug chain today, it’s highly likely that they would wait until the contest to report it to get a cash reward. This is a bad scenario for all parties. It’s bad for us because the bug doesn’t get fixed immediately and our users are left at risk. It’s bad for them as they run the real risk of a bug collision. By allowing security researchers to submit bugs all year-round, collisions are significantly less likely and security researchers aren’t duplicating their efforts on the same bugs.
• Our researchers want this: On top of all of these reasons, we asked our handful of participants if they wanted an option to report all year. They did, so we’re delivering.

Logistically, we’ll be adding Pwnium-style bug chains on Chrome OS to the Chrome VRP. This will increase our top reward to $50,000, which will be on offer all year-round. Check out our FAQ for more information.

Happy hunting!

*Our lawyercats wouldn’t let me say “never-ending” or “infinity million” without adding that “this is an experimental and discretionary rewards program and Google may cancel or modify the program at any time.” Check out the reward eligibility requirements on the Chrome VRP page.

Posted by Lucas Ballard, Software Engineer

SafeBrowsing helps keep you safe online and includes protection against unwanted software that makes undesirable changes to your computer or interferes with your online experience.

We recently expanded our efforts in Chrome, Search, and ads to keep you even safer from sites where these nefarious downloads are available.

• Chrome: Now, in addition to showing warnings before you download unwanted software, Chrome will show you a new warning, like the one below, before you visit a site that encourages downloads of unwanted software.

• Search: Google Search now incorporates signals that identify such deceptive sites. This change reduces the chances you’ll visit these sites via our search results.
• Ads: We recently began to disable Google ads that lead to sites with unwanted software.

If you’re a site owner, we recommend that you register your site with Google Webmaster Tools. This will help you stay informed when we find something on your site that leads people to download unwanted software, and will provide you with helpful tips to resolve such issues. 

We’re constantly working to keep people safe across the web. Read more about Safe Browsing technology and our work to protect users here.

Posted by Rob Mann, Security Engineering Manager

[Cross-posted from the Google Cloud Platform Blog]

Deploying a new build is a thrill, but every release should be scanned for security vulnerabilities. And while web application security scanners have existed for years, they’re not always well-suited for Google App Engine developers. They’re often difficult to set up, prone to over-reporting issues (false positives)—which can be time-consuming to filter and triage—and built for security professionals, not developers.

Today, we’re releasing Google Cloud Security Scanner in beta. If you’re using App Engine, you can easily scan your application for two very common vulnerabilities: cross-site scripting (XSS) and mixed content.

While designing Cloud Security Scanner we had three goals:

1. Make the tool easy to set up and use
2. Detect the most common issues App Engine developers face with minimal false positives
3. Support scanning rich, JavaScript-heavy web applications

To try it for yourself, select Compute > App Engine > Security scans in the Google Developers Console to run your first scan, or learn more here.

So How Does It Work?

Crawling and testing modern HTML5, JavaScript-heavy applications with rich multi-step user interfaces is considerably more challenging than scanning a basic HTML page. There are two general approaches to this problem:

1. Parse the HTML and emulate a browser. This is fast, however, it comes at the cost of missing site actions that require a full DOM or complex JavaScript operations.
2. Use a real browser. This approach avoids the parser coverage gap and most closely simulates the site experience. However, it can be slow due to event firing, dynamic execution, and time needed for the DOM to settle.

Cloud Security Scanner addresses the weaknesses of both approaches by using a multi-stage pipeline. First, the scanner makes a high speed pass, crawling, and parsing the HTML. It then executes a slow and thorough full-page render to find the more complex sections of your site.

While faster than a real browser crawl, this process is still too slow. So we scale horizontally. Using Google Compute Engine, we dynamically create a botnet of hundreds of virtual Chrome workers to scan your site. Don’t worry, each scan is limited to 20 requests per second or lower.

Then we attack your site (again, don’t worry)! When testing for XSS, we use a completely benign payload that relies on Chrome DevTools to execute the debugger. Once the debugger fires, we know we have JavaScript code execution, so false positives are (almost) non-existent. While this approach comes at the cost of missing some bugs due to application specifics, we think that most developers will appreciate a low effort, low noise experience when checking for security issues—we know Google developers do!

As with all dynamic vulnerability scanners, a clean scan does not necessarily mean you’re security bug free. We still recommend a manual security review by your friendly web app security professional.

Ready to get started? Learn more here. Cloud Security Scanner is currently in beta with many more features to come, and we’d love to hear your feedback. Simply click the “Feedback” button directly within the tool.

Posted by Chris Evans and Ben Hawkes, Project Zero; Heather Adkins, Matt Moore and Michal Zalewski, Google Security; Gerhard Eschelbeck, Vice President, Google Security

Cross-posted from the Project Zero blog

Disclosure deadlines have long been an industry standard practice. They improve end-user security by getting security patches to users faster. As noted in CERT’s 45-day disclosure policy, they also “balance the need of the public to be informed of security vulnerabilities with vendors' need for time to respond effectively”. Yahoo!’s 90-day policy notes that “Time is of the essence when we discover these types of issues: the more quickly we address the risks, the less harm an attack can cause”. ZDI’s 120-day policy notes that releasing vulnerability details can “enable the defensive community to protect the user”.

Deadlines also acknowledge an uncomfortable fact that is alluded to by some of the above policies: the offensive security community invests considerably more into vulnerability research than the defensive community. Therefore, when we find a vulnerability in a high profile target, it is often already known by advanced and stealthy actors.

Project Zero has adhered to a 90-day disclosure deadline. Now we are applying this approach for the rest of Google as well. We notify vendors of vulnerabilities immediately, with details shared in public with the defensive community after 90 days, or sooner if the vendor releases a fix. We’ve chosen a middle-of-the-road deadline timeline and feel it’s reasonably calibrated for the current state of the industry.

To see how things are going, we crunched some data on Project Zero’s disclosures to date. For example, the Adobe Flash team probably has the largest install base and number of build combinations of any of the products we’ve researched so far. To date, they have fixed 37 Project Zero vulnerabilities (or 100%) within the 90-day deadline. More generally, of 154 Project Zero bugs fixed so far, 85% were fixed within 90 days. Restrict this to the 73 issues filed and fixed after Oct 1st, 2014, and 95% were fixed within 90 days. Furthermore, recent well-discussed deadline misses were typically fixed very quickly after 90 days. Looking ahead, we’re not going to have any deadline misses for at least the rest of February.

Deadlines appear to be working to improve patch times and end user security—especially when enforced consistently.

We’ve studied the above data and taken on board some great debate and external feedback around some of the corner cases for disclosure deadlines. We have improved the policy in the following ways:

• Weekends and holidays. If a deadline is due to expire on a weekend or US public holiday, the deadline will be moved to the next normal work day. 
• Grace period. We now have a 14-day grace period. If a 90-day deadline will expire but a vendor lets us know before the deadline that a patch is scheduled for release on a specific day within 14 days following the deadline, the public disclosure will be delayed until the availability of the patch. Public disclosure of an unpatched issue now only occurs if a deadline will be significantly missed (2 weeks+). 
• Assignment of CVEs. CVEs are an industry standard for uniquely identifying vulnerabilities. To avoid confusion, it’s important that the first public mention of a vulnerability should include a CVE. For vulnerabilities that go past deadline, we’ll ensure that a CVE has been pre-assigned. 

As always, we reserve the right to bring deadlines forwards or backwards based on extreme circumstances. We remain committed to treating all vendors strictly equally. Google expects to be held to the same standard; in fact, Project Zero has bugs in the pipeline for Google products (Chrome and Android) and these are subject to the same deadline policy.

Putting everything together, we believe the policy updates are still strongly in line with our desire to improve industry response times to security bugs, but will result in softer landings for bugs marginally over deadline. Finally, we’d like to call on all researchers to adopt disclosure deadlines in some form, and feel free to use our policy verbatim if you find our data and reasoning compelling. We’re excited by the early results that disclosure deadlines are delivering—and with the help of the broader community, we can achieve even more.